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Abstract
Blight has plagued Philadelphia for the better part of a century, though the understanding 
of blight has changed dramatically over time.  Originally used to describe neighborhood 
overcrowding, the term retained its currency even as once-overcrowded neighborhoods 
emptied out in the decades after World War II.  The agenda of eradicating blight in its various 
forms has driven successive waves of redevelopment policy since the 1940s, and yet the 
problem persists to an astonishing degree in neighborhoods throughout the City. 
The “image” as a transformative planning tool is another concept with sustained significance 
in Philadelphia.  This thesis defines an image as the vehicle for communicating a compelling 
idea about urban form that shapes broader understandings of place, and that serves as a 
catalyst of, and a framework for, individual and collective action.  The importance of an image 
is best captured in longtime Director of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission (1949-
70) Edmund Bacon’s declaration that “it is the image, not the planner, which has the power.” 
Admittedly a slippery concept, the presence or absence of a strong image has consistently 
circumscribed the public reception and subsequent implementation of Philadelphia’s 
redevelopment strategies.  
This thesis is an examination of Philadelphia’s recent history of redevelopment through the 
dual lenses of blight and image. Noting a repeated vacillation between neighborhood-scaled 
design strategies and abstracted citywide analysis in the mid- and late-twentieth century, it 
posits the need for a flexible image, conceived at an intermediate scale.  
Thesis Committee
Supervisor: Brent D. Ryan
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Design & Public Policy
Reader: Anne Whiston Spirn
Title: Professor of Landscape Architecture & Planning
Reader: Lawrence Vale
Title: Ford Professor of Urban Design & Planning
4
5I would like to first thank Brent Ryan for his guidance on this project and throughout my two 
years at MIT.  His perspicacity and scholarship are a constant source of inspiration.  Thank you 
also to my readers, Anne Spirn and Larry Vale, for sharing their inimitable expertise with me 
over the last several months.
Thank you to the many men and women who were willing to sit for interviews.  Their candor 
and insightfulness were immensely helpful in my attempt to build a meaningful narrative. 
Thank you to John Kromer for taking me on an enlightening three-hour tour of Philadelphia 
last summer, and for multiple instructive interviews.  A special thank you John Carpenter 
at the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority for bringing me on as an intern in January, for 
welcoming my involvement in the City’s vacant land disposition policymaking process, and for 
our many wide-ranging conversations.  
Thank you to MIT’s Department of Urban Studies & Planning and to the Public Service Center 
for supporting my work with a pair of research grants.  Thank you to the staff at MIT’s Rotch 
Library, and to Brenda Galloway-Wright at Temple University’s Urban Archives for her invaluable 
assistance locating a wealth of obscure archival material.
Finally, thank you to Maggie, my soon-to-be wife, for her patience and support, to my family for 
providing a much-needed refuge, and to my classmates for keeping this experience enjoyable.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
6
7TABLE of CONTENTS
00: Intro - Philadelphia as Case ...............................................................
 Defining Blight
 Defining Image
 Thesis Structure
 Table 00.1: Image Matrix
01: Mid-Century Blight and “The Philadelphia Cure”...............
 The Groundwork for Postwar Planning
 The Urban Redevelopment Era
 Blight as Moving Target: Urban Renewal
 The End of Urban Renewal
02: The Crisis of Abandonment ............................................................
 Decades of Decline
 Frank Rizzo’s Blind Eye
 Fighting Blight in the 1990s
 John Kromer’s Inner-City Suburbs
 Adaptation Through Stabilization
03: The Challenges of Transformation .............................................
 A Return to the Neighborhoods
 Market Value Analysis
 Early Hurdles
 NTI Implementation
 The Legacy of NTI
04: Philadelphia’s New Toolkit ..............................................................
 Renewed Stability
 Blight Revisited
 Vacant Land Disposition Policy
 Code Enforcement
 Land Banking
 Philadelphia Plans Again
05: Conclusion - A Flexible Image .....................................................
 Trap of the Tabula Rasa
 Theories of Flexibility
 The Tools of Flexibility
 West Philadelphia Landscape Plan
 Philadelphia’s Next Image
Appendix A: List of Interviewees ..............................................................................................
Appendix B: Research .......................................................................................................................
Works Cited ............................................................................................................................................
PAGE #
9
11
14
17
19
21
28
32
44
54
57
59
63
64
66
72
79
80
83
90
93
96
99
101
103
105
109
110
111
117
119
120
124
128
131
135
137
139
8
9I spent the summer of 2011 working for the Philadelphia City Planning 
Commission.  During this time I had occasion to traverse much of the City by 
foot, by bicycle, and by car.  For a student of planning and design, Philadelphia 
is a truly enriching environment: the characteristic gridiron and the consistent 
rowhouse fabric endow the City with a natural rhythm and a comfortable, 
pedestrian scale.  This grid-and-rowhouse formula hearkens back to William 
Penn’s late-seventeenth century plan for Philadelphia, serving as a constant, 
tangible reminder of both the power of urban design and the persistence of city 
form. (Figure 00.1) 
 Philadelphia’s story is a complex one.  Despite the rational layout of 
its streets, the City is big, poor, and in a constant state of flux.  Its current 
population of 1.5 million makes it the fifth largest city in the country, yet this 
number is actually 600,000 less than the midcentury peak of over two million. 
And while the latest US Census data indicated that for the first time in fifty 
years, Philadelphia is gaining population (approximately 8,500 residents), this 
does not indicate that the City has necessarily reached a decisive inflection 
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INTRO - PHILADELPHIA as CASE
Figure 00.1: William Penn’s seventeenth century gridiron design for Philadelphia laid the groundwork for over 
three centuries of development and expansion (Source: Haverford Special Collections)
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point, nor does it suggest uniform stabilization.  Certain neighborhoods have 
experienced an influx of Hispanic and Southeast Asian immigrants, and others, 
like Northern Liberties, have rapidly gentrified in recent years.  Meanwhile, 
many neighborhoods have continued to shrink, communicating contradictory 
messages of growth and decline.
 The consequences of this shrinkage are easy to miss if you remain 
within the bustling narrow band that includes Center City and the University 
District in West Philadelphia. Venture mere blocks from these strong healthy 
neighborhoods, and the predictable relationship between built and unbuilt 
space breaks down.  Once continuous streetscapes are marred by Philadelphia’s 
“missing teeth,” crumbling, abandoned rowhomes and dilapidated factory 
buildings whose erstwhile resplendence shows through the patina of decay 
(Figures 00.2-00.7).  
 That said, there are other, more positive indicators of change over time 
in Philadelphia’s neighborhoods.  These creative adaptations of the city fabric 
occur at a range of scales and at the hands of a range of actors – from the 
artistically-minded neighborhood resident who transforms a vacant lot into an 
urban oasis, to professionally “stabilized” lots, to innovative developers who use 
the homogeneity of Philadelphia’s fabric to offset contemporary infill solutions, 
to the transplanting of acontextual suburban housing into the midst of the most 
depopulated, poverty-stricken neighborhoods in the City (Figures 00.8-00.13). 
All of these adaptations and aberrations have a story to tell:  
Housing, especially in the neighborhood context, represents an image 
of the city’s past patterns of development and opportunity.  It bears the 
imprint of households and their incomes and customs, stages of rapid 
growth and speculative expansion, and most often today, the differential 
effects of neighborhoods revitalized as against those forgotten.  It is, 
in short, a dynamic sculpture of the city’s historical patterns of growth, 
capturing moments of change in the destruction, the creation, and the 
adaptation of housing to social and economic shifts across the urban 
landscape. (Adams et al, 67)
Philadelphia’s pluralistic landscape humanizes decades of decline and 
represents a point of entry into a discussion of the past, present, and future 
role of planning in Philadelphia, and in shrinking cities generally.  
 This viewpoint presupposes, of course, that there is a future role for 
planning in Philadelphia – by no means a foregone conclusion.  As many have 
and will continue to point out, in shrinking, postindustrial, Rust Belt cities, 
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there are issues that seem to dwarf planning and design.  What about jobs? 
Or the sorry state of public education?  Or globalization?  Or the possibility 
that few want to live in these gritty cities – Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, 
Buffalo, etc. – anymore?   These are all valid, pressing concerns which merit 
examination, yet their merit does not obviate planning altogether.  Brent Ryan’s 
notion of “palliative planning,” as described in the 2012 publication, Design 
After Decline, provides a forceful answer to the aforementioned skepticism: 
None of these trends were within the control of [planners in the past] 
and none will be under their control in the future, whatever that future 
may bring.  This reality is sobering, but it does not call for passivity, 
acquiescence, or surrender to the inevitable…Whether or not people 
should logically remain in shrinking cities, many will, for people’s lives 
do not operate according to wholly rational standards…Municipal policy 
makers should recognize their responsibility to carry out palliative 
planning that makes the lives of their constituents better, even if those 
constituents are slowly diminishing in number. (Ryan 2012, 204-05)
This idea of palliation is particularly resonant in Philadelphia’s often unforgiving 
urban environment.
DEFINING BLIGHT
Throughout my thesis, I will refer time and again to the interplay of a pair of 
somewhat slippery concepts: “Blight” and “Image.”  Borrowed from agricultural 
terminology, blight is technically defined as anything that inhibits growth.  Over 
the last century, however, blight has meant many things to many people, its 
mutable nature imbuing it with ongoing significance (indeed, an alternate title 
to this thesis might have been “Blight Has The Power”).  
 A conceptual cousin to the “slum,” blight was coined in an urban context 
in the late nineteenth century, as housing reformers became increasingly 
concerned with the living conditions of urban, working class men, women, 
and children.  The often-inconsistent distinction between blight and slums 
is thoroughly documented in Robert Fogelson’s Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 
1880-1950 (2003).  As Fogelson notes, “blight” and “slum” are often used 
interchangeably, though I believe the two necessitate consideration as distinct 
interpretations of the same phenomenon, and I intentionally use only the 
former.  “Slum” has generally carried social, moralistic, often racially tinged 
connotations.  Whether veiled in euphemism or made explicit, the implication 
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Figure 00.2: A group of four boarded-up rowhouses 
(Photo © the author)
Figure 00.3: A rowhouse propped up to prevent 
collapse (Photo © the author)
Figure 00.7: An overgrown corner lot (Photo © the 
author)
Figure 00.5: A “missing tooth” between two 
occupied rowhouses (Photo © the author)
Figure 00.6: An overgrown corner lot (Photo © the 
author)
Figure 00.4: A cleared block in North Philadelphia 
(Photo © the author)
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Figure 00.8: A lot “stabilized” by the Philadelphia 
Horticultural Society (Photo © the author)
Figure 00.9: Another PHS lot (Photo © the author)
Figure 00.13: Interface Architects’ Sheridan Street 
Housing for local CDC APM (Photo © the author)
Figure 00.11: A suburban streetscape in the shadow 
of downtown Philadelphia (Photo © the author)
Figure 00.12: A “missing tooth” transformed into a 
private garden (Photo © the author)
Figure 00.10: Creative infill in North Philadelphia 
(Photo © the author)
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was that “slum dwellers” are somehow responsible for the degraded state of 
their surroundings.  I interpret blight, on the other hand, as a subjective yet 
agnostic signifier of physical and economic obsolescence – a reflection of the 
built environment not meeting the needs of a city’s residents.  Significantly, the 
blame in this case is shifted to the environment itself rather than to those who 
inhabit it.  
 As mentioned above, arguably the most interesting characteristic of blight 
is its conceptual elasticity.  Each chapter of this thesis explicates Philadelphia’s 
shifting identification and understanding of the blight in its midst.  Defined by one 
of Philadelphia’s bureaucrats in 1918 as “a district which is not what it should 
be,” blight has always carried this you-know-it-when-you-see-it quality.  Yet the 
picture of such a district has changed dramatically over the years.  For much 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, blight evoked conditions not 
unlike those captured by Jacob Riis in How the Other Half Lives (1890).  Drawn 
by the promise of employment in Philadelphia’s factories, European immigrants 
and eventually southern Blacks flooded the City, only to end up crowded into 
apartments carved out of subdivided rowhouses.  As overcrowding worsened and 
landlord maintenance ceased, cries of “blight” became increasingly strident.  In 
the decades after World War II, regional and national trends of suburbanization 
and deindustrialization ushered in a protracted period of population loss. 
Departing middle class, largely White families left thousands of unoccupied, 
nearly valueless rowhouses populating once-dense “inner-city” neighborhoods. 
In these areas, “blight” would come to signify neglect and abandonment.  Over 
the course of the twentieth century, therefore, the fundamental conception of 
blight changed from a byproduct of growth to a byword for decline. 
 Though blight had been a concern of housing advocates and downtown 
business interests for decades, the City’s fight against blight began in earnest 
in 1949.  That was the year when visionary architect and designer Edmund 
Bacon was appointed head of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission.  That 
same year the Federal Housing Act was passed by President Truman, providing 
large sums of federal money for “slum clearance.”  This fight continues 
today, as evidenced by former Mayor John Street’s expressly “anti-blight” 
Neighborhood Transformation Initiative, introduced in 2001.  Furthermore, 
“blight certification” by the Planning Commission remains the first step in 
Philadelphia’s redevelopment process. 
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DEFINING IMAGE
However subjectively determined, blight refers in all cases to physical 
characteristics of the built environment.  The second object of inquiry on the 
other hand – the “image” – is somewhat less concrete. 
 Kevin Lynch, one of the towering figures in the history of MIT’s Department 
of Urban Studies & Planning, is generally credited with the urban application of 
the concept of “image” in his seminal work, The Image of the City (1960).  Lynch 
provides the following description of an “image”:
Moving elements in a city, and in particular the people and their activities, 
are as important as the stationary physical parts.  We are not simply 
observers of this spectacle, but are ourselves a part of it, on the stage 
with the other participants…Nearly every sense is in operation, and the 
image is the composite of them all. (Lynch, 2) 
Lynch’s “image” is therefore both perceptive and participatory.  Lynch grounds 
his poetic characterization of the image by breaking the concept into five 
constituent elements – “paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks” – all 
of which contribute to the legibility or “imageability” of the built environment 
(Lynch, 46).  Lynch’s “image” is therefore concerned with the design of space, 
but only insofar as that design supports the engagement of people and place.
 In the Philadelphia City Planning Commission’s publication Issues of the 
1980s (1980), a section entitled “The Image of the City” echoes Lynch’s ideas 
about perception and subjectivity, while emphasizing the existence of multiple, 
overlapping images:
The image of a city is complex and multi-faceted.  To the neighborhood 
resident it is all the diverse elements and local associations that tend 
to make a place special and separate within the overall city.  To the 
businessman it is the aura of progress, expansion, of good maintenance, 
and a sense of order.  To the tourist it is the ease and accessibility which 
enables one to clearly, pleasantly, and easily negotiate one’s way around 
a lively, stimulating environment…To the urban designer it is a means to 
structure and coordinate the component parts of a city. (PCPC 1980, 39)
 Edmund Bacon, the articulate, bombastic Director of the Philadelphia 
City Planning Commission from 1949-1970, proffered a third perspective. 
Though often grouped with postwar power brokers like Robert Moses in New 
York and Edward Logue in Boston and New Haven, Bacon had neither their 
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financial resources nor their political clout.  What he did have, however, was his 
belief in the power of a strong image.  In 1989, reminiscing about his much-
lauded career, Bacon cryptically, almost humbly, mused:
Without the image, it just wouldn’t have happened.  Surely, as we are 
seeing now, it will continue its influence far into the future.  My method 
frequently is interpreted as requiring the planner to be arrogant and 
overbearing.  Yet it is the image, not the planner which has the power.  
For this to work, the planner must be able to create the image in the first 
place, and must trust the image to achieve its own fulfillment. (Strong 
and Thomas, 156)
As an early proponent of urban design, Bacon presided over some of the urban 
renewal era’s most inspired redevelopment efforts, promulgating a very specific 
“image” of Philadelphia’s blighted rowhouse neighborhoods transformed into 
dynamic, pedestrian-oriented urban environments.   
 These distinct and yet overlapping characterizations of an image all 
support Bacon’s assertion that “the image…has the power,” yet the shades of 
difference preclude a truly normative definition.  All characterizations suggest 
the possibility of a collective understanding of the present and the importance 
of an aspirational vision of the future.  In the context of city planning, an image 
is therefore a compelling idea about city form. Such an idea informs broader 
understandings of place and has the power to inspire individual, incremental 
actions – whether at the hands of neighborhood residents or private developers. 
Given this idea of the image as a design framework to guide the process of 
city building, I believe a true image must be a product of public planning and 
must be sufficiently adaptive and responsive to change.  As historian Eugenie 
Birch remarked in her examination of the role of the image in the South Bronx, 
“images develop incrementally: When one image seemingly dominates, it is 
already in a state of change” (Birch, 61).  
 It is important to note that the absence of an image can be an image 
unto itself.  In areas of market failure, neglect begets further neglect, yielding a 
collective vision of intractable decline.  In blighted neighborhoods, a powerful, 
yet flexible image must therefore act as a corrective for what are in many cases 
decades of disinvestment.  
 My thesis is in essence an attempt to understand the role of the image 
in Philadelphia’s redevelopment policy with respect to blight.  I trace the role 
of the image in plans and policies put forth over time, and distill lessons that 
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must inform the City’s fight against blight in the decades ahead.  In Table 00.1 
at the end of this chapter I outline the range of actors, timeframes, scales, and 
strategies under investigation, suggesting the image (or lack thereof) at work. 
And in an attempt to draw parallels between strategies without being overly 
reductive, I frame those strategies in terms of a pair of dichotomies: design / 
data-driven and adaptation / rejection of urban fabric.  The former identifies the 
strategic point of departure.  The latter identifies whether the substance of the 
strategy in question acknowledges the value in Philadelphia’s neighborhood 
fabric and seeks to adapt that fabric to new circumstances, or whether it rejects 
what exists in favor of something wholly different. 
THESIS STRUCTURE
In the first chapter of this thesis I explore the emergence of a blight discourse in 
Philadelphia in the early- to mid-twentieth century, drawing heavily on primary 
source material unearthed in Temple University’s Urban Archive.  I trace the 
causes and effects of neighborhood overcrowding, early fears of a “suburban 
exodus,” and identify the dominant planning paradigm underlying the proposed 
“solutions.”  I also look at the innovative, utopian postwar and early renewal-era 
attempts on the part of Edmund Bacon, Oskar Stonorov, and Louis Kahn to craft 
a modern image of the city built upon neighborhood-scaled, design-oriented 
revitalization plans, and at the development outcomes resulting from the 
transposition of their image to actual sites.  I explore the failure of these efforts 
to successfully catalyze neighborhood transformation, which called the viability 
of this image into question.  The result of this failure was the development of 
a reactive, image-less triage policy that deliberately abandoned Philadelphia’s 
“most blighted” blocks in favor of active code enforcement in Philadelphia’s 
“conservable” areas.
 In the second chapter I note the coincidence of the end of the renewal 
era and the election of Frank Rizzo as mayor, both of which initiated an unofficial 
twenty-year moratorium on thoughtful, large-scale planning in Philadelphia 
– described by Brent Ryan as a “planning hiatus”; this despite the fact that 
Philadelphia lost over 250,000 residents in the 1970s.  I describe how, without 
a positive, aspirational image in place, a de facto image of decline took hold. 
I then look at the reemergence of blight strategies in the 1990s.  I posit John 
Kromer’s work in North Philadelphia as Director of the Office of Housing and 
18
Community Development, and the lot stabilization program of the Pennsylvania 
Horticultural Society as updated, albeit incomplete attempts to create opposing 
images for Philadelphia’s high vacancy, blighted areas.
 The third chapter examines Mayor John Street’s Neighborhood 
Transformation Initiative at length, identifying the many successes and missed 
opportunities that resulted from a $300 million policy billed specifically as an 
“anti-blight” plan.  In this chapter, I draw heavily on the extensive press coverage 
of the NTI rollout in April 2001, and on the subsequent implementation hurdles 
faced, found in the pages of the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Philadelphia Daily 
News.  I also draw on a number of personal interviews, conducted in late 2011 
and early 2012 (see Appendix A for full list), with men and women intimately 
involved in NTI policy formulation.  By ignoring the lessons of the urban renewal 
era, I argue, NTI was set into motion without an image.  The result was confusion 
and fear amongst the general public, and intransigent resistance from powerful 
City Councilmembers.
 In chapter four I bring planning in Philadelphia up to date.  I describe 
the revival of planning under current mayor Michael Nutter and a host of newly 
acquired regulatory and enforcement tools that hold promise for the City’s ongoing 
fight against blight.  I identify the recently initiated district planning process, 
rolled out as a supplement to the new “citywide vision” – Philadelphia2035 – 
as a compelling vehicle for the development and dissemination of a new image 
for Philadelphia’s high vacancy neighborhoods. 
 In the final chapter I delve into current shrinking cities theory, exploring 
the relationship of the tabula rasa, “everyday urbanism” and “tactical urbanism” 
to the current challenges and opportunities represented by Philadelphia’s 
variegated built environment.  I close by positing the need for an image that 
is above all, adaptive, suggesting the resuscitation of Anne Spirn’s 1991 West 
Philadelphia Landscape Plan as a model for an “improvisational framework” 
that can take advantage of the City’s newfound planning capacity and regulatory 
toolkit. 
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An industrial city at the intersection of several railroad lines and bracketed by 
the Schuylkill and Delaware Rivers, Philadelphia’s strategic location supported 
a broad manufacturing base.  Ready access to factory jobs fueled explosive 
population growth through the early decades of the 20th century.  Between 1890 
and 1930, the population nearly doubled from just over one million to almost 
two million, cementing its place as the country’s third largest city (New York and 
Chicago were first and second, respectively).  This consistent growth generated 
considerable wealth for Philadelphia’s well-established aristocracy and for real 
estate speculators well positioned to cash in on the thousands of immigrants 
flooding into the City.  Housing was in high demand, and Philadelphia’s narrow, 
single-family rowhouses were soon overcrowded, even as the City’s orthogonal 
gridiron expanded ever outward.  
 It was a dynamic time; one in which the public sector, in part to combat 
speculation, would take an increasingly prominent role in shaping and reshaping 
the built environment in pursuit of a modern, industrial metropolis.   Through 
early urban planning and design, Philadelphia’s planners sought to burnish the 
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MID-CENTURY BLIGHT and 
“THE PHILADELPHIA CURE”
Figure 01.1: Louis Kahn’s design for West Poplar depicting the integration of Modernist forms into the existing 
physical and social fabric of West Philadelphia (Source: Architectural Forum, April 1952)
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City’s international reputation.
 Philadelphia’s turn-of-the-century 
economic preeminence called for a 
commensurately beautiful city, inspiring 
new architectural forms and urban 
expressions of civic pride.  Philadelphia’s 
City Hall, for instance, completed in 
1901 after a protracted thirty years of 
construction and $24 million, had the 
dual distinctions of being the world’s 
most expensive municipal building as 
well as the world’s tallest habitable 
building (Figure 01.2).  Goaded by the 
boldness of Chicago’s World Columbian 
Exhibition in 1893, a groundswell of 
enthusiasm mounted for what would 
become Fairmount Parkway (Figure 
01.3).  Functionally, Fairmount Parkway 
was intended to connect the new City Hall 
with Fairmount Park.  Psychologically, 
however, the grand, tree-lined boulevard 
modeled after Paris’s Champs-Elysees 
was meant to formally reinstate 
Philadelphia “in the beginning of 
the second century of our republic 
as she was at the commencement 
of the first—the metropolis of the 
western hemisphere” (Vitiello, 
413).  The required clearance 
of thousands of workers’ homes 
along with several factory buildings 
cost the City $25 million, and thus 
represents one of the largest, most 
expensive proto-urban renewal 
undertakings of the time (Adams et 
al, 101).
Figure 01.2: Philadelphia City Hall 
(Photo © the author)
Figure 01.3: Paul Cret’s early twentieth century plan for 
Fairmount Parkway (Source: City of Philadelphia)
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 These expensive public works projects were also motivated by an 
obsession with addressing the increasingly overcrowded neighborhoods that 
were an unsavory byproduct of Philadelphia’s prosperity.  This Industrial Age 
crisis was popularized by Jacob Riis’s late-nineteenth century study of New York’s 
“slums” in How the Other Half Lives (Figure 01.4).  The conditions captured 
by Riis’s evocative photojournalism closely resembled those in Philadelphia’s 
increasingly congested working-class neighborhoods, such as those cleared 
for Fairmount Parkway. As a contemporary Department of Public Works report 
indicated, the proposed Parkway would “enhance the value of property which is 
now stationary or declining, would aid in the elimination of slum districts, and 
would add a feature of great distinction and usefulness to the city” (Vitiello, 
415).  The unnamed author’s framing of Fairmount Parkway as an economic, 
physical, social, and political panacea would become the conventional litany 
used to justify “slum clearance” or “blight removal.”
 The clearance undertaken to make way for the Fairmount Parkway 
was unprecedented in scale, yet City-initiated demolition was becoming an 
increasingly familiar occurrence in dense, working-class neighborhoods 
throughout Philadelphia.  In a 1925 study by the Philadelphia Housing 
Association, Know Your City: Demolition of Dwellings in Philadelphia, the 
author describes the clearance of over 900 residential structures - the majority 
of which were still, at that point, structurally sound - “to make way for public 
improvements” (PHA 1925, 4).  The author rightly identifies the bitter irony 
Figure 01.4: One of Jacob Riis’s iconic photographs of New York’s 
turn-of-the-century “slums” (Source: Riis, How the Other Half Lives)
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in the demolition of habitable dwellings for “public improvements,” for “it is 
a well-known fact that in congested districts, families, as a rule, seek new 
accommodations in their same neighborhood… notwithstanding a decreasing 
population in these areas there has been an increase in the average number 
of persons per house” (PHA 1925, 4).  Clearance not only failed to alleviate the 
problem of “congested districts,” it exacerbated them.  In a final critique, the 
author documents the poor coordination of demolition and subsequent public 
improvements that “drove families out of houses in many cases weeks and 
months before the city was ready to go ahead with the new use” (PHA 1925, 5). 
This critique would become a well-worn refrain in the coming decades, as the 
premature evictions would stretch from weeks and months to years.
 Know Your City’s findings are a useful indicator of how Philadelphia’s 
public officials and early planners perceived the state of the City, and what level 
of intervention was deemed appropriate.  The problems of the time were primarily 
neighborhood overcrowding and the “obsolescence” of the City’s housing stock, 
but these problems were isolated to working-class neighborhoods and readily 
fixed through the public construction of community infrastructure. That said, 
given the growing population (Philadelphia’s population went from 1.5 million 
in 1910 to almost two million in 1930) and loss of habitable dwelling units due 
to demolition, middle- and working-class housing provision was fast becoming 
a major concern.  The Richard Allen Homes, built in North Philadelphia in the 
late 1930’s, for instance, was among the first of Philadelphia’s federally-funded 
housing projects.  The multi-unit, low-rise development introduced a Modernist 
vocabulary into one of Philadelphia’s most blighted neighborhoods. (Figure 01.5)
 The City’s increasingly heavy hand was a reflection of New Deal-era 
progressivism – though Philadelphia’s notorious Republican machine effectively 
blocked many public works projects – but it was also an attempt to make sense 
of the interplay of a panoply of complex forces across the City (Hillier 2003a, 
11).  Within the urban core, real estate speculation created unprecedentedly 
high “imaginative land values,” giving rise to a class of “slumlords.”  These 
individuals were willing and able to extract considerable value from their property 
by crowding the working poor into formerly single-family rowhouses (B. Newman, 
11).  These practices profoundly impacted Philadelphia’s burgeoning Black 
population.  For this was the era of the “Great Migration,” when over 1.5 million 
southern Blacks, displaced by the mechanization of agriculture and fleeing 
the Jim Crow South, moved to northern industrial cities.  Few housing options, 
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beyond those segregated neighborhoods that were already overcrowded and 
eventually housing projects built specifically for Black residents, were available 
to Philadelphia’s almost 150,000 new Black residents who came between 
1910 (84,000) and 1930 (220,000).
 This speculation, exploitation, and discrimination was supported by 
fundamental changes to the structuring of home financing, and by the practice 
of “redlining,” in which private lenders would consistently avoid certain 
neighborhoods based primarily on the perceived correlation between racial 
composition and investment “risk.”  University of Pennsylvania professor Amy 
Hillier captures the systemic nature of discriminatory lending at the time: 
During the 1930s, real estate agents, appraisers, and lenders all 
became obsessed with neighborhood risk ratings, in part because 
they blamed poor real estate appraisal methods for their Depression 
Figure 01.5: A 1971 view of the Modernist Richard Allen Homes, built for working-class families in North 
Philadelphia after considerable clearance was undertaken (Photo © Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives)
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losses and in part because they adopted the long-term mortgage as the 
standard.  With the short-term mortgages common through the 1920s 
and early 1930s, lenders had little concern for real estate trends in 
neighborhoods they serviced.  But the long-term self-amortizing loans 
that HOLC (fifteen-year) and [the Federal Housing Administration] (thirty-
year) instituted made lenders much more eager to consider the long-
term prospect of their investments (Hillier 2003, 414).
The federally-funded Home Owners’ Loan Corporation’s (HOLC) “Residential 
Security Maps,” published in the mid-1930s, illustrate these practices with 
remarkable candor.  According to the 1937 map, for instance, all of Lower 
North Philadelphia was declared “Hazardous” for investors (Figure 01.6).  An 
accompanying report noted, “from a residential standpoint this is the ‘blighted’ 
area of the city.  Houses are old and obsolete, with a high percentage unfit 
for use…The population is a mixture of Negro, Italian, Polish, and Jewish of 
low class…It has no prospects except the possible slow replacement by 
business and industry” (HOLC). Professor Hillier’s research challenges the 
conventional wisdom, first reported by Kenneth Jackson in Crabgrass Frontier, 
that the nefarious maps were the cause of redlining, instead asserting that the 
documents were a formalized representation of longstanding lending practices. 
 As the City’s working-class, increasingly Black population crowded into 
the urban core, Philadelphia’s affluent and more mobile White residents spread 
outward.  New neighborhoods were springing up along the urban periphery, 
leading to what the editors of the Philadelphia Record identified as “a great 
exodus from city to suburbs” as early as 1928 (Beauregard, 80).
 The escalation of these trends in the 1930s led to evermore ambitious, 
demolition-oriented efforts to eradicate blight and to modernize Philadelphia’s 
neighborhoods.  Many argued that blight removal was critical to the continued 
viability of the City, though there were powerful voices of dissent.  Bernard 
Newman, head of the Philadelphia Housing Association, an established 
advocacy group, cautioned his colleagues against an overreliance on built 
solutions to the spread of urban blight in a 1936 address to the Conference of 
the Pennsylvania Association of Planning Commissioners: 
I feel compelled to say that I am not unsympathetic toward the movement 
to stimulate a large construction program…But I do not want you to 
believe that such a program is all that is necessary in order to carry on 
this rehabilitation [of our blighted districts].  I will even predict the future 
holds no prospect of escape from blighted areas [sic].  [These] areas 
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Figure 01.6: Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, 1937 Residential Security Map.  Red represents “hazardous” 
district, yellow is “declining,” blue is “still desirable,” and green is “best” (Source: National Archives Records of 
the City Survey Program)
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are not fixed entities.  They are variables with diverse and changing 
characteristics; they do not lend themselves to a simple process of 
rehabilitation nor to standardized treatment (B. Newman, 4-5).
Newman elaborated on this plea for restraint with a final prescient warning: 
“while we may substitute something temporarily better we may also be laying 
the foundation for the recurrence of similar or worse conditions, or we may be 
perpetuating bad conditions long beyond the period that should be required for 
their normal removal” (B. Newman, 12).
 By the end of the 1930’s, Philadelphia was in the early stages of a 
major transformation.  Though still an industrial powerhouse, Philadelphia was 
struggling to come to terms with the citywide incidence of blight, operating under 
the assumption that physical interventions – demolition of obsolete buildings 
and the construction of new infrastructure, public housing, and community 
facilities – would prove a panacea.  These characterizations of Philadelphia are 
critical to an understanding of how the City’s planners and policymakers, with 
the exception of critics like Newman, viewed their own built environment, and of 
how they would go about formulating a cogent response in the years ahead.  
THE GROUNDWORK for POSTWAR PLANNING
It is not surprising, given Philadelphia’s emphasis on using physical planning 
to fight blight, that the architects of Philadelphia’s postwar strategy were 
themselves, architects.  The three leading voices of the time, Oskar Stonorov, 
Louis Kahn, and Edmund Bacon, were all visionary, socially-minded Modernists 
whose enthusiasm for city design was tempered by their respect for the integrity 
of Philadelphia’s urban fabric.  Their collective image was thus of neighborhoods 
revitalized through the implementation of innovative design principles that 
adapted what already existed to meet new needs.  Likewise, they shared the 
belief that Philadelphians deserved a voice in their future, advocating for 
direct community engagement. And while the reification of this image would 
not begin until the end of the decade, the early 1940s was a time in which 
a fertile discourse would build the public’s appetite for city planning and lay 
the groundwork for the City’s response to increasingly strident signals of urban 
decline.  
 In 1942, Mayor Bernard Samuel (incidentally Philadelphia’s last 
Republican mayor) and the City Council, under pressure from prominent 
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Philadelphia aristocrat Edward Hopkinson Jr., created the Philadelphia City 
Planning Commission (PCPC), naming Hopkinson as Chairman.  Shortly after 
the creation of the Planning Commission, Louis Kahn and Oskar Stonorov 
penned a remarkable, if rather didactic, pamphlet, Why City Planning Is Your 
Responsibility, as a way of introducing the new agency to the public.   Though 
Kahn and Stonorov were not on the Planning Commission, they concisely 
articulated the play of perceived forces acting on the City, and defined the 
contours of a set of design-oriented strategies for combating blight and decline. 
 Why City Planning opens with a call to action, and an exhortation to 
Philadelphians to transcend the parochial impulses inherent in a “city of 
neighborhoods”: “City planning concerns YOU and YOUR neighborhood – and 
also the fellow that lives a little bit further away from your immediate vicinity.” 
Wielding the second person, the authors underscore the significance of citizen 
participation with dystopian imagery that seems to invoke the atrocities being 
perpetrated across the ocean at that time.  Shirking one’s responsibility, the 
authors contend, means “resign[ing] yourself to the role of being just a statistical 
item on a punch card…just another citizen among millions that somewhere 
along the line must be counted” (Kahn, 1).  
 With that sobering preface, Kahn and Stonorov identify impending 
changes on the horizon, echoing admonitions of a “great suburban exodus” while 
pragmatically arguing for Philadelphia’s indispensability: “Not all people will be 
able to move into new houses after the war or into new-planned communities. 
Certainly there will be a definite exodus from the densely-populated areas of 
our cities.  Yet, at the same time, we must find ways and means to make over 
some of the old neighborhoods” (Kahn, 2).  For their readers, the term “old 
neighborhoods” would have immediately conjured up images of the blighted 
districts surrounding Center City.  
 Though the authors predicted that “many slum areas of cities 
undoubtedly will be totally rebuilt after the war,” Kahn and Stonorov were not 
among those midcentury Modernists seduced by visions of a wholly renewed 
city (Kahn, 8).  Kahn and Stonorov’s comprehension of the problems at hand 
was nuanced, though their diagnosis was, in many ways, an elaboration on 
those practices decried in Know Your City.  To demonstrate the path to 
neighborhood revitalization, they posited a generic, aging neighborhood 
immediately recognizable to the reader.  If block after block of monotonous 
rowhouses was the “Before,” then the “After” was an entirely new, yet familiar, 
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urban space created through targeted demolition and road closures along with 
the construction of commercial and community spaces (Figure 01.7).  
 Kahn and Stonorov were proposing a compelling image of the 
neighborhoods of today, made new though the diversification of uses and the 
introduction of creative public spaces.  “We can do a lot to protect worthwhile 
older residential neighborhoods from decay,” they claimed, “hence, we must 
regard some of these not-quite blighted neighborhoods as conservation areas…
they should not be destroyed.  We must give them such protective armor that 
they can continue to remain good places to live in” (Kahn, 3).  This was true 
urban design before urban design was an established practice.  The strength 
of this image would define the City’s approach to fighting blight for at least a 
decade.  
 The authors close Why City Planning with an attempt to reconnect with 
the lived existence of the average Philadelphian, and to assuage any lingering 
anxieties: “This plan, as outlined, means essentially conservation and not 
outright destruction.  Your neighborhood can become a better place to live 
in.  You won’t have to pull up stakes and seek so-called better pastures in the 
suburbs” (Kahn, 10).  It is important to note that while their concern with public 
engagement was genuine, their specific appeal to those at risk of fleeing for 
Figure 01.7: The neighborhood “before and after” diagram showing how urban design could revitalize older 
residential neighborhoods (Source: Why City Planning Is Your Responsibility)
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the suburbs suggests the “You” was primarily, if not exclusively, Philadelphia’s 
middle-class, White population.
 The principles underlying the image crafted in Why City Planning 
Is Your Responsibility, particularly neighborhood rehabilitation and citizen 
empowerment, were recapitulated in a groundbreaking exhibition in the fall of 
1947.  Planned by Oskar Stonorov with support from Philadelphia City Planning 
Commission staff (including Edmund Bacon as “Co-Designer”) the Better 
Philadelphia Exhibition was an unprecedented (and unequalled) frenzy of city 
planning.  The Exhibition was funded by the City along with a broad coalition 
of local business leaders.  The intent was to “show that city planning is not 
just a spare-time hobby but a vast and complicated program for the physical 
development of the whole Philadelphia area” (Hanna, 3).  Putting it more bluntly, 
Architectural Forum described the exhibition as an opportunity “to sock home 
what is wrong with Philadelphia and what, specifically, can be done about it” 
(Architectural Forum 1947, 1).  
 The Better Philadelphia Exhibition broadcast a new image of the City to 
an audience far greater than any limited-run pamphlet.  In just over a month, 
the Exhibition’s captivating displays, which took up two floors of the downtown 
Gimbel’s Department Store, attracted an incredible 385,000 visitors.  The 
Better Philadelphia Exhibition bespoke the role of city planning at a range of 
scales.  The Exhibition also provided an opportunity to directly communicate 
the responsibilities of the newly-minted Redevelopment Authority to the public. 
This state-enabled agency, created in 1945, lent implementation muscle to 
the work of the Planning Commission using powers of land acquisition through 
eminent domain and bond issuance in support of redevelopment projects.
 The Better Philadelphia Exhibition was in large part an exercise in city 
boosterism, portraying a vibrant future for the nation’s third-largest city.  Yet blight 
too was quite literally on display.  The “Time and Space Machine” (apocryphally 
conceived by Edmund Bacon in the middle of the Pacific Ocean during his tour 
of duty in World War II), for instance, represented the outward expansion of 
Philadelphia’s urban fabric through a series of dynamically illuminated Plexiglas 
panels.  This Machine also foretold the consequences of growth in the absence of 
proper planning: a slowly swinging pendulum kept time as “the shadow of blight 
spreads gradually over the City” (Architectural Forum 1947, 6).  Visitors were 
then led past a renewed Philadelphia, presented in the form of a meticulously 
detailed 24-foot-long model with “flip-up” panels, that showed the replacement 
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of existing City fabric with newly planned 
projects.  There were even “price tags 
on scale models of typical projects [to] 
give taxpayers a realistic idea of the cost 
of civic progress” (Architectural Forum 
1947, 8). (Figure 01.8)
 Concluding the exhibit, Stonorov 
shifted to a familiar, human scale 
with a “full-size reconstruction of a 
street corner…complete even to a 
messy garbage can.”  This model 
brought the experience of blight home 
by “recreat[ing] the atmosphere of 
drabness and monotony which blights 
may of Philadelphia’s residential 
areas” (Architectural Forum 1947, 11). 
Entering a full-scale rowhouse and 
casting their gaze out of one of the rear 
windows, visitors descried a model representing how a typical high-density 
rowhouse neighborhood could be transformed through urban design and citizen 
participation.  Significantly, the design principles were applied to a specific site, 
rather than to a generic set of blocks as was the case in Why City Planning. 
In the representation of a renewed South Philadelphia neighborhood, blight 
was cleared and roads closed to accommodate three-story Bauhaus-inspired 
apartment buildings, a shopping center, a nursery school, and public open 
space.  Despite these public and privately funded interventions, the basic 
scale and fabric of the neighborhood was been retained through preservation 
and rehabilitation (Figure 01.9).  National policy would briefly align with this 
homegrown image in the late 1940s and early 1950s, providing opportunities 
to implement this innovative design approach.
THE URBAN REDEVELOPMENT ERA
1949 was a watershed year for national urban policy.  Despite a booming 
postwar economy, studies indicated that millions of Americans were living in 
substandard dwellings in cities throughout the country.   Addressing what was 
Figure 01.8: The Better Philadelphia Exhibition’s 
“flip-up panel” in action (Source: Klemek, The 
Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal)
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perceived to be a mounting crisis, President Truman announced in his State of 
the Union that “five million families are still living in slums and firetraps. Three 
million families share their homes with others…As an immediate step, Congress 
should enact the provisions for low-rent public housing and slum clearance” 
(Truman).  
 Truman’s call was answered by the passage of the 1949 Federal Housing 
Act.  Title I of this new legislation, entitled “Slum Clearance and Community 
Development and Redevelopment,” was meant to “induce private investors to 
clear slum areas” through the provision of large federal grants “made available to 
local public agencies to finance the initial costs of planning a project; acquiring, 
clearing or preparing the land for sale; and selling or leasing the land” (Forest, 
723-24).  In offering up federal monies to cover up to two-thirds of the cost of 
land acquisition, the drafters of the Federal Housing Act were hoping to counter 
the deleterious, blighting impact slumlords continued to exert on city centers. 
The FHA funding was therefore intended to offset the cost of land in the “inner-
city industrial and lower-income residential areas [that] however unsightly, were 
generally profitable” (von Hoffman 2000, 304).  
 Though Title I was vague about the scale and design of urban 
redevelopment projects, the language was precise in its focus on “slums”: 
This bill limits federal financial assistance to the assembly and clearance 
of areas which either are predominantly residential or which will be 
redeveloped primarily for residential use. This limitation is fully justified 
in view of the fact that the primary purpose of federal aid in this field is to 
help remove the impact of the slums on human lives rather than simply 
to assist in the redevelopment or rebuilding of cities. (Forest, 729)
Dispensation of federal Title I money was contingent on the creation of “a 
Figure 01.9: The proposed transformation of a blighted South Philadelphia neighborhood in the Better 
Philadelphia Exhibition (Source: Architectural Form, 1947)
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specific redevelopment agreement and plan, which was to be drafted by the 
appropriate local agency” (Forest, 724).  
 In Philadelphia, this legislation placed the responsibility of reshaping the 
City in the hands of the Planning Commission and Redevelopment Authority. 
Edmund Bacon, by then Executive Director of the Philadelphia City Planning 
Commission, surely understood the implications of the new federal legislation, 
including his considerable clout.  Yet in an address to the Annual National 
Planning Conference held that October in Cleveland, Ohio, Bacon warned 
against overenthusiasm, presciently identifying fundamental shortcomings in 
the federal legislation.  Notably, he rejects the “slum clearance” emphasized 
in Title I and even the characterization of neighborhoods as “slums,” settling 
instead on the more neutral “blight”:
The very nature of urban blight itself is complex, elusive, difficult to 
define.  The mere spending of money, clearance of areas or building of 
projects doesn’t necessarily constitute a valid attitude on urban blight.  
The direct facilities offered by the federal redevelopment legislation are 
curiously negative in character.  They provide only for the clearance of 
areas for tearing buildings down.  If this results simply in the building of 
houses in blighted areas that otherwise would be built anyway, and in 
the transfer of the basic problem associated with blight to other areas, 
then it may be seriously questioned whether action under the federal 
legislation actually meets the specifications of the job, namely, a valid 
and basic attack on the problem of urban blight. (Bacon 1949, 18)
Ultimately, Bacon’s address to the Planning Conference was aspirational, 
reflecting his commitment to and confidence in the transformative power of 
good design.  Echoing the sentiments espoused by Kahn and Stonorov earlier 
that decade, Bacon asserted that “within any neighborhood the vital force for 
regeneration is still alive…in the midst of all this decline there still exists the 
vitality to improve.  These cells have within them the latent capacity to replace 
themselves and to restore themselves” (Bacon 1949, 19-20).
 Bacon’s misgivings about the federal policy notwithstanding, Title I of 
the 1949 Federal Housing Act empowered the City of Philadelphia to implement 
what had, until that point, been a largely theoretical discussion of redevelopment 
priorities.  The City was therefore able to act on the arresting data uncovered by 
a citywide Housing Quality Survey undertaken in the year before, in 1948.  
 The first Study Area certified for redevelopment was East Poplar, a 
neighborhood only one mile northeast of Philadelphia’s City Hall.  At the time 
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of the study, the East Poplar Housing Survey recorded “approximately 1,770 
residential structures, 4,425 dwelling units, and 12,555 inhabitants” in a 
predominantly rowhouse neighborhood (PCPC 1949, 3).  This remarkable 
density – almost three dwelling units and over seven occupants per rowhouse 
– reflected the repeated subdivisions undertaken by slumlords.  As the survey 
described, “originally single-family homes, occupied by upper-middle class 
or well-to-do residents…were ‘converted’ into multi-family structures, the 
conversions frequently involving nothing more than collecting the rent separately 
for different floors or rooms of the house.” This led the author to conclude that 
“even without a careful study of specific conditions, it is easily discernible that 
this Area is now a definitely undesirable place in which to live” (PCPC 1949, 3). 
An arcane neighborhood scoring system yielded a “median Total Housing Score 
of more than 180 points” making East Poplar “one of the most severely blighted 
residential areas of Philadelphia…leaving little doubt that drastic measures 
will be needed to restore the Area to acceptable standards of housing quality” 
(PCPC 1949, 5).
 East Poplar’s selection as the first area for redevelopment reflects what 
has been characterized as a “worst-first” approach (Knowles, 61).  As William 
Rafsky, the powerful housing coordinator appointed by Mayor Clark, and another 
major figure in Philadelphia’s renewal era, described:
The approach was in line with what was being done by most American 
cities at the time.  Namely, where was the worst blight?  Where was the 
slum housing in the most dilapidated condition?  We surveyed our city, 
we plotted blight on maps, and we decided that the action that we ought 
to take was to bulldoze the houses that were uninhabitable, that were 
too expensive to rehabilitate, and to replace them with new housing.  We 
thought in that way we would get rid of the cancer in the city. (Rafsky, 7)  
Rafsky’s claim that they were simply following the standard procedure is 
both dismissive and inaccurate, and is perhaps a function of the simmering 
antagonism he and Bacon developed towards one another over the years. 
However, it is clear that on a basic level Bacon did in fact subscribe to the 
conventional wisdom about how blight could best be fought: namely, that like 
cancer or a weed, blight was best attacked at the root.  According to this line 
of thinking, a catalytic development in a blighted area would tap into the “vital 
force for regeneration” and would provide a context of investment in which 
adjacent property-owners would be motivated to move forward with long-
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Figure 01.10: Preliminary Site Plan for the East Poplar Redevelopment Area developed by Oskar Stonorov for 
the City Planning Commission.  Blighted urban fabric has been replaced by new open spaces, and new, low-rise 
Modernist dwellings (Source: East Poplar Redevelopment Area Plan)
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delayed renovations. 
 Oskar Stonorov, one of the most prominent voices in Philadelphia’s 
redevelopment conversation, was selected by the Planning Commission to 
create the East Poplar Redevelopment Area Plan.  Predictably, the plan was 
thematically consistent with the design-oriented, adaptive image Stonorov had 
been advocating for years.  Interpreting the findings of the East Poplar Housing 
Survey through the lens of Stonorovian planning and design theory, the Plan 
states: 
[East Poplar] contains structures in sound physical condition but 
deteriorating rapidly.  Much of this area is suitable for rehabilitation, with 
some clearance and new construction recommended at critical spots…
The site plan preserves certain critical existing institutions…and calls for 
the preservation of certain groups of existing houses…thus preserving 
the old city character and avoiding the monotony of a large, uniform 
housing development. (PCPC 1949a, 5)  
Within this excerpt, Stonorov’s adherence to the image he himself helped craft 
is clear.  Similarly clear is his unwillingness to echo the Survey’s blunt, almost 
glib, characterization of East Poplar as “a definitely undesirable place in which 
to live” (PCPC 1949, 3).
 True to form, Stonorov’s Redevelopment Plan retained the character of 
the area.  The traditional Philadelphia grid, much of the existing rowhouse fabric, 
and all of the major community, religious, and social institutions were considered, 
in the same breath, he suggested street closures, targeted demolition, and the 
insertion of Modernist multiunit apartment houses throughout the site.  Also key 
was the provision of considerable public open space in the densely populated, 
underserved neighborhood.   These open spaces included parks, baseball 
fields, and a distinctive pedestrian greenway to provide play and circulation 
space for young and old. (Figure 01.10) The East Poplar Redevelopment Area 
Plan depicted a new type of Philadelphia neighborhood: one liberated from the 
monotony of the rowhouse grid, and one with a creative interpenetration of built 
and unbuilt, private and public spaces.  
 The Plan’s novel design approach was paralleled by a commensurately 
bold implementation scheme.  Operating with Planning Commission and 
Redevelopment Authority support, the Friends Neighborhood Guild - a Quaker 
organization with historic ties to the area - undertook the transformation of 
“four blocks of East Poplar’s most decayed townhouses into a mutually owned 
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Figure 01.12:  Spring Garden Homes, built as part of the original East Poplar redevelopment 
(Photo © the author)
Figure 01.11: The promise of urban renewal (Photo © Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives)
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and collectively rehabilitated interracial housing development” (Bauman 1987, 
108). (Figure 01.11) Bolstering these activities were complementary public 
and private developments: the 173-unit Penn Towne Apartments, “a privately 
managed, garden housing complex for middle-income families”; and the Spring 
Garden Homes, a Philadelphia Housing Authority built and managed “203-unit, 
low-rise public housing project” (Bauman 1987, 110).  (Figure 01.12)  Through 
these collective actions, East Poplar was redeveloped as a mixed-income, 
mixed-use neighborhood long before these concepts had been articulated as 
such, or had any currency within the planning profession.  Reminiscing about 
East Poplar 25 years later, Bacon unabashedly described the vision for the area 
as “utopian” (Bacon 1975, 6).
 The innovations evident in the redevelopment of East Poplar were 
recognized immediately.   In 1952, an article in Architectural Forum famously 
labeled the project a manifestation of “The Philadelphia Cure,” in which 
“penicillin, not surgery” was the treatment of choice (Architectural Forum 1952, 
112).  In characterizing the “Cure,” the article identified six distinctions between 
Philadelphia’s approach to redevelopment and what was happening elsewhere:
(1) Redevelopment has been cut down to size.  There are no monstrous 
single-project solutions planned for Philadelphia; (2) Philadelphia’s 
small takes involve a minimum of dislocation of present inhabitants; 
(3) By holding meetings in the local areas before drawing any plans, 
Philadelphia’s Planning Commission has preserved democracy and 
good feeling; (4) Philadelphia is protecting the social structure of the 
area as a neighborhood held together by an institutional structure; (5) 
By pulling in architects skilled in urban design…Philadelphia has evolved 
remarkable new expedients for making whole city areas harmonious; (6) 
Where possible, Philadelphia has tried to preserve the historical past of 
the area. (Architectural Forum 1952, 113)  
Planners came from around the world to study the “Philadelphia Cure,” placing 
Philadelphia at the center of a global conversation about postwar urban 
redevelopment.  
 Unfortunately, as the pages of Architectural Forum reported, “all did not 
go smoothly with the first of Philadelphia’s atomized redevelopment projects, 
the East Poplar Area.  Incoherence, the besetting vice of urban operations by 
independent owners working side by side, almost killed it” (Architectural Forum 
1952, 116).  Further complicating the redevelopment efforts, and precluding 
further experimentation with development partnerships, were the bureaucratic 
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Figure 01.13:  Louis Kahn’s plan for Mill Creek creatively integrates a pedestrian greenway, high-rise towers, 
low-rise detached units, and apartment buildings onto the site.  Note that the most extensive redevelopment 
was reserved for the southeastern corner of the site which, as the Housing Quality Survey reported, “was almost 
entirely non-white.”  (Source: Mill Creek Redevelopment Area Plan)
strings attached to the federal money on which the project relied:  “When the plan was sent to 
Washington for HHFA approval, it went as a series of projects designed by different architectural 
firms.  But Washington balked…the principles of the approved over-all plan had been lost, the 
Philadelphia Planning Commission was told, and other projects of this piecemeal character 
would be unacceptable” (Architectural Forum 1952, 116).  The irony of course, is that the 
“over-all plan,” a manifestation of the image, was whole, while the funding and implementation 
structures were “piecemeal.”  Over fifty years after East Poplar, the innovative public-private 
arrangement discouraged by Washington has become commonplace
 The Redevelopment Plan for Mill Creek in West Philadelphia followed shortly after East 
Poplar in the early 1950s.  As an outlying neighborhood three miles west of City Hall, Mill Creek 
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had not been subjected to the same degree of speculation and overcrowding as 
East Poplar.  By the time of the Survey, the area contained “4,450 residential 
structures, 5,500 dwelling units, and a population of 21,855,” indicating the 
single-family housing fabric was still largely intact.  In fact, while perhaps a 
backhanded compliment, the Survey declared Mill Creek “one of the least 
deficient [study areas]…substantially superior to several of the others” (PCPC 
1949b, 7).  From this perspective, the selection of Mill Creek suggests a more 
nuanced redevelopment strategy than simply “worst-first.”   
 There were, however, significant changes underway.  Physically, this 
neighborhood had been “considerably altered by the intrusion of commercial and 
industrial uses” and by the “collapse of the ancient Mill Creek Sewer in 1945” 
(PCPC 1949b, 5).  Major demographic changes were also afoot. At the time of the 
Mill Creek Housing Survey, “considerable population changes have taken place. 
At present, [Mill Creek] is two-thirds non-white [and] the southeastern corner of 
the Area contains an almost entirely non-white population” (PCPC 1949b, 5). 
In Mill Creek, therefore, it seems the City was acting opportunistically, using the 
extensive relocations already caused by the Mill Creek Sewer collapse in the 
mid-1940s as a justification for intervention.  
 Louis Kahn was selected by the Planning Commission to design the 
“over-all plan” for Mill Creek, giving him an opportunity to reify his neighborhood-
scaled urban design vision.  As the work of one of the great twentieth century 
American architects, the Mill Creek Redevelopment Area Plan was a true 
Gesamtkunstwerk, replete with a range of housing options, a shopping area, 
community spaces, and other 
amenities. (Figure 01.13)
 Kahn’s plan generated 
controversy at the time due to his 
inclusion of several fifteen-story 
Modernist apartment towers-in-the-
park alongside more conventionally 
scaled two- and three-story semi-
detached units. Philadelphia at that 
time was still a low-rise, rowhouse 
city.  Yet Mill Creek is a far cry from 
the cold efficiency of Le Corbusier’s 
infamous Plan Voisin.  (Figure 01.14) Figure 01.14: Le Corbusier’s polemical Plan Voisin, 1925 (Source: Flickr - joanofarctan)
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Though the renderings of Kahn’s Plan present a drastic departure from the 
familiar scale of the rowhouse, he created a transition between the existing 
neighborhood and the towers with lower-density structures, suggesting a more 
humanistic, integrated vision.  As urban historian John Bauman describes, 
“Kahn attempted to incorporate public housing into the social and physical 
fabric of the existing neighborhood…Reflecting his strong belief in the continuity 
of space, Kahn designed Mill Creek without boundaries, making it, ideally, 
part of the whole tissue of Mill Creek life” (Bauman 1987, 114).  Furthermore, 
Kahn’s interweaving circulation systems, in particular the pedestrian greenway, 
emphasized the lived, human-scaled experience above the birds-eye view:
At the core of the plan is the proposed greenway along Aspen Street.  
Sections of Aspen Street will be closed to vehicular traffic in order 
to insure a truly local and enjoyable pedestrian access to schools, 
churches, recreation centers, and public housing areas…These open 
public spaces serve the dual purpose of creating an order of traffic 
movement in residential areas…and of providing areas for recreation for 
young and old (PCPC 1952, 6-7).  
Kahn’s design vision at Mill Creek was 
never fully realized, likely because 
the federal rebuke of East Poplar 
described in Architectural Forum 
precluded further creative thinking 
about implementation.  Nevertheless, 
the Plan speaks to the persistence 
and power of the image promulgated 
ten years earlier in Why City Planning 
is Your Responsibility.  Formally, the 
Plan has historical significance as a 
progenitor of the eventual scheme 
for Society Hill, arguably the zenith 
of renewal planning in Philadelphia, 
in which I.M. Pei’s outsized, high-rise 
towers were similarly softened by 
Modernist rowhouses and a pedestrian 
greenway (Figure 01.15).  
 Unfortunately, the need for low-
Figure 01.15: Bacon’s Society Hill redevelopment, 
one of the most successful renewal-era projects, used 
the tenets of the “Philadelphia Cure” to great effect, 
famously landing him on the cover of Time Magazine 
in 1964. (Source: Time, November 1964) 
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income housing and the continued spread of blight in Philadelphia exceeded 
the capacity of the proponents of the “Philadelphia Cure,” and not all architects 
shared the collective image or an interest in community engagement.  Acting 
independently of the Planning Commission, the Philadelphia Housing Authority 
authorized the construction of several concurrent public housing projects, many of 
which required considerable clearance and relocation.  Design decisions, and an 
emphasis on efficiency resulted in a mix of uninspired low-rise, multiunit buildings 
and Corbusian cruciform high-rises. (Figure 01.16)  These architects and planners 
were operating with a much different image predicated on efficiently meeting 
minimum standards, rather than on lived experience, and on the wholesale 
clearance and replacement of old, “obsolete” fabric instead of adaptation. This is 
a critical point, as the projects built reflect a plurality of actors, and even images, 
in postwar Philadelphia, complicating the picture of the renewal era. 
Figure 01.16: The Philadelphia Housing Authority’s 1,000+ unit Diamond-Norris Project introduced cruciform 
high-rises into the midst of typical rowhouse neighborhood (Photo © Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives)
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BLIGHT as MOVING TARGET: URBAN RENEWAL 
The mid-1950s brought significant changes to federal urban policy.  A postwar 
rightward shift under President Eisenhower resulted in the updating of Truman’s 
Housing Act with the Housing Act of 1954.  This bill formally introduced the term 
“renewal” into the planner’s lexicon and fundamentally recast the role of the 
public sector in urban revitalization.  Though semantic, the switch from “urban 
redevelopment” to “urban renewal” reflected a mounting awareness and concern 
regarding blight.  If “redevelopment” implied the need for targeted development 
subsidies, “renewal” suggested there was something fundamentally awry, and 
that the very fabric of America’s cities was in need of replacement.  
 Departing from the residential emphasis of the 1949 Housing Act, 
Eisenhower’s policy deliberately elided the contentious topic of public housing 
in favor of commercial redevelopment in and around the downtown.  Powerful 
political and economic forces quickly coalesced around this new approach. 
As Rutgers professor Richard Flanagan noted, “public housing promised only 
to create racial and ethnic divides, whereas urban renewal plans promised to 
increase federal aid and generate support from city businessmen” (Flanagan, 
267).  Henceforth, housing provision was neither seen as requisite to 
redevelopment, nor as a critical component of neighborhood design efforts. 
Instead, public housing became almost exclusively a mechanism with which 
to offset the loss of dwelling units due to commercial renewal efforts.  This 
change had profound consequences nationwide.  “The nature and purpose of 
public housing in 1954 was finalized as housing for the poor – with such low 
production numbers that public housing could never be offered as a serious 
housing alternative for large numbers of the middle class, much less all the 
poor” (Flanagan, 282).  Furthermore, bifurcating housing and commercial 
redevelopment, rather than treating the two as interconnected aspects of 
city building, made a project’s bottom-line more significant than the quality of 
life afforded.  As John Bauman notes, in Oskar Stonorov’s high-rise design for 
Southwark Plaza, he was encouraged to “use the cheapest materials possible” 
(Bauman 1987, 177).
 In Philadelphia, these federal policy changes came at a time of 
increasing disillusionment with the “Philadelphia Cure.”  Rather than produce 
the envisioned cells imbued with the  “latent capacity to replace themselves,” 
the carefully planned and executed redevelopments at East Poplar, Mill Creek, 
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and elsewhere had seemed to just spread the problems of overcrowding and 
blight around.  As William Rafsky put it:
What we were able to do in the early 1950s was to create an island 
of good surrounded by a sea of bad, which in effect continually played 
havoc with the good things that we did, and produced negative influences 
on decent housing.  As a result, it was impossible to really maintain 
the housing in the way that we wanted to because the neighborhood 
itself had not been changed, there were just a few good blocks.  
While we were working on this blight, adjacent blocks were adversely 
affected when those who were dispersed from the clearance…began 
overcrowding the existing structures nearby.  While we were working on 
this, other neighborhoods somewhat removed were deteriorating, and…
obsolescence and population movements were creating new problems 
for us. (Rafsky, 8)
The demonstrable limitations to the “Philadelphia Cure” undercut logic of Bacon 
et al’s “worst-first” approach to fighting blight.  As well as anyone, Edmund Bacon 
recognized the limitations to his approach, candidly expressing the challenges 
ahead while insisting that his methods not be abandoned entirely:
While we recognize that mistakes were made in some of the redevelopment 
work so far undertaken, we also recognize that the elimination of blight 
is a very difficult problem at best, and we do not think the difficulties 
attendant upon the efforts in the more blighted sections should lead 
us to a policy that abandons these areas altogether for any sustained 
period, but rather to a policy in which a portion of our energy is directed 
toward developing new solutions to these older areas which overcome 
the major problems revealed by our old approachs (McKee, 65-66).
That said, ascribing the shortcomings of Bacon’s efforts solely to physical 
determinism would be inaccurate.  Though federal money was available for 
acquisition and clearance of expensive inner-city land, the neighborhood visions 
were ultimately reliant on an ability to draw private investment into surrounding 
areas in which developers had little interest.  “The City’s willingness to put public 
resources into Lower North Philadelphia could not draw private investors into 
neighborhoods they saw as ‘nonviable’” (Adams et al, 112-13).  Furthermore, 
Bacon was not the power broker many take him to be.  Distinguishing himself 
from the likes of Robert Moses in New York and Ed Logue in Boston and New 
Haven, Bacon noted they “had direct access to the sources of power…[and] 
directly manipulated and controlled vast amounts of money…I never had 
the privilege.  I never exercised either control of large amounts of money nor 
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direct political power…I invariably had to work by motivating other people to do 
something which seemed appropriate” (Bacon 1975, 3). 
 In addition, there were other confounding forces at work.  Rafsky’s 
“obsolescence and population movements” were recasting and hastening the 
problem of blight in ways the City was ill equipped to handle.  In 1956, University 
of Pennsylvania Professor of City Planning William Wheaton lamented that “the 
centers of our older cities are being abandoned by people…Those who can afford 
to do so move to suburban areas, where the residential atmosphere is more 
pleasant” (Wheaton, 1).  This was not simply a recapitulation of a decades’ old 
fear.  Aside from a slight, anomalous population drop in the 1930s, Philadelphia 
was truly shrinking for the first time in the City’s 300-year history.  However, the 
absolute drop of almost 70,000 people in the 1950s, just over 3% of the City’s 
midcentury population of 2.1 million, does not entirely capture the phenomenon 
identified by Professor Wheaton.  
 Much of the abandonment was not to outlying counties but to 
Philadelphia’s still sparsely developed outer reaches.  According to the 
Philadelphia City Planning Commission’s 1957 Annual Report, “during 1957 
the Commission approved subdivision totaling approximately 386 acres and 
providing for an additional 3,279 new homes in the City, mostly in the Far 
Northeast” (PCPC 1957, 10); and this was only a fraction of the 16,800 new 
dwelling units planned for the Far Northeast at that time.  
 This rapid expansion of in-city suburbs provided middle-class 
Philadelphians with an opportunity to put distance between themselves and 
the central city blight.  It was also an opportunity to discard the narrow, aging 
rowhouses for new houses replete with amenities – off-street parking, yards, 
privacy, etc. – largely precluded by Philadelphia’s historic fabric.  The map of 
the Far Northeast from the Annual Report reflects the degree to which the 
planned development of Philadelphia’s outlying land was a departure from, and 
alternative to, Willam Penn’s gridiron. (Figure 01.17)  That said, Bacon and the 
Planning Commission weren’t entirely ready to cede the trappings of urbanism. 
They proposed an innovative, hybridized, suburban rowhouse scheme that 
Redevelopment Authority director (and eventual founder of premier Philadelphia 
architectural firm Wallace, McHarg, Roberts & Todd) David Wallace declared to 
be “the biggest tool in Philadelphia’s kit…a new product not now on the market: 
a homogenized mix of various housing types, but with the rowhouse in a new 
and exciting form as the main ingredient” (Wallace 1961, 55). (Figure 01.18) 
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Figure 01.17: A map of the projected buildout of the Far Northeast predicting a mix of detached housing units and 
creative arrangements of suburban rowhouses (Source: PCPC 1957 Annual Report)
Figure 01.18: An idyllic rowhouse cul-de-sac block (Source: PCPC 1957 Annual Report)
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Evident in clusters throughout Philadelphia’s outlying neighborhoods, these 
hybrids were a new, semi-urban vernacular. (Figure 01.19)  Of course, these new 
neighborhoods were expressly White neighborhoods, as restrictive covenants 
excluded even Philadelphia’s upwardly mobile Black population.
 There were, however, contemporary developments such as Yorktown, a 
600-unit development just west of East Poplar, which brought this suburban 
rowhouse hybrid to Philadelphia’s Black middle-class.  Developed by Norman 
Denny, who’d cut his teeth building out much of the Far Northeast, Yorktown 
required that the Redeveloplment Authority clear dozens of blocks of aging 
rowhouses to make way for the new, “homogenized mix.” (Figure 01.20) 
Yorktown’s cul-de-sacs (described further in the following chapter) have sustained 
a vibrant middle-class enclave for almost fifty years.  
 Yorktown aside, “trickle-down” economic theory would suggest that the 
abandonment of middle-class, largely White neighborhoods for the new in-city 
suburbs opened up improved housing opportunities for the City’s upwardly 
mobile Black population.  However, continued discriminatory lending practices 
constrained such mobility (Downs, 8).  Thus, by the mid-1950s, Philadelphia was 
contending with the paradoxical conditions of overcrowding and abandonment. 
Put differently, “the decentralization of economic and residential locations…
created, in Philadelphia’s case, graphic examples of the paradox of poverty and 
plenty, virtually side by side” (Adams et al, 66).
 The need for course correction was, by that point, a foregone conclusion. 
William Rafsky – the City’s powerful Housing Coordinator, appointed by Mayor 
Clark – authored a new scheme based on David Wallace’s 200-page Central 
Urban Renewal Area (CURA) Study.   Rafsky’s strategy reads as a fundamental 
rejection of Bacon et al’s neighborhood-scaled, design-led approach to fighting 
blight.  As described by Rafsky:
We decided that we needed a new strategy.  In 1957, the various city 
agencies came together and carried out another survey [that] found…the 
oldest areas were the worst.  Those that were built somewhat later were 
modestly bad, and those that were on the outskirts were still sound with 
only the earliest signs of blight.  They were almost in concentric circles 
around the downtown area.  You could draw those lines.  We said: Let’s 
shift our strategy.  Instead of working in the areas where the blight was 
most concentrated, why don’t we move to the outside?  Why don’t we try 
to prevent these areas from declining?  So we shifted completely from 
working in the heart of the slums to containing the blight . (Rafsky, 9)
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Figure 01.19: One of the envisioned rowhouse cul-de-sacs along Pennypack Street in Philadelphia’s Far Northeast
(Photo © the author)
Figure 01.20: Yorktown developer Norman Denny, working with the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, 
cleared several blighted blocks to bring the suburban rowhouse to Lower North Philadelphia (Photo © Temple 
University Libraries, Urban Archives)
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The CURA Study divided neighborhoods into three categories based on land use 
analyses conducted by the City Planning Commission (Figure 01.21).  Though 
given a letter grade rather than a score, this process was largely an elaboration 
on the Housing Quality Surveys completed in the late 1940s.  Neighborhoods 
given an “A” were most blighted and required considerable clearance and code 
enforcement.  “Moderately blighted” “B” areas required some clearance along 
with residential rehabilitation.   “C” areas had little blight “and probably could 
be saved by eliminating ‘sore spots’ in the neighborhood” (Petshek, 139-40). 
Retreating from previous strategies, the City would no longer invest in A or B 
areas:
A complete shift in emphasis [was announced].  It was decided not to 
work in the worst central slum sections and to follow blight as it spread, 
but to start in ‘the outlying older neighborhoods in an effort to stop the 
spread and then gradually work inward through increasingly serious 
blight.’ Thus the blight would be checked, and the redevelopment would 
be ‘anchored’ to stable neighborhoods and not surrounded by areas 
with many substandard dwellings. (Petshek, 141)
The fact that most, if not all, of the A and B neighborhoods were predominantly 
Black by that time, while the C were mostly White, indicated the government 
had formally embraced the practice of redlining. 
 Though the CURA grade was a blunt and decisive verdict, Rafsky and 
his cohort were making a compelling argument that blight was not a cancer or 
a weed, but something systemic, with citywide implications.  CURA identified 
commonalities among neighborhoods, and advocated for the creation of a toolkit, 
or at least a range of appropriate strategies, to fight different manifestations of 
blight. 
 In many ways, the resultant CURA Plan was a logical response to the 
perceived failures of East Poplar, and a repudiation of Bacon.  It was a citywide 
strategy, scaled up and abstracted; the antithesis of the “Philadelphia Cure.” 
And rather than worst-first site selection criteria that focused investment 
in those areas where blight was most severe, CURA advocated saving those 
neighborhoods deemed transitional.  Yet in its rejection of Bacon’s urban design 
in favor of a technocratic, data-driven strategy, CURA presented a plan absent 
an image.  As early as 1961, David Wallace mused that “what is needed is a 
real, tangible image of what comprehensive metropolitan-wide urban renewal 
would do,” noting the CURA Study he himself coauthored, “was a start toward 
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the kind of thing I have in mind, but only a start.  It did not translate statistics and 
method into a concrete image – a model if you will, or a movie, or a Disneyland” 
(Wallace 1961, 52-53)
 Reminiscing about having to watch his image systematically dismantled, 
Bacon was understandably indignant:
The thing that happened was, that in order to be scientific about this 
thing, and academic about this thing…each individual dwelling was 
given a separate score.  And then what happened?  Science entered the 
picture.  Mathematics came in, and each separate dwelling in the block 
was given an average score.  Then the average score was plotted on a 
map.  The black…and the gray…and the white showed the average per 
block; and at that moment of perception the vicious aspect of the urban 
Figure 01.21: The midcentury CURA Study designated 
Philadelphia’s neighborhoods as A - “most blighted,” B - 
“moderately blighted” or C - “conservation” (Source: Bauman, 
Public Housing, Race, and Renewal)
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renewal approach was established…The whole concept of the individual 
treatment of neighborhoods, of essentially the saving of neighborhoods, 
and the working with neighborhoods and developing systems to raise 
neighborhood morale went down the drain (Bacon 1975, 9-10).
Bacon’s resistance to the tenets underlying CURA was not purely a question of 
ego, though his was indisputably oversized.  The CURA Plan expressly shifted 
support away from those neighborhoods to which Bacon had devoted himself, 
and that remained most in need.  In despatializing the City’s neighborhood 
interventions, CURA relegated the City to more of a supporting role than a lead 
actor’s.  Though “certain major nonphysical programs, such as adult education, 
were proposed to hit at the problems of the disadvantaged from a different 
direction,” as noted by David Wallace, the strategy was predicated on what 
amounted to triage (Wallace 1960, 161-62).  
 Unfortunately, the “science” and “mathematics” underpinning the CURA 
Plan did not hold the answer to blight.  For one, the citywide scale precluded active 
engagement with Philadelphia’s disenfranchised population.  Furthermore, the 
abstracted strategy left the City ill-equipped to communicate an image of a 
renewed Philadelphia.  As early as 1961, only five years after the CURA Study, 
Wallace lamented “we have made a botch of urban renewal to date.”  Without 
an image “people don’t understand what we’re after – or even talking about” 
(Wallace 1961, 47).  Not surprisingly, the proposed code enforcement program 
in A and B areas never got off the ground, and funding for conservation in the C 
areas dwindled quickly (Bauman 1987, 149). 
 Instead of systemic neighborhood rehabilitation and blight elimination, 
CURA’s lack of an image allowed business interests to set the agenda, directing 
the majority of public investment into Center City renewal.  Much of this involved 
finding ways to make Philadelphia “competitive,” including the improvement of 
auto circulation through the construction of Vine Street Expressway and I-95, 
and the facilitation of local universities’ – University of Pennsylvania, Temple 
University, and Drexel University – campus expansion programs.  
 Bacon and the Planning Commission, locationally and strategically 
constrained by the shifting sands of urban policy, adapted with aplomb, 
authoring a number of well received Center City renewal projects in the late 
1950s and early 1960s including Market East Plaza (1958) and Independence 
Mall (1962).  It was also at this time that Bacon began what many believe to 
be his crowning achievement as Planning Director; the transformation of one of 
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Philadelphia’s blighted Center City neighborhoods into Society Hill, a high-end 
urban neighborhood.  Society Hill was a watershed development, as it proved 
the existence of unmet demand for high-rise luxury housing in city centers. 
It also demonstrated that historic rehabilitation was a marketable strategy. 
(Figure 01.22) 
 As Bacon himself pointed out in his remarkable 1967 publication, 
Design of Cities, many of the design tenets evident in Society Hill – historic 
preservation and rehabilitation, pedestrian circulation systems, high-rises 
buffered by rowhouses – were elaborations on the image promulgated in the 
Better Philadelphia Exhibition and attempted in the urban redevelopment 
efforts of the late 1940s and early 1950s.  That Bacon’s design vision was only 
fully realized as a gentrification tool at Society Hill supports Carolyn Adams’s 
observation that, “publicly sponsored redevelopment ‘worked’ downtown, 
where investors were eager to put private money into public projects” (Adams 
et al, 112-13).  
 The conceptual, financial, and spatial realignment of priorities away 
from blighted, low-income neighborhoods and toward Center City became the 
Figure 01.22: Society Hill redevelopment in progress.  Note the towers by I.M. Pei in the background and the 
historically rehabilitated rowhouse adjacent to a blighted, unrestored rowhouse in the foreground. (Source: Time, 
November 1964)
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dominant paradigm in Philadelphia for decades, even as the crisis of blight 
continued to evolve and deepen.  
THE END of URBAN RENEWAL
Planners’ unsuccessful, midcentury efforts to “solve” blight in Philadelphia raise 
a number of significant questions about what might have been done differently. 
How could a forward-thinking cadre of planners and architects, operating with 
considerable federal money at their disposal and committed to eliminating 
blight consistently miss the mark?  
Figure 01.23: Diagrammatic representation of “Population and Labor Force 
Estimates” from the 1960 Comprehensive Plan (Source: 1960 Comprehensive 
Plan)
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 One answer is that they simply misread the writing on the wall. 
Philadelphia’s Comprehensive Plan, a six-year planning effort completed in 
1960, was an ambitious, technocratic, data-driven document that captures 
the Zeitgeist, and describes how Philadelphia understood itself.  Though well 
conceived, it was predicated on three flawed “major background condition 
assumptions,” namely that “(1) Center City will remain the dominant regional 
center; (2) The City’s economic growth will proceed rapidly enough to enable 
the City to invest in the facilities called for; (3) The City will maintain a balanced 
population, including middle and high, as well as low-income families” (PCPC 
1960, 16).  Based on these assumptions and a number of authoritative tables 
and charts, the Plan predicted that a modest growth rate of around 5% would 
lead to a population of 2.25 million Philadelphians by 1980; this despite the 
considerable population loss of the 1950s.  To call the prediction optimistic 
would be overly generous; by 1980, Philadelphia’s population had shrunk to 
well under 1.7 million.  (Figure 01.23)
 This schizophrenic presumption of and planning for growth in the 
midst of decline extended beyond inaccurate population predictions. The 
Comprehensive Plan assured the reader that “with the exception of textiles, 
no major manufacturing groups are expected to suffer absolute decreases; in 
fact, substantial gains are anticipated for several of these groups, such as food, 
machinery and metals” (PCPC 1960, 28).  As it turned out, the 1960s and 1970s 
would prove physically and economically traumatic as the City hemorrhaged 
over 115,000 manufacturing jobs (Adams et al, 31).
 However, to fault Bacon, Rafsky and their colleagues for lacking 
premonitory gifts is to oversimplify matters and obfuscates the lessons to be 
learned from their missteps.  As Bacon well knew, “the very nature of urban 
blight itself is complex, elusive, difficult to define,” and in the middle decades of 
the twentieth century, changes far beyond the purview of planning alone were 
underway (Bacon 1949, 18).  Without past precedent, two opposite strategies 
were proposed, each of which had its own logic.  Bacon’s design-driven approach 
sought to adapt the fabric of neighborhoods to make them better places for 
Philadelphians, regardless of race or socioeconomic standing.  His image was 
powerful but it was ultimately overreliant on adjacent property owners, not to 
mention financial institutions, getting in line.  Witnessing Bacon sinking millions 
of public dollars into isolated developments surrounded by blight supported 
Rafsky’s alternative approach of using public subsidy to bolster neighborhoods 
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along the shores bounding the “sea of bad.”  Yet analysis alone could not 
provide an image to guide Philadelphia’s redevelopment policy, and renewal 
ended up happening almost exclusively in Philadelphia’s downtown.  Having 
unsuccessfully experimented with such polarized, polemical strategies in the 
1950s and early 1960s, one wonders whether some third mode of planning 
might have been possible.  Such a strategy, executed at a scale greater than 
that of the neighborhood but less than the city as a whole, and that used data 
and design to inform an image, never came to pass.
 Throughout the 1960s, urban renewal would come under fire from an 
unlikely alliance.  Detractors included liberal activist Jane Jacobs, who famously 
excoriated the program in The Death and Life of Great American Cities, civil 
rights activists who rebranded the program as “Negro Removal,” and fiscal 
conservatives like Martin Anderson, who, in a memo to President Nixon, incisively 
described the program’s “distinguished record of failure”:  “after 20 years, 
$3 billion, and one million evicted people, we find that a major consequence 
of urban renewal is a net reduction in low-income housing” (Anderson, 1). 
Heeding Anderson’s call, Nixon eliminated the urban renewal program in the 
early 1970s, effectively closing the book on large-scale public interventions in 
Philadelphia, even as blight and abandonment consumed the City.
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After decades of managing growth, Philadelphia’s planners were unable to 
predict, much less combat, the City’s precipitous decline.  Contrary to the 
projections of the 1960 Comprehensive Plan, the population loss of the 1950s 
marked the onset of a protracted period of shrinkage.  The City’s employment 
base followed a similar trajectory.  In the coming decades, factories that had been 
the backbone of Philadelphia’s neighborhoods closed their doors and shuttered 
their windows.  Many of the jobs followed Philadelphians to the suburbs, while 
others ended up in the booming American South and Southwest.  The loss of 
people and jobs sent the City into a downward spiral, as the diminished tax 
base hampered public service provision, which in turn exacerbated the crisis of 
blight, prompting further abandonment.
 And while the consequences of deindustrialization rippled throughout 
Philadelphia, the poorer, working class neighborhoods were hit disproportionately 
hard. The intractability of urban blight in what had become poor, predominantly 
Black neighborhoods stymied planners despite the strategies pursued by Bacon 
and Rafsky described in the previous chapter.  The new crisis of abandonment 
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THE CRISIS of ABANDONMENT
Figure 02.1: A North Philadelphia streetcape whose fabric has been largely eroded by demolition over time
(Photo © the author) 
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overshadowed the 
modernist optimism of 
the “Philadelphia Cure,” 
raising truly existential 
questions about the role of 
city planning in shrinking 
cities.  As Edmund Bacon 
despondently articulated 
in 1975, “until and unless 
we face up to the issue 
of abandonment…and 
until we get a program 
which really handles the 
situation, we are going 
to get nowhere…There’s 
a politics of population 
explosion, but there is no 
politics of depopulation. 
We have barely, barely, barely, barely begun to realize that we must face up to 
our failures” (Bacon 1975, 14-15).  
 The challenge of facing up to failure was made more onerous by 
concomitant changes in local leadership and in the mechanisms for delivering 
federal funding.  A leadership void was created when Edmund Bacon stepped 
down as Director of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission in 1970, 
precipitating the agency’s virtual dismantling.  In addition, the curtain falling on 
urban renewal presaged the end of large, federally funded revitalization in favor 
of distributed Community Development Block Grants.  
 As a result of these and other changes, by the late 1970s many of the 
neighborhoods deemed “most blighted” by the CURA Study had depopulated. 
Abandonment, not overcrowding, was the new paradigm. “Blight” no longer 
evoked families crowded into narrow rowhouses, but rather those selfsame 
rowhouses empty and crumbling after years of neglect.  Consequently, the 
ever-malleable conception of blight was expanded to include not just blighted 
structures but the ubiquitous vacant lots, known appropriately as Philadelphia’s 
“missing teeth.”  (Figure 02.2)  A new, de facto image of poverty and decay took 
hold, not to be loosed until the early 1990s.
Figure 02.2: A typical “missing tooth” (Photo © the author)
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 Under the business-friendly regime of Mayor Ed Rendell (1992 – 1999), 
Philadelphia rode a wave of national prosperity.  At this time, several actors 
revived the fight against blight in Philadelphia’s long-neglected neighborhoods. 
Though operating in a severely constrained financial environment, diverse 
actors such as Office of Housing and Community Development Director John 
Kromer and the Pennsylvania Horticultural Society (PHS) began to experiment 
with adaptive strategies keyed to abandonment.  Like Bacon, these strategies 
were neighborhood-scaled, yet they were in the service of much different images 
and in response to much different understandings of blight.  And while Kromer 
and PHS were united in a conviction that much of Philadelphia could never 
recover its erstwhile density, they posited contrasting images for high vacancy 
neighborhoods.
DECADES of DECLINE
The oft-decried “suburban exodus” that began with an outward trickle of 70,000 
Philadelphians in the 1950s and 54,000 in the 1960s became a veritable 
flood in the 1970s.  During that decade, Philadelphia lost over 250,000 
residents, putting it in the unfortunate company of its Rust Belt cousins, Detroit, 
Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Buffalo.  The impact of this abandonment on the 
built environment was stark indeed; interminable stretches of boarded up 
rowhouses came to represent the contemporary notion of blight. (Figure 02.3)
 A 1972 report by the Housing Association of Delaware Valley, Housing 
Abandonment: The Future Forgotten, captured the confusion and fear of the 
era:
For the first time we are being forced to question our assumption that 
the inner-city housing stock will always be available for somebody’s use 
as we are faced with the possibility of seeing the entire core of central 
cities becoming inhuman and uninhabitable shells.  We are threatened 
in fact with the destruction of central cities as we have known them.  
Philadelphia is one of those cities whose very life is threatened…the fact 
that the residential core of a superficially stable city like Philadelphia 
is being left vacant and derelict is terrifying. (Housing Association of 
Delaware Valley, 2)
Researchers such as political scientist Sandra Featherman conducted intensive 
research on the psychology of abandonment, asking such basic questions as 
“Who is the early residential abandoner?  Why does he abandon his property? 
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And which properties are abandoned early?” (Featherman, 2).  Featherman’s 
1976 publication, Early Abandonment: A Profile of Residential Abandonment in 
its Early Stages of Development noted that the “discarding of residential property 
in neighborhoods has reached epidemic proportions…in some census tracts in 
Philadelphia, for example, over forty percent of the residential structures have 
been withdrawn from the market, with many blocks virtually entirely vacated” 
(Featherman, 1).  Of the many findings in Featherman’s study, one that was 
perhaps most distressing was the unpredictability of abandonment. While 
there were surely useful neighborhood indicators (parcel size, age of structure, 
etc.), Featherman documented was human nature at work: individuals making 
decisions prompted by any number of personal circumstances. 
 The conventional wisdom at the time was that the suburban migration of 
the middle-class, given the catchy sobriquet “White Flight,” was precipitated by 
Figure 02.3: A desolate stretch of abandoned rowhouses in North Philadelphia, 1975 (Photo © Temple 
University Libraries, Urban Archives)
61
fears engendered by the race riots of the 1960s.  Yet as Adams observes, there 
were many other factors at play: 
It is still not clear to what degree the movement of whites from the city 
was actually grounded in explicit racism.  Indeed, during the 1960s and 
1970s the collapse of the manufacturing economy of the city and the 
shift of jobs to the suburbs might just as easily explain whites’ migration 
to the suburbs…It is at least as plausible to argue that this was a flight 
toward economic opportunity as it is to argue that is was a flight from 
racial conflict (Adams et al, 84).
And beyond the exigencies of employment, basic housing preferences were 
rapidly changing.  As Kenneth Jackson describes in Crabgrass Frontier, the 
amenities and homogeneity of the suburbs had a powerful draw, recasting the 
collective understanding of success (Jackson, 239).  Whatever the motivations 
underlying Philadelphians’ decisions to leave the City, abandonment was 
a pervasive phenomenon, though not a uniformly distributed one.  Certain 
neighborhoods, especially the 19th century streetcar suburbs in North and 
West Philadelphia, were particularly susceptible to abandonment.  As Adams 
reported, “streetcar suburbs were inherently less stable because the residents 
did not have close ties to a work place.  The streetcar suburbs also contained 
a higher proportion of white-collar and professional workers who, with greater 
resources and earning power, were more mobile than factory workers” (Adams 
et al, 79).  
 Confronted with the spatial realities of population loss, some planners 
and economists did attempt to wrestle with the “politics of depopulation.” New 
York City Housing Commission Roger Starr, for instance, famously advocated for 
the “planned shrinkage” of New York City in the 1970s.  Less well known, but 
more interesting from a city form, or image, perspective, was urban economist 
Wilbur Thompson’s work.  In his contribution to the 1977 publication, How 
Cities Grow Old Gracefully, Thompson acknowledges the limitations to even 
successful revitalization schemes such as Society Hill, positing the need for 
proactive, designed shrinkage strategies:
We can all point to success stories in inner city renewal: historic districts 
(and many not nearly so historic) that are well on the way back to 
respectability and stability and often even high status.  But these bright 
spots do not fill the full canvas…As depopulation leads to property 
abandonment, what land management strategies are open to us – how 
should we arrange the holes that open up in the inner city?  We could 
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just take depopulation and abandonment as it comes, economizing on 
the time and energy of the public managers.  Or we could instead try 
to guide the dwindling population into a rough checkerboard pattern, 
seeking to cluster those persons who remain and alternate these clusters 
with other places that we help to empty out…Checkerboard clustering 
and clearing would not only preserve old efficiencies, but offers some 
new gains.  Greater physical separation between neighborhoods implies 
greater physical identity and could in turn promote a greater sense of 
community.  (Thompson, 68-69)
Though endlessly fascinating in theory, it is fair to say the notions of planned 
shrinkage or checkerboard clustering gained little traction.  As Starr recalled, 
“planned shrinkage is not a popular idea – for simply suggesting that the 
department of city planning should study it, I was denounced as a genocidal 
lunatic and enemy of man” (Starr, 379).  Indeed this hard lesson has been 
learned and relearned in recent years by well-intentioned planners who have 
suggested similar approaches to shrinkage in Detroit and New Orleans.
 Despite the research Featherman and others dedicated to the study of 
abandonment, structural changes to federal funding profoundly recast the role 
of the city in the development process.  “In the shift from the federal Urban 
Renewal program …public agencies lost control over the definition, site selection, 
and planning of projects and became primarily conduits for private developers 
to assemble financing for their projects” (Adams et al, 116).  Though urban 
renewal had an extremely problematic legacy in cities throughout the country, 
the elimination of the program created a void in public financial support for 
urban revitalization. 
 The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, signed into 
law by President Ford as part of the Housing and Community Development Act 
of 1974, consolidated a number of place-based, project-specific federal grants 
– urban renewal, neighborhood development, Model Cities, and neighborhood 
and public facilities, among others – into a single grant as a means of reducing 
bureaucracy.  Henceforth, federal grants would be distributed according to 
metrics of city size and relative poverty levels rather than in response to specific 
proposals.  This consolidation and simplification severed the linkage between 
Washington and cities’ individual redevelopment projects, and while there were 
basic overriding national objectives  - including “the elimination of slums and 
blight and the prevention of blighting influences and the deterioration of property 
and neighborhood and community facilities” - federal oversight was relatively 
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minimal (Hays, 198).  Indeed, employing libertarian principles within the context 
of a federal grant program, it was decided, “communities [should] establish 
their own community development priorities and allocate their block grants and 
other resources to meet them” (Fishman, 203).  The policy implications of this 
shift were dramatic and swift.  As an article in Urban Lawyer warned in 1975, 
only one year after the codification of CDBG:
Local officials are given unprecedented responsibility and discretion 
in formulating and carrying out their own housing and community 
development programs…If these responsibilities are meaningfully 
exercised…a more rational and comprehensive approach to solving 
urban problems should result.  If they are not, the potential is great for 
compounding existing problems and inflicting serious injuries on persons 
of low and moderate income whom the Act is principally intended to 
assist. (Fishman, 214)
This concern was particularly prescient in a strong-mayor city like Philadelphia. 
As I describe below, mayoral priorities have circumscribed redevelopment policy, 
for better and for worse, ever since. 
FRANK RIZZO’S BLIND EYE
Racked in the 1960s by race riots, disinvestment, and job loss, Philadelphia 
voted itself into the hands of law-and-order candidate Frank Rizzo.  Rizzo, a former 
cop, was an “old school” South Philadelphian with a reputation for patronage 
hires and a coolness towards the City’s Black population.  A scandal surrounding 
Rizzo’s scuttling of a housing project in a majority White neighborhood in West 
Philadelphia led a US District Court Judge to conclude in 1976 that “Mayor Rizzo 
stated that he considered public housing to be the same as Black housing…
Mayor Rizzo therefore felt that there should not be any public housing placed 
in White neighborhoods because people in White neighborhoods did not want 
Black people moving in with them.  Furthermore, Mayor Rizzo stated that he did 
not intend to allow PHA to ruin nice neighborhoods” (Daughen, 196).
 As Joseph Daughen and Peter Binzen made clear in their 1977 
biography, and as the judge’s verdict underscored, Rizzo was fundamentally 
opposed to housing provision, which he considered tantamount to Philadelphia 
Housing Authority and Redevelopment Authority “handouts.”  Rizzo made a 
priority of stacking the boards of each organization with his cronies shortly after 
his election, ensuring their quiescence.  Though Rizzo putatively supported a 
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scattered site public housing program during his campaign, promising to “take 
title to [Philadelphia’s estimated 40,000] abandoned homes, rehabilitate those 
that had potential, and demolish the rest,” it seems that particular promise fell 
by the wayside (Daughen, 192). Rizzo did, however, make good on his promise 
to “demolish the rest,” and during his time in office an unprecedented number 
of rowhouses, some occupied, some not, would come down.  Between 1970 
and 1983 (Rizzo presided as mayor from 1972-80), almost 17,000 residential 
buildings were demolished.  Of these, 8,000 came down in Lower North 
Philadelphia alone (PCPC 1987, 32).
 That there is not a single mention of the Philadelphia City Planning 
Commission in Daughen and Binzen’s account of the first years of the Rizzo 
mayoralty, speaks volumes.  The omission indicates both Rizzo’s disinclination 
to support city planning and the degree to which the post-Bacon Planning 
Commission had been relegated to near obscurity.  Among the very few reports 
published by the Planning Commission during Rizzo’s tenure was the bluntly 
titled Issues for the 1980s, whose opening line “Philadelphia is losing people 
and jobs” says it all (PCPC 1980, 1).  Most of Issues is a boilerplate description 
of economic development challenges, though a section entitled “Image of the 
City” posits the complexity and importance of an image.  “In the 1980s, it will be 
Center City’s image and function as a place, or the special image it projects as 
a place, that will be of crucial importance to its continued successful perception 
by businessmen, investors, and tourists” (PCPC 1980, 40).  Notably absent 
from this litany of stakeholders are Philadelphia’s residents.  In addition, the 
statement’s explicit emphasis on Center City leaves little doubt about the 
increasing conflation of planning and downtown economic development.
FIGHTING BLIGHT in the 1990s
Though less personally problematic, Rizzo’s rather feckless successors William 
Green III (1980-84), and Philadelphia’s first Black mayor, W. Wilson Goode 
(1984-92), struggled to preserve an increasingly dismal status quo.  In 1991, 
however, District Attorney Ed Rendell was elected mayor, ushering in a slow, but 
palpable reversal of fortune for the City.  By all accounts a charismatic, savvy 
politician, Rendell shook a moribund Philadelphia to life with a combination of 
business-oriented tax policies and propitious timing.
 Needless to say, in the early 1990s the mayoralty was a dubious 
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prize considering the City was on the brink of bankruptcy.  At the time of his 
election, 20% of the City was living below the poverty line and only 85,000 
of the City’s approximately 300,000 midcentury manufacturing jobs remained. 
Not surprisingly, decades of what amounted to “benign neglect” had taken a 
toll, and by the late 1980s there were “more than 21,000 long-term vacant 
residential structures in Philadelphia…[with] 1,000 properties becoming first-
time vacancies every year” (PCPC 1987, 30).  And this count doesn’t even begin 
to account for the tens of thousands of vacant lots that resulted from Rizzo’s 
demolition campaign.  
 As mayor, Rendell’s demonstrable passion was for economic 
development, particularly in Center City.  One of his landmark decisions was to 
designate the entire city as blighted in order to support the broad application 
of a ten-year tax abatement program (Kromer 2010, 30).  From a planning 
perspective, Rendell’s pet project was the Avenue of the Arts initiative, which 
sought to bring theaters, restaurants, and most importantly people, to the Broad 
Street corridor in the evenings.  In a recent interview, John Kromer, appointed 
Director of Philadelphia’s Office of Housing and Community Development 
(OHCD) in 1992, put it thusly:  “He really wanted to develop the Broad Street 
corridor.  His reflexive response to a development question was, ‘How does this 
relate to the Avenue of the Arts?’  He devoted a huge amount of attention to 
that”  (Kromer 2012).  
 Rendell had little personal interest in the high-vacancy neighborhoods 
ringing Philadelphia’s city center that actually were blighted.  But given the clear 
and present questions about Philadelphia’s very solvency, Rendell’s Center City 
focus was not predicated on the latent racism of a Frank Rizzo, but on political 
pragmatism and his own business acumen.  And while he stayed away from 
housing or blight policy, Rendell implicitly supported new initiatives by way of 
John Kromer.  As Kromer put it, the Mayor provided “an opportunity for me and 
others to make some decisions about what we thought would make sense.  We 
had a great deal of independence and consistent political backing.  The basic 
directive was, ‘figure it out’” (Kromer 2012).  
 Though Mayor Rendell compensated for his disinterest in housing policy 
by deputizing John Kromer at OHCD, he made no such concessions to the 
Planning Commission. As John Kromer recently recalled, Rendell was a self-
proclaimed man of action, and was deeply skeptical of planning’s often long 
time horizon: “He was uncomfortable with city planning…He was in a do it now 
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mode, constantly aware of the City’s crisis.  Taking a year to develop plans didn’t 
make any sense to him.  He and the Planning Commission were not able to 
communicate effectively at that point and were not on the same page” (Kromer 
2012).  Setting aside Rendell’s personal convictions, this incredulous view of 
long-term planning is a perennial problem in strong-mayor cities with two-term 
limits; the benefits of any planning work authorized and funded today will likely 
come to fruition under, and be credited to, some future mayor.
JOHN KROMER’S INNER-CITY SUBURBS
Considering the scale of decline in many of Philadelphia’s neighborhoods, 
“figuring it out” was no small order.  Responding to Mayor Rendell’s emphasis 
on the Broad Street corridor, Kromer and OHCD’s first major undertaking was 
sited along Broad Street, north of the Vine Street Expressway and south of 
Temple University in Lower North Philadelphia.  Coincidentally, this first effort 
was immediately adjacent to East Poplar, the site of Bacon’s original midcentury 
Redevelopment Area Plan.  This adjacency bears mentioning as it reflects the 
persistence of blight in North Philadelphia despite the innovative midcentury 
work of the Planning Commission.  Indeed, Kromer’s selected site was in the 
midst of what Rafsky had described as the residual “sea of bad.”  
 Kromer, like Bacon, was operating in a blighted neighborhood, yet in this 
case the condition was manifest not in overcrowded slums but in abandoned, 
crumbling rowhouses and garbage-filled vacant lots.  Bacon’s adaptive image 
was no longer a resonant one for Philadelphia’s blighted neighborhoods given 
how little actual physical or social fabric remained.  The bleak urban landscape 
selected by Kromer and OHCD elicited such post-apocalyptic descriptors as 
“bombed-out,” and “vast expanses of nothing but brick rubble,” as if only a war 
could have created such desolation (V. Loeb). 
 Kromer’s decision to focus on North Philadelphia can be understood as a 
return to Bacon’s “worst-first” approach.  In this context, Kromer was breathing 
life into Bacon’s then forty-year-old conviction that “within any neighborhood 
the vital force for regeneration is still alive…in the midst of all this decline there 
still exists the vitality to improve,” (Bacon 1949, 19-20).  Kromer was not an 
urban designer, and his plans were not predicated on physical determinism.  As 
I describe below however, he did propose a radical image for the neighborhood. 
Kromer sought regeneration not through design per se, but in the activation of a 
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seemingly nonexistent real estate market and in capitalizing on latent demand 
for a low-density “suburban” housing stock. 
 In a slim but impactful policy paper, Home in North Philadelphia, Kromer 
concisely articulated the challenges and opportunities underlying his vision for 
Lower North Philadelphia.  The point of departure for this image, as described in 
Home, was the acceptance that Philadelphia was a shrinking city.  Accordingly, 
Kromer argued that rebuilding the City’s high vacancy neighborhoods with the 
same traditional, dense rowhouse fabric that had been so unceremoniously 
abandoned would be naïve and wasteful, and also a missed opportunity:
Philadelphia in the 1990s does not need the same high level of housing 
density as it did a century before, when North Philadelphia was a 
manufacturing center with worker housing densely clustered around 
factories.  Lower density development would offer residents amenities 
such as side yards and driveways – and a ‘spread out’ development 
approach could revitalize acres of North Philadelphia – not just target 
blocks. (Kromer 1993, 10-11)
In place of Philadelphia’s traditional density of approximately thirty units per 
acre, Kromer suggested ten as a viable alternative.  This assertion was, I believe, 
one of the first practicable attempts to answer Bacon’s call to “face up to the 
issue of abandonment,” and represents Kromer’s de facto image.  But it also 
came down to a fairly basic calculation: there was a surfeit of vacant housing 
and vacant land in an area of market failure, in which construction of new or 
the preservation of old would incur costs far in excess of possible sales prices. 
Any construction or rehabilitation therefore required significant public subsidy, 
and the funds available for such efforts were increasingly scarce.  By rejecting 
Philadelphia’s historic fabric, building bigger homes on reconfigured lots the 
City could quite literally stretch its money further.  This required the assembly 
of several contiguous, narrow parcels and their replatting into something wholly 
different.  This approach reframed blight, imbuing vacancy with value, as it 
provided an opportunity to work at a large scale in an advantageously located 
neighborhood without incurring the costs of mass relocation.  
 Kromer put the principles espoused in Home to the test in his 176-unit 
West Poplar development.  Comprised entirely of single-family houses, West 
Poplar created a suburban enclave in the heart of Lower North Philadelphia. 
(Figure 02.4)  Architecturally, the West Poplar houses were unapologetically 
suburban, offering “features such as master bedrooms, country kitchens, 
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central air-conditioning, full basements and private yards, with brick front and 
rear vinyl-siding exteriors” (Heavens). Urbanistically, the houses’ setbacks, 
driveways, and fenced-in yards presented a stark contrast to the City’s 
traditional fabric.  Kromer’s image took principles undergirding “defensible 
space,” a concept coined by Oscar Newman in the early 1970s that stressed 
“the range of mechanisms – real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas 
of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance – that combine to bring 
an environment under the control of its residents,” to their logical conclusion 
(Newman, 3). 
 Herein lies a critical distinction between the dominant images of the 
City in the 1950s and 1990s. Bacon, Stonorov, and Kahn were fighting blight 
through an adaptation Philadelphia’s fabric.  Their design schemes respected 
and largely preserved the Gestalt of rowhouse neighborhoods, proposing the 
introduction and integration of new features like a pedestrian greenway, and 
community facilities.  Kromer on the other hand, attacked the problem by 
rejecting the existing built environment in favor of one more “defensible” and 
more in line with perceived housing preferences.  Treating the area as a tabula 
rasa, Kromer grafted a decontextualized streetscape onto several blocks of 
North Philadelphia.
 Almost twenty years later the design decisions underlying West Poplar 
continue to provoke polarized responses.  In Design After Decline (2012), 
Figure 02.4: The houses at West Poplar (Photo © the author) 
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MIT Professor Brent Ryan challenges the formal banality of West Poplar and 
subsequent suburban developments, asserting that “from either a progressive 
policy or critical urban design perspective, North Philadelphia’s suburbanization 
seemed both unnecessary and senseless…the City’s commitment to 
suburbanization in North Philadelphia was perhaps its most significant urban 
design failure of the post-renewal era” (Ryan 2012, 135).  And the failure is 
not purely aesthetic.  West Poplar and similar, adjacent developments break 
the built rhythm of Broad Street, de-densifying one of the City’s best-served 
transit corridors.  Furthermore, building at a low density arguably precludes the 
eventual integration of additional services, particularly small-scale commercial 
uses, characteristic of Philadelphia’s neighborhoods.  
 In Fixing Broken Cities (2010), Kromer anticipates Ryan’s critique of West 
Poplar, but provides an important reminder of the context of North Philadelphia 
in the 1990s.  He states outright that in a high vacancy area of market failure, 
discussions of mixed-use development were beside the point.  “The West Poplar 
development had a limited number of goals,” among them to “build new housing 
at a larger scale…to spread development out over a larger area; and to create 
a housing product that would be more attractive than standard government 
subsidized housing and therefore more likely to sell in the weak mid-1990s real 
estate market within a neighborhood that had not experienced a high volume 
of real estate transactions since Eisenhower’s time” (Kromer 2010, 87-88). 
John Carpenter, Deputy Executive Director of the Philadelphia Redevelopment 
Authority, echoed Kromer’s defense in a recent conversation.  Speaking of West 
Poplar and similar “suburban” developments, he emphasized the value of a 
variegated housing stock:
There’s a reason that one quarter of the population of this City left for 
the suburbs over the last fifty years.  They wanted space, a little bit 
of land around them.  They wanted something they were not getting 
in the City…The way I see it we’re not missing an opportunity there, 
we’re diversifying the housing stock of the City.  And we are creating a 
collection of neighborhoods of choice out of neighborhoods that were 
the last choice for many people.  It’s not like there’s a shortage of land 
for development.  In fact we’ve barely kept up.  One might argue we 
haven’t kept up remotely.  (Carpenter 2012)
This debate is further obfuscated by the catholic celebration of Yorktown, a 
private, midcentury housing development described in the previous chapter. 
Developed in the 1960s in the hybrid rowhouse/cul-de-sac vernacular, Yorktown 
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brought suburban amenities to Lower North Philadelphia’s middle-class Black 
population. (Figure 02.5) Many have celebrated Yorktown for its high-quality 
urban design and its convincing, contextual transplantation of a foreign housing 
typology.  Professor Ryan has called Yorktown’s houses an improvement  “upon 
the nineteenth-century Philadelphia rowhouse and on Modernist design itself” 
(Ryan 2012, 144).  
 Given the superlative praise of Yorktown’s design, it is perhaps surprising 
that the development was an explicit source of inspiration for Kromer considering 
the design decisions he supported.  In his 1996 publication, Learning from 
Yorktown, Kromer acknowledges the development’s contextual design but 
focuses on its delivery of hitherto unimaginable amenities to an underserved 
population in the urban core: 
[Yorktown] featured suburban design innovations popular in the 1950s 
and 60s, such as cul-de-sacs, patios, and attached garages.  These 
amenities helped to fully distinguish Yorktown from both the area’s 
troubled past and from the surrounding neighborhoods of older stock 
rental housing, while the rowhouse styling of the housing preserved a 
uniquely urban identity. (Kromer 1996, 1) 
Kromer’s astute analysis of Yorktown raises questions about why a similar 
hybrid wasn’t pursued at West Poplar.  As Kromer put it recently:
Figure 02.5: Yorktown today (Photo © the author)
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Yorktown was deliberately designed to look like contemporary suburban 
housing with an explicit recognition that this was a type of housing which 
African Americans were being denied at the time.  This was a type of 
housing that was most successful in terms of the market, at that time.  
Testing that in the Philadelphia market seemed the best way to go in an 
uncertain market. (Kromer 2012) 
The implication, of course, is that the suburban-style townhouses of West Poplar 
are, in fact, the conceptual and even aesthetic heirs of Yorktown.  Like Yorktown 
developer Norman Denny, Kromer’s vision was of a stylistically recognizable, 
yet distinct enclave within the City that would diversify the available housing 
options with a new building stock that bespoke middle-class success.  
 Kromer’s work in Lower North Philadelphia represents an image of sorts, 
providing both a design strategy and a specific solution to the contemporary 
understanding blight.  Indeed, the strength of this image is such that many 
subsequent developments, subsidized and otherwise, adopted the suburban 
vocabulary.  (Figure 02.6)  Yet this unresolved, perhaps unresolvable debate 
over city form is as pressing now as it was twenty years ago.  Philadelphia has 
plenty of neighborhoods that resemble West Poplar in the early 1990s, and 
decisions made today will shape tomorrow’s opportunities. 
 Though steady appreciation indicates that the West Poplar townhouses 
remain popular among homebuyers, the development did come at a substantial 
Figure 02.6: A bird’s-eye view of North Philadelphia shows the complete suburbanization of this Lower North 
Philadelphia neighborhoods.  Note the cul-de-sac and the occasional grouping of rowhouses  (Source: Google Earth) 
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expense to the City, raising questions about the strategy’s replicability.  The 
aforementioned land assembly, site preparation, and construction subsidies 
cost Philadelphia millions; and while it largely stabilized the immediate area, 
it did not stem the tide of abandonment.  Disheartening 2000 Census figures 
indicated not only that North Philadelphia lost population during the 1990s, 
but that the rate of abandonment was nearly double that of the 1980s (14% vs. 
8.6%).  
 The continued decline the blocks around West Poplar sparked a debate 
that would have rung uncannily familiar to anyone who lived through the 1950s. 
In a Philadelphia Inquirer article from 2001, City Councilmember (and current 
Mayor) Michael Nutter lamented that while trying to prevent North Philadelphia 
“from completely falling apart . . . we have not done enough to stabilize and 
promote many other areas of the city” (Gorenstein).  Anthony McIntosh, 
executive director of the Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation, the 
agency responsible for the financing of housing construction, echoed Nutter’s 
concerns: “We have to develop decent and affordable housing, but if we’re not 
maintaining what we currently have, by the time we complete new construction…
what we didn’t preserve will become a new problem” (Gorenstein).  Inadvertently 
perhaps, both men were reiterating William Rafsky’s midcentury lament that, 
“[we created] an island of good surrounded by a sea of bad (Rafsky, 8)”
 Past was indeed prologue and, as I describe in the following chapter, 
Kromer’s place-based, “worst-first,” housing-oriented interventions in blighted 
neighborhoods would soon give way to a citywide plan that rejected a strong 
design image in favor of abstract analysis.
ADAPTATION THROUGH STABILIZATION
If John Kromer’s work in North Philadelphia represents one particular image of 
a blighted neighborhood transformed into a suburban enclave, the concurrent 
work by the Philadelphia Horticultural Society (PHS) presents an equally 
forceful, yet almost diametrically opposed strategy for dealing with the same 
set of problems. 
 PHS is a storied, almost 200-year-old organization best known for its 
annual sponsorship of the world’s largest indoor flower show.  Beginning in 
the 1970s, however, PHS expanded its operations, creating Philadelphia Green, 
an innovative community greening and gardening program.  Partnering with 
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community organizations, PHS “helped 
turn vacant lots into gardens, created 
garden blocks by lining streets with 
flowering barrels and house-fronts with 
window boxes, planted street trees, and 
developed small sitting parks” (Bonham 
et al, 17).  (Figure 02.7) These soft 
interventions were specifically meant 
to counter blight in “communities that 
were teetering on the edge of despair” 
(Bonham et al, 17).
 By the late 1990s Philadelphia 
Green had an established track record 
in long-neglected neighborhoods. 
And while their time and investments 
yielded cherished neighborhood assets, 
the multi-year commitments and 
considerable effort required restricted 
PHS’s work to those communities with 
sufficient capacity to plan and manage 
these assets.  Furthermore, the scale of blight and vacancy in the City dwarfed 
the limited impact of the program.  As former PHS Executive Vice President, 
Blaine Bonham described in a recent interview, “the amount of vacant land 
that was coming online in the early 1990s overwhelmed any volunteer efforts 
in the communities…It was like a tsunami of vacant land” (Bonham 2012). 
If the program was to be brought to scale, a simpler strategy that could be 
implemented and maintained independent of community capacity was required:
Our thinking was, we’ve got to propose a solution that can go to scale.  
It had to be a low maintenance solution…You didn’t want to overinvest 
in it.  It had to be something that could be maintained relatively simply 
without volunteers.  And that was the assumption – you can’t have 
volunteers do this, you have to commit the funds for this kind of land 
maintenance. (Bonham 2012)  
With the municipal support of Kromer and the Office of Housing and Community 
Development, and with financial support from prominent Philadelphia-based 
foundations, William Penn Foundation and Pew Charitable Trusts, PHS designed 
Figure 02.7: The results of one of Philadelphia 
Green’s many successful community partnerships 
(Source: Bonham et al, Old Cities / Green Cities)
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a vacant land management program for Eastern North Philadelphia.  This area, 
comprising only 2.5% of the City’s land, contained 20% of Philadelphia’s 32,000 
vacant lots. 
 PHS’s simple but impactful solution to the surfeit of vacant lots in 
Eastern North Philadelphia was to develop a scalable lot stabilization program 
able to meet the overwhelming need.  Lot stabilization in this case is a process 
by which debris is removed, grass and shade trees are planted in newly added 
topsoil, and a signature wooden fence is erected around the periphery of the 
site.  The intention behind this treatment was as simple as the treatment itself, 
“the most practical things were grass and trees – which after ten or fifteen 
years add considerable value to the land – and fences.  You can step over 
those fences; that wasn’t the point.  The fence was a signal that that land 
was being cared for” (Bonham 2012). (Figure 02.8-9)  Indeed the fence was 
among the most impactful aspects of the lot stabilization program.  Using the 
same operative defensible space principles that suggested the need for private 
yards at West Poplar, the fence was used to signify ownership, even though 
the owners of many of these parcels were nowhere to be found.  Significantly, 
the fences were built with openings to accommodate maintenance crews, but 
also to implicitly provide public access to the lots despite private ownership. 
The fence design itself – an unpainted, wooden, post-and-rail treatment – was 
a dramatic departure from the ubiquitous Jersey barriers or worse, chain link 
fences. PHS’s lot stabilization treatment asserted that an inexpensive solution, 
thoughtfully and consistently applied could be extremely impactful, providing a 
means for adapting blighted neighborhoods to lower densities.
 With these objectives in mind, PHS targeted New Kensington, a 
neighborhood in Eastern North Philadelphia, for its pilot lot stabilization 
program.  New Kensington was an industrial neighborhood developed in the 
mid-nineteenth century due to its propitious proximity to the Delaware River. 
In the wake of widespread factory closures, the neighborhood quickly lost a 
disproportionate share of its population.  By the early 1990s, the neighborhood 
contained over 1,000 vacant lots, a situation so dire that a community planning 
process determined vacancy, not drugs or crime, to be what residents described 
as “the biggest problem of all” (Bonham 2002, 93).  Despite the elevated 
vacancy rate, stable religious organizations and the presence of a young but 
high capacity community developer, New Kensington Community Development 
Corporation (NKCDC), buoyed the neighborhood.  These institutional sources of 
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Figure 02.8: A stabilized corner lot (Photo © the author) 
Figure 02.9: A sequence of stabilized lots (Photo © the author) 
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strength provided a community context for the pilot, creating an opportunity to 
implement the operative model at a neighborhood scale.  
 An analysis of the New Kensington pilot program by Philadelphia-based 
consultancy, Fairmount Ventures, yielded a number of important findings.  The 
pilot program, which treated over 500 lots, had “a significant impact, visually 
and psychologically, on [the] neighborhood” (Fairmount, 8).  The study also 
identified the necessity of buy-in from and partnerships with community-based 
organizations.  In addition, Fairmount’s study exposed limitations to PHS’s 
pilot program.  First, not all neighborhoods have strong local organizations like 
NKCDC, precluding the same degree of involvement.   Another was that “basic, 
standardized cleaning and low-level greening represent a first step in vacant 
land management, but does not inspire community involvement over the long 
haul.  Community planning for vacant land management needs to address 
parallel tracks, the personal and the communal” (Fairmount, 8).  The study 
also indicated that lot stabilization work must take place in the context of larger 
neighborhood redevelopment plans, and thus requires close collaboration with 
the City Planning Commission.  
 Since the initial implementation of PHS’s lot stabilization program in the 
1990s, a number of recent studies have proven what was anecdotally known 
to be true – lot stabilization did much more than beautify a block.  In 2005, 
University of Pennsylvania Professor Susan Wachter generated a “geographic 
database, based on the location of property parcels and the timing of property 
transactions, as well as the location and timing of public investment” and used 
a hedonic regression analysis to isolate the impact of greening on property 
values.  Wachter’s analysis indicated “vacant land improvements result in 
surrounding housing values increasing by as much as 30%, a large impact. 
New tree plantings increase surrounding housing values by approximately 10%” 
(Wachter, 16).  
 And as recently as November 2011, a report in the American Journal of 
Epidemiology concluded that PHS’s work was having a demonstrable effect on 
public health and safety:
In terms of safety, our analyses showed that vacant lot greening was 
associated with gun assaults, which were significantly reduced citywide 
after the greening treatment.  Vandalism and criminal mischief were also 
significantly reduced after the greening treatment in at least one section 
of Philadelphia.  In terms of health, vacant lot greening was associated 
with residents’ reporting significantly less stress and more exercise in 
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select sections of Philadelphia. (Branas et al, 1301)
These statistically significant findings have burnished the reputation of the 
program and are a useful reminder of the interconnection between health, 
safety, and the quality of the built environment.
 Though the lot stabilization work was meant as a holding pattern rather 
than a permanent transformation, it communicates a strong public commitment 
to a neighborhood.  And while the scattered installations can seem rather ad hoc, 
Philadelphia Green’s Senior Director Bob Grossman identified a loose design 
logic that governs site selection: “We propose sites based on our knowledge of 
the community and the City.  We prioritize the most visible sites to encourage 
economic development, sites that can help stabilize transitional blocks, and 
sites that will have the most impact in terms of health and safety like schools 
and recreation centers” (Grossman).  Given that PHS’s installations are likely to 
remain in place until property values exceed construction costs – which might 
be never given the realities of market failure – this work represents an image 
much different from the one at work in West Poplar.  Whereas Kromer took a 
proactive position with respect to vacancy and blight, rejecting what was there in 
favor of something new, PHS is reactively assisting in the adaptation of blighted 
neighborhoods to new physical and economic realities.  And while Kromer was 
positing a neighborhood-scaled image, PHS’s work operates at both the scale 
of the block and the neighborhood depending on the concentration of vacancy.
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The resurgent concern over blight that began in the 1990s found its voice in 
Council President John Street.  As Council Representative for the high vacancy 
Fifth District in North Philadelphia, Street positioned himself as the champion 
of Philadelphia’s neighborhoods in direct opposition to Rendell’s single-minded 
focus on downtown revitalization.  Upon securing the Democratic nomination, 
Street built his campaign around an expressly “anti-blight” platform.  Street 
promised to fight blight with a sweeping program that would come to be known 
as the Neighborhood Transformation Initiative (NTI).  
 NTI was a bold approach to urban policy that sought to combat the 
physical manifestations of abandonment with widespread demolition, and 
to stimulate the City’s moribund real estate market with strategic property 
acquisition and disposition.  Due to its large geographic and financial scale, NTI 
was fraught by Council infighting and cost overruns.  Furthermore, NTI’s focus 
03
THE CHALLENGES of 
TRANSFORMATION
Figure 03.1: The oxymoronic detached rowhouse - one of the unfortunate results of NTI-era demolitions
(Photo © the author) 
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on clearance, eminent domain, and relocation revived the dormant, unresolved 
anxieties of a citizenry still smarting from the urban renewal era.   And while 
NTI was not simply “urban renewal redux,” as its detractors would claim, policy 
implementation was circumscribed by perceived parallels to urban renewal. 
Ironically, as much as NTI was hampered by its resemblance to renewal-era 
policies, it was a reluctance to learn from those selfsame policies that spelled 
its failure.  
 Despite NTI’s distinctly physical, interventionist approach to fighting 
blight with demolition, property acquisition, and strategic disposition, the policy 
was never communicated in terms of an image for Philadelphia.  Instead, 
NTI was consistently framed within the neoliberal, image-less idea of market 
activation.  In this respect, NTI missed an opportunity to draw upon the bold 
urbanist experiments of the renewal era and the more recent strategies of the 
1990s, falling into the same trap William Rafsky and David Wallace had in the 
late 1950s.  As I argue below, NTI’s failure to provide an aspirational image of 
Philadelphia precluded the public and political support needed to implement 
such an ambitious initiative.  Indeed, the common conception of NTI as little 
more than an expensive, large-scale demolition program belies what was in fact 
an attempt to creatively and holistically reverse decades of disinvestment and 
decline.
A RETURN to the NEIGHBORHOODS
Ed Rendell’s success was palpable.  The City had rebounded from the brink 
of bankruptcy to such a degree that, by the turn of the twentieth century one 
could speculate about Philadelphia’s comeback without irony.  To the chagrin 
of many Philadelphians, term limits and gubernatorial aspirations precluded 
Mayor Rendell’s seeking a third term.  When it came time for Rendell to cast 
his lot with one of the Democratic candidates vying for his position, John Street 
– activist, lawyer, Fifth District Representative, and Council President – was 
the clear choice.  An election-year profile on Street in the Philadelphia Inquirer 
described his characteristic forcefulness and on the tenor of his relationship 
with Rendell: 
Street was a powerhouse…Rendell made Street part of every important 
decision in City Hall, shared patronage jobs, and heaped praise on him. 
The two met every Tuesday morning - in Street’s office…“I think the 
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relationship was forged out of necessity and built on respect and total 
sharing of information and somewhere along the line it metamorphosed 
into genuine friendship,” the Mayor said recently (Quinones).
Yet Street and Rendell’s comity masked a fundamentally different set of 
priorities.  Street, himself a longtime Yorktown resident, knew firsthand the 
consequences of neighborhood neglect, benign or otherwise.  Paraphrasing 
Street, the Inquirer profile noted: “Under Rendell, the city came back from near-
financial ruin, but it does not mean ‘we can throw up our hands and declare 
victory.  We’ve been successful in revitalizing our downtown area, but now we 
need to concentrate on the neighborhoods’” (Quinones).  This was not mere 
campaign-trail rhetoric.  Street anchored his political career to the promise of 
neighborhood revitalization, building his platform on a proposed $250 million 
Redevelopment Authority bond, to be issued specifically for blight elimination.
 The fact that large-scale blight removal was a viable cornerstone of 
Street’s campaign reflects the depth of the decline that had taken hold in many 
of the City’s neighborhoods.  Despite Rendell’s success drawing businesses 
and residents to Philadelphia’s downtown, and despite the innovative blight 
strategies described in the last chapter, the City was in crisis. Street’s eventual 
Chief of Staff, Joyce Wilkerson, noted that when Street took over “there were 
thousands of abandoned cars on the streets…and hundreds of open-air 
drug markets in Philadelphia neighborhoods.  [Rendell hadn’t been] paying 
a lot of attention to neighborhoods.  There was certainly no comprehensive 
neighborhood strategy” (Wilkerson). 
 Sworn in as Philadelphia’s 97th mayor on January 9, 2000, John Street 
restated his commitment to fighting blight in a rousing inaugural address:
We all share a vision of a better Philadelphia. A better Philadelphia with 
strong neighborhoods free from blight, vacant houses, trash-strewn 
lots and abandoned cars…although we will make the revitalization of 
our neighborhoods our highest priority, we will never surrender to the 
false choice between improving our Center City area or improving our 
neighborhoods. We must do both in this city…Over the past year, I have 
spoken of the need to aggressively attack the cancer of blight and 
abandonment that destroy the character of a block and a neighborhood. 
The City has more than 30,000 vacant lots and at least 20,000 
abandoned buildings. At best, they are eyesores. At worst, they are 
magnets for drugs and crime.  We will develop a strategic vision and public 
apparatus for confronting the effects of 50 years of population decline. 
I will launch an all-out, systematic effort to remove blighted buildings 
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and reclaim the overgrown, polluted lots that dot our city. We will turn a 
negative into a positive, and work with neighborhood residents, political 
leaders and local businesses to return this land to useful purposes.  I 
will also personally lead an effort to rid our City, once and for all, of the 
abandoned cars that have become symbols of neighborhood neglect in 
communities across Philadelphia.  In the coming weeks, I will ask the 
City Council to make an unprecedented $250 million down payment on 
this accelerated war on blight. (Street)
The details of Street’s policy were still inchoate, but his forceful language starkly 
contrasted his priorities with his predecessor’s.  Portentously, his war on blight 
was framed from the very beginning in terms of what would be removed – cars, 
buildings, etc. – rather than what would be provided.
 The large scale of Street’s war on blight was unlike anything seen 
in the City since the days of midcentury urban renewal.  Significantly, this 
would not be an effort funded or defined by the federal government.  Street’s 
initiative promised to be a homegrown, do-it-yourself approach to revitalization. 
Unhampered by federal standards or guidelines, Philadelphia was positioned to 
fight blight holistically and on its own terms.  
 In the spring of 2000, Street proved both his mettle and his commitment 
with a shock-and-awe campaign to rid Philadelphia’s streets of abandoned cars. 
On April 4th, before personally leading a fleet of over 100 tow trucks into North 
Philadelphia on a 40-day mission to remove 1,000 cars a day, Street announced 
from the steps of City Hall, “what you have today is the first installment of our 
commitment to clean up our neighborhoods, to make them a place of hope 
for people who live in them and the people who visit our City” (Panaritis).  The 
towing blitz was an overwhelming success, generating considerable acclaim 
and political capital for Street and his anti-blight program.
 In the wake of Mayor Street’s high-profile towing successes, Patricia 
Smith was tapped to define and manage the still somewhat nebulous “anti-
blight program.”  Among Smith’s early contributions was the rebranding of the 
program as “Neighborhood Transformation Initiative,” suggesting an awareness 
of the need for a more affirmative frame.  Beyond branding, Smith’s first task and 
a herculean one at that, was to wade through decades of inconsistent record 
keeping to establish the scope of blight and abandonment.  As Daily News 
journalist Earni Young noted: “Mark Twain once said there are lies, damned lies 
and statistics.  When it comes to figuring out how much vacant and abandoned 
real estate there is in Philadelphia, it’s hard to tell which is which…Determining 
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whether a property is vacant or abandoned is not as easy as it seems. Empty 
doesn’t equal abandonment. A building or lot may be temporarily empty while 
awaiting sale or development for some other use” (Young 2000).
 Smith’s work took on an added urgency when, in the summer and fall of 
2000, Philadelphia’s sturdy rowhouses began collapsing at an unprecedented 
rate.  Though not a wholly unfamiliar occurrence in a city with an aging building 
stock, what had been an ongoing problem became a crisis.  Disturbing 
headlines such as “Home Collapses on Family: Two Tots Among Five Injured in 
North Philadelphia,” became increasingly commonplace (Bello).  But identifying 
buildings in imminent danger of collapse proved challenging.  Not only did 
the City still lack a proper count of abandoned buildings, but the rowhouses’ 
brick facades often disguised the structural decay that sets in once a roof has 
been perforated.  The crisis reached a fever pitch at the end of the hot, damp 
summer of 2000.  In a city used to twenty or so collapses a year, 22 rowhouses 
came down over the course of a week in late August.  Though in some well-
publicized cases – most famously the “sinking houses” of Logan Triangle – 
the compromised structural integrity was a product of soil subsidence, in most 
instances the cause was simply slow decay resulting from years of neglect. 
 And while addressing structures in imminent danger of collapse was a 
top priority, Smith realized that a blight program would need to go beyond mere 
triage.  As urban scholar Alan Mallach and others have observed, abandonment 
is merely the final stage in a dynamic, protracted process.  If a city wants to 
proactively address the problem, the intervention must happen much earlier, 
when the structure is still salvageable.  Code enforcement represents one 
avenue for early public intervention, though this presupposes the municipal 
capacity to do so.  Unfortunately, as John Accordino and Gary Johnson observed, 
“most cities appear to lack the staff or resources to do a thorough and timely 
job of code enforcement and tax-delinquent property disposition.  Because 
additional abandonment and tax-delinquencies occur every day, most cities can 
never catch up with the problem” (Accordino and Johnson, 313).
MARKET VALUE ANALYSIS 
Seeking to model the complexities of systemic abandonment and blight in 
Philadelphia’s neighborhoods, Smith reached out to a locally-based community 
development finance institution and research organization, The Reinvestment 
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Fund (TRF).  At Smith’s behest, TRF conducted an innovative, comprehensive 
and - most importantly - data-driven analysis of Philadelphia’s neighborhoods. 
TRF’s findings, it was hoped, would capture the dynamism of neighborhood 
change, suggesting opportunities for a range of coordinated, top-down strategic 
interventions.   
 The culmination of TRF’s research was a presentation delivered on April 
18, 2001 entitled Neighborhood Transformation: A Strategy for Investment and 
Growth. Titling their presentation thusly suggested optimism but, problematically, 
that the Street administration had to some degree fallen victim to Bacon’s 
axiom that “there’s a politics of population explosion, but there is no politics of 
depopulation” (Bacon 1975, 14-15).  For the bold promise of “growth” in the 
midst of decline is a clear indication that the Street Administration had both 
feet planted in the growth paradigm, unable to fully acknowledge the realities 
and implications of shrinkage.  
 Neighborhood Transformation opens with “The Problem,” presenting 
a sequence of three increasingly disturbing maps that depicted the spread 
of vacancy, as represented by little black dots. (Figures 03.2-4) The first 
map, showing vacancy in the mid-1970s was titled “Vacancy Did Not Appear 
Overnight,” and displayed the predictable concentrations of black dots in 
North, South, and West Philadelphia. The second map, titled “Today We Are At 
A Critical Juncture,” presented a current (2001) vacancy snapshot, showing an 
increased density of black dots around those same concentrations along with 
a troublesome outward spread. The third map projected vacant structures in 
2020 and showed a City ubiquitously mottled with black dots.  The condition, as 
represented, is so pervasive that the high vacancy clusters in North, South, and 
West Philadelphia are virtually indistinguishable from what were considered 
stable neighborhoods.  Those maps had the desired impact, making a forceful 
case that, as the third slide’s heading pronounced, “We Cannot Maintain the 
Status Quo.”
 Following the vacancy maps was an articulation of the Mayor’s somewhat 
generic vision: “Preserve Healthy Neighborhoods, Create Opportunities for 
Redevelopment, and Build 21st Century Neighborhoods for a 21st Century 
City.”  Remarkably, the TRF research also predicted that Philadelphia would 
buck a fifty-year trend of population loss, instead targeting an optimistic “5% 
(75,000 person) growth” within ten years (NTI 2001).
 The presentation’s most important message, however, was embedded 
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Vacancy Did Not 
Appear Overnight
Vacant Residential
Structures - 25 years ago
Today We Are At A 
Critical Juncture
Vacant Residential
Structures Today
We Cannot Maintain 
The Status Quo
Projected Vacancies 2020
Figure 03.2-4: The TRF “black dot” maps (Source: Neighborhood 
Transformation)
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in TRF’s identification and mapping of Philadelphia’s six “market clusters.” 
Using a litany of metrics including, “housing sales prices, demolition activity, 
vacancy rates, presence of dangerous properties, owner occupancy rates, age 
of housing, presence of non-market rate rental housing, mix of commercial 
and residential uses,” and “consumer credit profiles,” each of Philadelphia’s 
neighborhoods was given a grade corresponding to its relative market strength. 
From best to worst, these clusters were termed “regional choice, high value and 
appreciating, steady, transitional, distressed,” and “reclamation” (NTI 2001). 
(Figure 03.5)
 Using hard data to develop and map neighborhood strength typologies 
seemed to be a bold, new approach, and yet there was a highly resonant local 
precedent.  Regardless of whether or not the authors of the market-value 
analysis were looking to Philadelphia’s midcentury Housing Quality Surveys or 
to the Central Urban Renewal Area (CURA) Study, TRF’s maps were, in many 
ways, a more nuanced recapitulation of past efforts of quantifying blight.  
 The TRF maps, however, were a most sophisticated and complex 
interpretation of the urban landscape than CURA’s blunt “A,B,C” analysis, 
identifying micro-trends and hitherto invisible juxtapositions of healthy and 
unhealthy fabric.  As Pat Smith recently recalled, “the ability to show it spatially 
brought home commonalities between different neighborhoods.  It showed 
where our strong housing markets were, and where stable markets were 
butting up against weaker markets” (Smith 2012).  The market value analysis 
also indicated that many of the seemingly stable higher-income neighborhoods 
were really a patchwork of stronger and weaker subareas.  
 Another important distinction between TRF’s analysis and the CURA 
Study was that fact that the typological determinations were not intended as 
a justification for abandoning the poorest neighborhoods as lost causes, but 
rather as a tool with which to calibrate the levels and tools of the intervention. 
For NTI was to be a citywide anti-blight plan, and all of the aforementioned 
market clusters stood to benefit from the policy.  
 These benefits were carefully tailored to the needs of various 
clusters using a toolkit that reflected more holistic thinking.  For instance, in 
Philadelphia’s strongest “Regional Choice Markets,” the stated government role 
was to “promote and propel the market,” which involved Business Improvement 
District and marketing support, streetscape improvements, and strict code 
enforcement, while in “Transitional Markets” the government would “respond 
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Figure 03.5: TRF’s mapping of Philadelphia’s market clusters reflects the level of abstraction 
that results from building a plan on analysis without an image (Source: 2003 NTI Progress Report)
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rapidly to physical or economic deterioration.”  In the most blighted “Reclamation 
Markets,” the government’s role was demolition, property encapsulation, 
acquisition, and site assembly - all of which was described euphemistically as 
“invest to build from strength and create conditions for market rebirth” (NTI 
2003, 9). 
 Despite TRF’s fine-grained analysis, concern was voiced early on that 
the market clusters were not sufficiently sensitive to the variegated economic 
topographies of Philadelphia’s neighborhoods.  Blight Free Philadelphia, a 
2001 report by Research for Democracy (a partnership between the faith-
based Eastern Pennsylvania Organizing Project and Temple University’s Center 
for Public Policy) challenged TRF’s analysis:
Because abandoned property occurs in clusters, neighborhoods with 
extensive abandonment also have many solid residential blocks and 
relatively vital commercial areas.  These blocks and business corridors 
represent strong clusters of value within weak neighborhood housing 
markets.  The market analysis in the Neighborhood Transformation 
Initiative potentially categorizes entire neighborhood markets as 
reclamation areas without accounting for the variation within the 
communities. (Research for Democracy, 16) 
 An additional, unadvertised impetus behind Street and Smith’s data-
driven approach was the depoliticization of Philadelphia’s highly-charged vacant 
land acquisition and disposition process.  Though nowhere to be found “on the 
books” in the City’s Home Rule Charter, Philadelphia’s unspoken “Councilmanic 
Prerogative” was (and is) as ironclad as any law.  As the Committee of Seventy, 
a century-old local government watchdog organization, puts it, “Councilmanic 
Prerogative refers to the near-absolute powers wielded by City Council members 
over land development projects in their districts.  Each of the ten District Council 
members can help advance these projects or halt them in their tracks…each 
District Council member receives full deference from their Council colleagues 
when making these decisions about their own district” (Committee of Seventy). 
Hard data, it was thought, would mitigate Council resistance by producing 
incontrovertible justifications for land management decisions. 
 Having used TRF’s research to develop a working understanding of 
the scale of the problem and of the City’s investment landscape, Street and 
Smith laid out the resources in play and the tools at hand.  The $250 million 
bond, proposed during Street’s campaign, was divided into a number of 
tranches including $35 million for land acquisition through eminent domain 
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and for relocation, $30 million for the encapsulation of 2,500 buildings, $20 
million for neighborhood preservation, and $5 million for information-systems 
upgrading.  By far the biggest, headline-grabbing line item was the allocation 
of $140 million for the demolition of 14,000 residential structures and an 
additional $20 million for the demolition of commercial and industrial buildings 
(NTI 2001).  Among the Initiative’s other stated goals was the clean-up of all of 
Philadelphia’s 31,000 vacant lots.  
 Predictably, the specific numbers attached to NTI’s various objectives 
would haunt Street and his staff, as unforeseen complications with 
implementation compromised certain goals.  The forecasts, however, were made 
deliberately, and were consistent with an overall commitment to transparency. 
The hard numbers communicated to the public that Street meant business.  As 
Pat Smith recalled recently: “We wanted to quantify everything so that we could 
measure our progress over time, as opposed to just having generalized goals” 
(Smith).
 Conspicuously absent from TRF’s presentation, however, was an image 
for Philadelphia, despite the profound impact that NTI, as planned, would have 
on the built environment of neighborhoods throughout the City.  The strategic 
thinking was clear enough, elucidated by the well-conceived maps, yet there 
was no articulation of what sort of a city the collective impact strategies would 
produce.  A 2001 Philadelphia Daily News article concisely identified this 
oversight: “In fact, it’s really less a blight plan than a blight analysis. The Mayor’s 
staff has produced a crackerjack analysis of depopulation and the resulting 
blight of vacant property, and the best-looking maps we’ve ever had showing us 
where the blight is” (Hughes 2001).  Alan Mallach echoed this argument in a 
recent conversation:
TRF’s analysis was interesting but the problem with that kind of analysis 
is that it’s an input to planning, not planning itself.  Market trends are 
an incredibly important part of the planning process, but they are not 
themselves a plan or a vision or a strategy. The market value analysis 
was interesting and valuable analysis, but people started to confuse 
that with a plan for the city.  (Mallach)
These damning insights are ultimately what link NTI to CURA, recapitulating David 
Wallace’s lament that without an image “people don’t understand what we’re after 
– or even talking about” (Wallace 1961, 47).  Street had promised transformation, 
but had never discussed into what.  Consequently, just as had been the case half a 
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century before, NTI came to be understood by the public as a demolition program 
rather than a transformative vision for Philadelphia.  No one had an answer for the 
obvious question; when the buildings come down, what will go up in their place?
EARLY HURDLES
Having presented a set of quantifiable goals and their respective price tags in 
the April 2001 presentation, Neighborhood Transformation, Street and Smith 
set out to garner the public’s buy in.  “Goal 1” of NTI, for instance, as stated 
in the FY2003 Consolidated Plan, was to “facilitate and support community-
based planning and the development of area plans that reflect citywide and 
neighborhood visions” (City of Philadelphia 2002).  Though the Planning 
Commission would ultimately produce “Community Plans” as part of NTI, these 
came years later, at which point the die had already been cast.
 The failure to articulate an image early on, coupled with the fact that 
“eminent domain” and “relocation” were enumerated tools in the NTI toolkit, 
put Philadelphians on alert.   Though many who lived in blighted, high-vacancy 
neighborhoods surely welcomed the overdue municipal attention and even the 
opportunity for relocation, for others the rhetoric bore an uncomfortable likeness 
to the more fractious policies of the renewal era, and seemed a harbinger of 
doom.  
 And these early fears were not unwarranted or even exaggerated. 
Relocation and eminent domain, arguably the most contentious aspects 
of public involvement in redevelopment, were communicated with baffling 
callousness.  The day after the Neighborhood Transformation presentation was 
delivered, Mayor Street was quoted in the pages of the Philadelphia Daily News: 
“We will be as sensitive, humane and as caring as we can, but we are willing to 
make hard and tough decisions.”  In the same article, Jeremy Nowak, founder of 
The Reinvestment Fund, made the City’s position even starker: “We’re thinking 
of building elimination the way an investor would - clear a path so you can 
invest and build…there is no way to avoid relocation if you’re going to demolish 
large number of buildings” (Young 2001).  The candor is refreshing and clearly 
consistent with the aforementioned commitment to transparency, yet without 
identifying how the City would make demolition and relocation decisions, one 
wonders how they could have expected anything other than exaggerated rumors 
and frantic pushback.  John Kromer, who by that time had stepped down as 
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Director of OHCD, framed the lack of clarity thusly:
The memory of urban renewal was fresh in the minds of a lot of people 
in North and West Philadelphia who had been alive during the 1960s.  
There was uncertainly with NTI.  It wasn’t really known who would be 
displaced or what the plan was.  There was also the TRF map and the 
recommendations for reclamation areas were teardown and relocate.  
That uncertainty created a problem.  (Kromer 2012)
Yet a full year after the article cited above, the same journalist – Earni Young – 
indicated how little the City had done to quell concerns of the citizenry: “Residents 
fear Street’s Neighborhood Transformation Initiative is a reincarnation of the 
1960s Urban Renewal program…The deep-seated fear of displacement and 
gentrification makes NTI a hard sell in minority neighborhoods, where the 
concentration of vacant buildings is highest” (Young 2002).
 Unfortunately, the legacy of urban renewal was to become a millstone 
about the neck of NTI, despite the fact that there were substantive distinctions 
between the two approaches that simply weren’t articulated.   When questioned 
directly about the relationship between urban renewal and NTI, Pat Smith drew 
these critical distinctions:
Shedding the urban renewal connection was hard.  That was a very 
traumatic time for people of color.  But urban renewal had far more 
relocation that we even considered under NTI…We appreciated that 
relocation can be devastating in and of itself.  NTI offered enhanced 
relocation benefits, including the opportunity to return to the new housing 
that was being built. We did not propose relocating anyone unless we 
knew for certain that we had a financeable development project.  (Smith)
 Further impeding the advancement of Street’s anti-blight initiative was 
an intransigent City Council rightly concerned with both the prevalent public 
skepticism about NTI, and equally so with the fact that their Councilmanic 
Prerogative was under attack.  NTI’s data-driven underpinnings, it was thought, 
seemed to be a mechanism for circumventing Council altogether.  As Pat Smith 
recalled in a recent interview:
There was concern that we were going to bypass City Council.  There was 
a lot of resistance to the idea of a centralized disposition of properties.  
It runs up against the district prerogative in Philadelphia…We really 
underestimated the degree that City Council wanted to be involved in the 
decision making process.  It took a long time to engage them…“What’s 
in it for my district” drove decisions about allocation of NTI funds and 
approving budgets for acquisition and demolition packages. (Smith)
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As Council approval was required for the authorization of the Redevelopment 
Authority’s bond, protracted infighting caused considerable delays.  The NTI 
bond, eventually upped to $295 million, would formally win Council approval 
in March of 2002, though the debate over how and where the funds would be 
distributed continued unabated.
 Strawberry Mansion, for instance, a high vacancy neighborhood in North 
Philadelphia, was selected for the NTI pilot.  But Darrell Clarke, Street’s successor 
as the Fifth District Councilman (and current Council President) declared: “We’re 
not ready…I’m not pulling the trigger until the process is at a place where we’re 
comfortable…I just don’t think we’ve had an opportunity to have the level of 
discussion we should about the aftermath of the demolition” (Young 2002a). 
As one concerned Strawberry Mansion resident told the Inquirer, “I’m worried 
they’re going to tear these buildings down and not put anything back.  What 
good does that do?  The neighborhood will look pitiful, a lost neighborhood. 
We’ve got too many empty lots as is” (Eichel).  This reasonable concern would 
become a refrain throughout the NTI years and captures the perils of a plan 
executed without a corresponding image.
 Yet another example of a missed opportunity can be found in the disconnect 
between the NTI demolition work and PHS’s lot stabilization.  Though the NTI years 
saw the formalization of the City’s relationship with the Pennsylvania Horticultural 
Society through their inclusion in the General Operating Budget, lot stabilization 
was not necessarily used to palliate neighborhood concerns.  As Bob Grossman, 
Senior Director of Philadelphia Green recalled, “the NTI demolition process was 
independent of what we did, though we tried at various times to coordinate better 
with it; sometimes with success, sometimes not” (Grossman).  Why lot stabilization 
was not considered the final step of the demolition process remains unclear. 
Surely the knowledge that a greened, maintained lot would replace an abandoned 
rowhouse would’ve assuaged the anxieties expressed above.
 In the end, Council’s resistance slowly eroded the very premise of NTI, 
namely that acquisition and disposition decisions would be made according the 
data.  As a means of pushing the bill through Council, it was decided instead 
that NTI resources, not unlike CDBG funds, were to be distributed throughout 
Philadelphia proportionally by district according to the prevalence of blight. 
Though the political palatability of spreading the money around is clear enough 
(especially in light of the lengthy approval battles with Council) it undermined 
the utility of the very data on which NTI was built.  
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NTI IMPLEMENTATION
All of the public debates and political machinations over NTI were, of course, 
prelude to actual policy implementation.  This too presented a torturous path for 
the Street administration.  All of the big moves of NTI – demolition, acquisition, 
and disposition –were subject to unexpected setbacks.  
 As noted above, despite a commitment to demolishing only those 
buildings in imminent danger of collapse or as dictated by TRF’s cluster analysis, 
Council’s insistence on inclusion undercut any semblance of a true strategy 
beyond political expediency. Street’s Chief of Staff, Joyce Wilkerson, recalled, 
“demolition was arbitrary – political.  It wasn’t a housing strategy, it was politics” 
(Wilkerson).  In addition, rowhouse demolition proved fully twice as expensive as 
had been predicted.  As the Philadelphia Inquirer reported in September 2006, 
“Originally, NTI planners estimated demolitions would average $11,500. The 
actual figure was $23,000, according to NTI budget statements.  The big extra 
cost was covering the party walls of adjacent homes with stucco for protection. 
That work cost $9,000 a wall, the NTI office said in a 2004 budget update. And 
for every 100 demolitions, 64 party walls required stucco” (Lin).  In the end, 
only 8,000 of the planned 14,000 demolitions were accomplished.  It is hard to 
know what to make of this oversight, but one may assume that the revelation 
did not sit well with the public.
 Property acquisition under NTI was similarly fraught.  Early decisions 
marked an attempt to “invest to build from strength,” as prescribed by the 
Neighborhood Transformation presentation.   Pilot acquisition programs were 
concentrated in Mantua (West Philadelphia) and Strawberry Mansion (North 
Philadelphia), two heavily blighted neighborhoods adjacent to prominent, 
marketable City assets: University of Pennsylvania and Drexel University, and 
Fairmount Park, respectively.  Unfortunately, the City’s active interest distorted 
market conditions, inflating property values.  That provided an opportunity for 
nimble speculators to buy up parcels needed for larger land assemblies and to 
resell them to the City, thereby extorting Philadelphia’s ponderous bureaucracy. 
 In 2003, a newly constituted Interagency Acquisition Review Team, 
working with City Council, revised the acquisition strategy, developing seven 
“Acquisition Zones.”  These included Mantua and Strawberry Mansion, along 
with Sharswood, Cecil B. Moore, Tioga, Logan, and Brewerytown.  These 
scattered locations selected were indicative of a realignment of priorities and a 
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scaling back of ambitions.  As Haverford professor Stephen McGovern notes in 
his incisive profile of NTI:
The shift from a concentrated to a somewhat more dispersed strategy 
with respect to acquisition dollars also had ramifications for the timing 
of future redevelopment.  By moving acquisition resources away from 
neighborhoods near the red-hot Center City Market and toward the 
blighted Acquisition Zones where private investment had been moribund 
for decades, the administration was essentially settling for a long-term 
redevelopment strategy, at least with respect to market-rate housing. 
(McGovern, 550)
Chastened by having fallen victim to real estate speculation in the pilot 
neighborhoods, and likely encouraged by local trends that mirrored the national 
housing boom, the Street administration reconsidered the initial budget 
allocations.  While the aforementioned cost overruns had stymied demolition, 
acquisition requests actually exceeded expectations:  
Mayor Street wants City Council to allow him to just about empty his anti-
blight-plan kitty for property acquisitions in just one year...The increase 
[to $43.9 million] more than triples the $12 million NTI allocated for 
property-takings last June. The change is part of a midyear resolution 
that increases the NTI budget for the current fiscal year from $68 million 
to $102 million.  NTI director Patricia Smith said the changes reflect 
the unexpectedly strong demand for land acquisition and higher-than-
projected costs for demolition in the program’s first year. (Young 2002b)  
Though one could interpret this as the City trying to act nimbly, shifting its 
strategy in accordance with new opportunities, it reads more like another 
example of bureaucratic disorganization. 
 Soon after this strategic shift the Council authorized the acquisition of 
an unprecedented 5,000 properties.  This was an order of magnitude greater 
than the 200 to 300 transactions the Redevelopment Authority (RDA) – the 
agency responsible for processing acquisition requests – was equipped to 
handle.  Yet the massive land acquisition authorization was made without any 
commensurate staffing changes to augment the RDA’s organizational capacity. 
This obvious mismatch was described by former RDA Executive Director Herbert 
Wetzel as “like a python swallowing a huge pig,” and created a predictable, 
years-long bottleneck (Lin).  By 2005, it was noted that “while the Neighborhood 
Transformation Initiative trumpets its record-breaking acquisition of 5,500 
properties, only 600-700 titles have actually been transferred because the city 
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lacks the capacity to complete appraisals and title reports” (Hughes 2005). 
 Property disposition, the process by which the City (via the Redevelopment 
Authority) puts acquired buildings or vacant land back into productive use, is the 
critical final step in contending with vacant land.  But without an articulated image 
of Philadelphia’s high vacancy neighborhoods post-NTI, the Street administration 
lost an opportunity to help guide development decisions.  Joyce Wilkerson was 
frank on this point: “Developers ended up driving where development happened 
more so than we might have wanted.  So you had development happening in 
Brewerytown in part just because the land was there” (Wilkerson).  Indeed the 
much-lauded Brewerytown development, a multi-unit, market-rate project by 
Westrum Company just south of Strawberry Mansion, was one of the only, if 
not the only, major developments directly linked to NTI. (Figure 03.6) Ironically, 
Westrum’s development was not particularly transformative, as its isolated 
site was an attempt to create a new neighborhood rather than improve what 
already existed.  Finally, rather than creating a transparent, systemic approach 
to disposition, “a lot of planning was done on a transactional basis with private 
developers” (Gladstein).
Figure 03.6: Westrum’s Brewerytown development (Photo © the author)
96
THE LEGACY of NTI
In 2005, after completing the FY2006 NTI budget, Pat Smith left the employ of 
the City to work for The Reinvestment Fund.  Eva Gladstein, then head of the 
Philadelphia’s Empowerment Zone program, was brought on in Smith’s stead to 
close out the program.  Reflecting on her two years as Director of Neighborhood 
Transformation, Gladstein said:  “I saw my role as ‘let’s evaluate what was done, 
let’s try to embed the stuff that’s working in the City in a way that’s not just 
viewed as NTI so it can outlast this program, and let’s dump what’s not working’” 
(Gladstein).  Among Gladstein’s innovations was the creation a program 
dedicated specifically to Philadelphia’s neighborhood commercial corridors, 
many of which were themselves blighted.  Her “Commercial Corridor Support 
Program” acknowledged that blight was not merely a residential phenomenon, 
and sought to “target neighborhood commercial corridors for blight removal 
and physical improvements, as well as business services that assist corridor 
businesses to be competitive and provide needed employment, goods and 
services within their markets” (NTI 2006, 4).  Though too late to become 
embedded in the fabric of NTI, this holistic, plannerly approach to neighborhood 
transformation at least suggested the range of alternative outcomes.
 Though it fell short of most of its stated goals, NTI had a significant 
impact on Philadelphia’s built environment.  Thousands of demolitions and 
considerable property acquisition had taken place within just a few years.  Yet, 
as Eva Gladstein mused; “Did it turn the city around?  It made a significant 
impact on a few neighborhoods – but did it turn the city around? No.  Did it 
prevent other units from becoming vacant? Not necessarily” (Gladstein). (Figure 
03.7) How could almost $300 million, intended specifically and exclusively for 
blight elimination, could fail to do just that?  
 NTI was beset with a succession of hurdles, not the least of which was 
the legacy of urban renewal.  Ironically, the failure of NTI is a result of the Street 
administration’s reluctance to embrace precisely what worked during the 
renewal era.  As a professed “anti-blight” program, NTI was embedded in the 
physical fabric of the City, yet there was absolutely no design or land use vision 
for what would, or even should, come next.  As John Kromer put it: 
I really can’t think of a time when Mayor Street said something that 
indicated what sort of neighborhood he liked or what his ideal of a 
neighborhood would be.  Or when he mentioned the type of design he 
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thought was especially interesting.  That wasn’t a big priority or at least it 
didn’t come across as one.  He was much more interested in the people 
side of things.  He wanted to make sure people were being dealt with 
fairly and he wanted to give people in blighted areas opportunities to be 
successful. (Kromer 2012)
In their commitment to activating markets, assembling attractive parcels for 
developers, the authors of NTI lost sight of the very cause of Philadelphia’s 
blight crisis: namely, abandonment.  Though Philadelphia’s population had 
stabilized by the 2000s, the City was not even remotely on track for the 5% 
growth promised in 2001. Furthermore, the stabilization of the 2000s was not 
uniform; many of Philadelphia’s blighted neighborhoods continued to shrink 
despite a citywide increase in investor activity and the emergence of “hot” 
neighborhoods like Northern Liberties. 
 Philadelphia entered the twenty-first century a dramatically shrunken, 
if not actively shrinking, city.  Yet, as Joyce Wilkerson rightly noted, “there 
was always a lot of pressure to keep the population up, but being smaller is 
an opportunity.  Some of these neighborhoods are tough to live in and NTI 
should’ve given us an opportunity to reimagine those neighborhoods, to 
reimagine the City…It all fits together.  It’s not just land use.  How do you live in 
Figure 03.7: NTI’s false promise: Demolition clearly failed to activate this particular market  
(Photo © the author)
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these structures?  Who are we designing for?  How do you make Philadelphia 
viable?” (Wilkerson)  These questions, and the emphasis on “reimagining,” all 
suggest what an image might have brought to NTI.  But as Bacon proved in 
the mid-twentieth century, the formulation of an aspirational image takes a 
robust planning infrastructure and an interest in thinking creatively about the 
betterment of Philadelphia’s built environment.  As I explore in the following 
chapter, recent initiatives under current Mayor Michael Nutter suggest that 
the necessary planning armature is being built.  With the proper pieces falling 
into place, I believe there are impending opportunities to generate an image 
of Philadelphia’s blighted neighborhoods that begins to answer many of 
Wilkerson’s questions, and that finds the value in vacancy.
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In 2007, as Mayor Street’s second term drew to a close, the failures of 
NTI weighed heavily on his administration.  The title of a 2008 Philadelphia 
Inquirer article, “What Gives With Street’s Legacy?” said it all (Kerkstra 2008a). 
Blight all but dropped out of the urban discourse when a distressing uptick in 
Philadelphia’s violent crime rate and the City’s consistently underperforming 
schools became the defining issues of the 2007 election season.  Not 
surprisingly, city planning itself was largely absent from the primary debates. 
Covering a panel discussion among Democratic hopefuls, Inga Saffron reported 
in the pages of the Inquirer, “while the three participating candidates all agreed 
that Philadelphia needs to rejuvenate its dysfunctional planning and zoning 
agencies, their proposals were largely about tinkering with the existing system. 
And when asked to name a signature initiative that could match the scope of 
Richardson Dilworth’s blueprint for reviving Society Hill or John Street’s anti-blight 
04
PHILADELPHIA’S NEW TOOLKIT
Figure 04.1: The recently renovated Parkside mansions in West Philadlephia (Photo © the author) 
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strategy, none ventured a vision” (Saffron).  
 After a hard-fought Democratic 
primary, Fourth District Councilman Michael 
Nutter rose to the top of a crowded pack 
of candidates, securing the nomination 
and, eventually, the mayoralty.  Nutter, a 
bred-in-the-bone West Philadelphian, had 
by that point spent over fourteen years on 
City Council.  And while Nutter had been 
a participant on the panel cited above, 
and indeed had no “signature initiative,” 
his stance on planning was a refreshing 
departure from that of his mayoral 
predecessors.  He was paraphrased in the 
same Inquirer article as having asserted 
that “strong urban-planning policies were 
essential to expanding the city’s job base 
and would help the city’s poor far more 
than government antipoverty programs. 
If Philadelphia hopes to compete with other 
cities for taxpaying residents and businesses…
it needs a modern, professionally run planning 
department” (Saffron).  
 Though Nutter’s conviction - which can be boiled down to “planning 
matters” - is unremarkable in and of itself, it is important to place it in the 
context of decades of more or less open disregard for city planning.  As Mayor 
Nutter described in late November 2011 during a panel discussion at Harvard 
University’s Graduate School of Design: (Figure 04.2)
The challenge in Philadelphia over the years has been one of transactions; 
it’s been a transactional environment; it’s been about who you know, not 
what you know or what your idea is. The other challenge has been that 
the mayor is the only local elected official with a term limit. No planner 
thinks in four or eight year chunks of time.  You think in terms of 20, or 
even 50 years.  I’m trying to change the culture to think big, to think long 
term. That’s why planning matters…Our commission was the number 
one planning body in America and I was determined to restore it to that 
level of prominence. (Nutter)
Figure 04.2: Current Mayor Michael Nutter 
speaking at Harvard’s Graduate School of Design 
in November 2011 (Photo © the author)
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Mayor Nutter has always maintained a degree of personal remove from specific 
planning decisions – he has no Neighborhood Transformation Initiative, nor 
even an Avenue of the Arts – yet he has honored his commitment to support 
planning in Philadelphia.  In his first term alone, Nutter presided over the 
creation of a sustainability plan (Greenworks Philadelphia), an open space 
plan (Green2015), a “citywide vision” (Philadelphia2035), a green stormwater 
management plan (Green City, Clean Waters), a modernized zoning code, and 
the City’s first formalized vacant land disposition policy.  Though each of these 
initiatives has come out of a different department, all are mutually reinforcing, 
and reflect an unprecedented degree of interdepartmental coordination and 
collaboration.  And while blight and vacancy are the primary focus of only the 
last of these initiatives, an awareness of these phenomena suffuses all current 
planning work.  Blight is not being treated in isolation, but as part of a larger 
system. 
 Thus, in a constrained funding environment, without the benefits of 
urban-renewal-era funding or a local bond issue (Philadelphia is, in fact, still 
paying off the original NTI bond) Philadelphia is using its existing non-monetary 
resources to move forward: an approach Mami Hara, architect and Chief of Staff 
at the Philadelphia Water Department, likened to “shopping your closet” (Hara). 
Given Philadelphia’s budget issues and Nutter’s wonkish tendencies (he is a 
graduate of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School), it is no surprise 
that much of Philadelphia’s recent planning work, like NTI, is predicated on 
taking advantage of the private market.  Though this approach bodes well for 
many of Philadelphia’s neighborhoods, in which bureaucratic inefficiencies and 
transactional decision-making have impeded development over the years, it says 
little about the City’s current position with regards to areas of market failure. 
Furthermore, as I argue below, none of the recent planning efforts provide an 
image to carry Philadelphia forward; even Philadelphia2035 articulates a set of 
principles too broad to inspire collective action.  That said, a district planning 
process built into the “citywide vision” and begun only recently, represents an 
assertive step in the right direction.
RENEWED STABILITY
Upon his inauguration in 2008, Mayor Nutter made a clean break with Street’s 
policies and many of his hires.  This involved the replacement of a number 
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of “last-minute Street administration appointees – including Sharif Street, the 
former mayor’s son – as part of a comprehensive shake-up of the City’s zoning 
and planning apparatus” (Kerkstra 2008).  It also involved the immediate 
suspension of NTI spending and a thorough audit of program expenditures in 
the wake of an accounting controversy.  
 Many speculated political motivations underlying these decisions, 
seeing them as a housecleaning, but also as a thinly-veiled refutation of Street. 
These suspicions, ardently denied by Nutter, were supported by the many public 
quarrels between the two (including vociferous debates over the NTI bond) that 
shook Councilmanic Chambers throughout the Street’s tenure.  As the Inquirer 
put it, “Nutter and Street simply do not like each other, politically or personally. 
Their long-running feud culminated in Nutter’s mayoral campaign, in which he 
ran as the anti-Street, a tactic that helped him surge to the top of the five-
candidate field” (Kerkstra 2008a).
 It was, therefore, with a relatively clean slate and a public referendum that 
Nutter authorized the drafting of both a new “citywide vision” – Philadelphia2035 
– and a thoroughly updated zoning code.  Remarkably, neither Philadelphia’s 
Comprehensive Plan nor the zoning code - the two documents intended to 
articulate the City’s development agenda - had been updated since 1960.   At 
that time the City’s population was over two million and all signs seemed to 
point to moderate growth in the coming decades.  
 The timeliness of Philadelphia’s planning revival was highlighted by the 
release of the 2010 Census figures.  These incontrovertible data indicated that 
for the first time since 1950, Philadelphia had gained population.  Though this 
increase of approximately 8,500 people was less than 1% of the City’s overall 
population (and a fraction of the 75,000 predicted in 2001) the psychological 
ramifications were far-reaching.  As many were (and are) quick to claim, 
Philadelphia had turned a corner and was no longer a shrinking city.  Though 
only two years into his first term, Mayor Nutter had no compunction about taking 
credit for the uptick: “What it’s really about is folks recognizing that the City is 
moving in the right direction…We’ve changed some of the culture here in city 
government, and things are in fact improving” (Shaw).  
 However, Philadelphia’s recent population increase does not reflect a 
policy triumph or a renewed attraction to city living, but the play of international 
migration trends.  In the 2000s all of Philadelphia’s growth was in the Hispanic 
and Asian communities, both of which experienced over 40% growth.  In that 
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same period, the City’s Black population declined incrementally, while the White 
population dropped dramatically – 12.7% over the decade (Shaw).
BLIGHT REVISITED
Despite the celebrated population growth of the 2000s, and despite Mayor 
Street’s multi-year $300 Million Neighborhood Transformation Initiative, blight 
and abandonment remain overwhelming, citywide issues in Philadelphia.  A 
2010 study by Philadelphia’s branch of the national Local Initiatives Support 
Corporation (LISC), entitled Improving Philadelphia’s Vacant Property 
Programs, identified systemic problems with the City’s approach to vacant land 
management.  Notably, many of the problems exposed by the LISC report had 
been identified ten years earlier in the NTI rollout, and their persistence was an 
implicit indictment of NTI’s overreach.
 One of the most conspicuous issues identified was the poor coordination 
between the City’s multiple land holding agencies.  Each agency maintained 
an independent inventory, a distinct agenda, and a unique decision-making 
process.  First on the list was the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority (PRA 
– formerly RDA), whose inventory swelled with the protracted NTI-era takings. 
Second was the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA), whose holdings were 
primarily the result of a scattered-site housing program initiated by Edmund 
Bacon in the 1960s.  Though an innovative program in its time, most of the 
scattered housing units were sited in weak market neighborhoods as a cost 
cutting measure, only to be abandoned shortly thereafter.  Other land holding 
agencies identified in the study were the Department of Public Property 
(DPP), the Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation (PHDC), and the 
Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC).  
 A consequence of this fragmented ownership was that the process by 
which an individual, a developer, or a CDC could purchase a City-owned parcel – 
be it for a side yard, condominiums, or affordable housing – remained labyrinthine 
and transactional.  Worse, if the abandoned, blighted property in question was 
privately owned, it could be impossible to even determine who holds title.  In 
light of these procedural challenges, Philadelphia LISC’s first recommendation 
was that the City develop “a vacant property reclamation strategy to…serve 
as a blueprint for how the City intends to manage the acquisition, disposition, 
and reuse of vacant properties beyond individual transactions and projects” 
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(LISC, 23).  This “blueprint,” it was hoped, could be used to forge “stronger 
connections between the City’s vacant property programs with longer range, 
neighborhood driven plans for economic development, green jobs, affordable 
and workforce housing, and vacant property reuse” (LISC, 23).  
 Philadelphia LISC’s findings were echoed by a concomitant study, 
Vacant Land Management in Philadelphia.  Conducted by a Philadelphia-
based consultancy, Econsult Corporation, at the behest of the PRA and the 
Philadelphia Association of Community Development Corporations (PACDC), 
Vacant Land Management analyzed the extent and effect of the City’s vacant 
land.  Econsult identified 40,000 vacant parcels distributed throughout the 
City, three-quarters of which were privately held.  Echoing LISC’s admonition, 
Econsult noted significant bureaucratic and procedural snares caused by the 
fact that “City-owned parcels are owned by different agencies with different 
rules and agendas…As a result, neighborhoods bear undue distress, the City 
and its taxpayers pay dearly, and those seeking to improve properties and 
reclaim blocks are discouraged” (Econsult, i).   
 The real contribution of Econsult’s study to the blight discourse in 
Philadelphia was in quantifying the degree to which vacancy and blight are 
financial burden to the City:
Vacant parcels diminish property values within the City by an aggregate 
$3.6 Billion, a variety of City agencies together spends over $20 million 
annually to maintain City-owned and non-City-owned vacant parcels, 
and privately held vacant parcels represent at least $2 million each 
year in uncollected property tax revenues to the City and School District. 
(Econsult, 32)
Econsult took this analysis a step further, dividing the projection of diminished 
property values by the total number of housing units in the City, and determining 
that blight costs the average household $8,000.  This number, which presupposes 
a uniform distribution of vacancy, is by no means an accurate reflection of 
conditions on the ground.  Yet it successfully drove home the message that, 
as Econsult’s Richard Voith described, “vacancy is a citywide problem. No 
neighborhood escapes the problem of vacancy” (Lucey).  These staggering 
figures were widely circulated in the press and have in essence become the 
City’s baseline.  As the Inquirer reported, “the problem of blight has confounded 
Philadelphia mayors for decades and generated volumes of policy papers.  Now 
comes a new study, and an urgent warning: Do something posthaste, because 
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vacant land and abandoned buildings are costing us dearly” (Lin).
 As Philadelphia LISC and Econsult’s studies indicated, “doing something” 
required deep reforms of the City’s policy and regulatory frameworks.  New tools 
were required to deal with vacant land throughout the lifecycle of a property.
VACANT LAND DISPOSITION POLICY
Faced with Econsult’s sobering vacancy data and mired in a national recession, 
Mayor Nutter tasked his administration with reconceiving Philadelphia’s existing 
blight strategies.  In doing so, he was attempting what Managing Director Rich 
Negrin’s Chief of Staff, Brian Abernathy described as “working from within to 
improve the City’s management of vacant land” (Lin).  The Mayor’s first step 
was to charge Negrin and Finance Director Rob Dubow with the convening of 
a multi-agency Land Management Working Group.  The group was comprised 
of representatives from over a dozen City agencies including all of the 
aforementioned land holding agencies, the Planning Commission, the Office of 
Housing and Community Development, the Commerce Department, Department 
of Licenses and Inspections, Department of Parks and Recreation, and the Law 
Department.  The Land Management Working Group’s composition reflected 
the Nutter administration’s commitment to a holistic approach to blight; it was 
likely the first time such a panoply of departmental representatives was at the 
same table.
 The overarching goal of the Land Management Working Group was to 
find actionable ways to streamline Philadelphia’s opaque, onerous disposition 
procedures while simultaneously increasing agency accountability.  Most 
notably, such streamlining included the creation of a single point of contact or a 
“front door” which would be tasked with “receiving applications and expressions 
of interest, managing or coordinating the acquisition and disposition process 
and being held accountable for delays and problems” and the publication of 
a “comprehensive inventory of all City-controlled surplus property” (City of 
Philadelphia 2012a).   
 Critical to this streamlining process has been the application of “LAMA,” 
a land management software package developed by the Davenport Group that 
has only recently (spring 2012) been rolled out.   As PRA Deputy Director, John 
Carpenter described:
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LAMA is an enterprise-wide data system designed to track the City’s real 
property inventory and the business processes of acquiring, managing, 
and disposing of it.  Each division of each agency had its own rules for 
doing that work, and none of those were linked very well, or at all, in 
the past.  LAMA represents the first effort to connect all those various 
pieces; it’s our first opportunity to see the life cycle of the whole system. 
(Carpenter 2012a)
As designed, the software combines and displays the major land-holding 
agencies’ property, and provides a means for logging and regularly updating 
expressions of interest in particular parcels.  Using an ArcGIS platform, this 
information is presented in tabular form, but also spatially. (Figure 04.3)  “For 
the first time, we can see the PRA’s true inventory, not as some simple database 
list, but mapped and in relation to the other inventories of the City.  From a 
planning perspective we now know what we own, where we own it, and where 
what we own is proximate to other agencies’ property” (Carpenter 2012a).  
 The data managed through LAMA will eventually link up to a public 
website (currently in the RFP stage) that will enable individuals to browse the 
City’s inventory, log expressions of interest, and track the processing of their 
requests.  This will not only increase agency accountability, it will expose delays 
or denials resulting from overuse of the Councilmanic Prerogative (described 
Figure 04.3: The LAMA interface provides tabular and spatial representations of the City’s publicly owned vacant 
land inventory (Source: PRA LAMA Training Manual)
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in the last chapter).  “We’re trying to move into a world where there’s more 
transparency about what we own and more transparency about how we process 
requests” (Carpenter 2012a).  
 In conjunction with the roll out of LAMA, the recommendations of the 
Land Management Working Group have been consolidated into a single policy 
document, Policies for the Sale and Reuse of City-Owned Property.  This slim, 
12-page document has the power to transform the City’s disposition protocol, 
described by John Carpenter as largely “unspoken, unwritten, and subject to 
change based on the circumstances of any individual transaction” (Carpenter 
2012).  Policies for the Sale concisely describes a set of actionable steps and 
policy triggers meant to ensure that disposition protocol is predictable and that 
disposition decisions are consistent, timely, and transparent. 
 The first of the “Guiding Principles” enumerated in Policies for the Sale 
–“encourage the development and reuse of vacant properties consistent with 
Philadelphia2035 and other city-approved and accepted plans” – speaks 
to the fact that this document is expressly procedural, not planning. (City of 
Philadelphia 2012a, 1).  Acknowledging that planning should have a direct role 
in property disposition decisions is a good starting point, but an opportunity 
was missed to be somewhat more prescriptive.  For this is one of the only, 
if not the only, pieces of urban policy that deals expressly with vacancy and 
abandonment.  By taking a strong position on how considerations of city form 
can inform disposition decisions in areas of market failure, the policy could 
have provided the underpinnings of a forceful image.
 Among the other aims of the policy is the formal positioning of the PRA 
as the “front door” agency, responsible for managing the inventories of PRA 
along with PHDC and DPP.  Policies for the Sale also spells out the determinants 
disposition decisions, describing what will be subject to a competitive bidding 
process, sold directly to a qualified buyer, or made available at a negotiated price 
for “community benefits,” including “affordable housing, economic development 
projects, community projects such as parks, gardens, or community facilities, or 
side and rear yards for adjacent homeowners” (City of Philadelphia 2012a).  
 Policies for the Sale also introduces an automated valuation model 
(AVM) which will comprehensively reform the property appraisal method. 
Generated by Econsult using an involved multivariable regression analysis, the 
AVM will streamline pricing; thereby ensuring that property for which there is a 
viable proposal will be taken off the City’s hands and put into productive use. 
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Currently, any request for a publicly owned property triggers a lengthy process 
including a private appraisal that can take several weeks and cost hundreds 
of dollars.  Consequently, an individual must wait until after an expression of 
interest has been logged and money expended on an appraisal, to establish 
a base price.  “There was uncertainty about price until the agreement to 
purchase had been made,” Carpenter observed, likening the existing protocol 
to ordering and eating the market-rate fish off a menu without checking the price 
first (Carpenter 2012a). While the AVM pricing is meant to capture low-value 
properties, real estate brokers will be used to actively market any parcels above 
a certain price threshold, or for which considerable developer demand has been 
expressed.  Ultimately, however, the sale value of a parcel is only one aspect of 
a larger consideration.  To quote John Carpenter, “it is more important to us to 
put property back into productive use than it is to extract every dime of value 
from every piece of property in the inventory.  We’ve got more development, 
less blight, and a better tax base.  The cash generated from the sale is a useful 
byproduct but not the primary point” (Carpenter 2012a).
 Though the many innovations embedded in Policies for the Sale are far-
reaching, the document is not without its detractors.  One recent critique is that 
by requiring letters of support from City Council for certain disposition decisions, 
the policy codifies the Councilmanic Prerogative, increased transparency 
notwithstanding.  The University of Pennsylvania-affiliated website PlanPhilly, 
recently reported that citizens “are concerned that the plan formally concentrates 
power in the hands of politicians and their favored organizations, putting private 
market builders in a secondary position” (Kerkstra 2012).  Andrew Goodman 
of PennPraxis, though generally supportive, expressed concern that there is 
an overreliance on the private market: “there needs to be a better process so 
that all elements are considered.  Permanent green space is not supported…
the City still sees open space as something it has to pay for and wants to get 
vacant land to a place where they don’t have to be responsible for it anymore“ 
(Goodman).
 Along with these critiques leveled at policy content are concerns over 
what’s not included.  While the new disposition policy will overhaul the City’s 
protocol in the case of publicly owned vacant land, this accounts for only one-
quarter of the estimated 40,000 vacant structures and lots in the Philadelphia 
today.  “The City’s draft policy falls well short of any kind of comprehensive plan 
for dealing with the estimated 40,000 pieces of vacant property that spread 
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blight, depress property values and attract crime in neighborhoods across 
the City” (Kerkstra 2012).  Indeed, as Econsult made abundantly clear, blight 
remains everyone’s problem, regardless of ownership.
CODE ENFORCEMENT
Code enforcement, administered by the Department of Licenses and Inspections 
(L&I), is the City’s regulatory tool for dealing with privately owned vacant land.  Until 
recently, basic data collection issues have historically hampered the complex task 
presented by the sheer quantity, distribution, and unpredictability of vacancy and 
abandonment.  As Maura Kennedy, L&I’s Director of Strategic Initiatives, noted, 
“we didn’t know where the land was or who owned it” (Kennedy).  Furthermore, 
decades of inconsistent code enforcement had sent a message to property owners 
that the City was too overburdened to notice or deal with maintenance violations.
 Recently however, L&I has been operating against a backdrop of newly 
adopted, transformative state and local legislation. Act 90, the Neighborhood 
Blight Reclamation and Revitalization Act, signed into law on October 27, 2010, 
states that blighted properties “create public nuisances which have an impact on 
crime and the quality of life of our residents and require significant expenditures 
of public funds in order to abate and correct the nuisances” (Act 90).  The Act 
authorizes substantive municipal action against property-owners.  These include 
hefty fines, denial of further building permits, and the attachment of liens to an 
individual rather than to the abandoned property itself.  Most significantly, Act 
90 extends Philadelphia’s reach beyond Pennsylvania state lines, allowing for 
extradition of out-of-state property owners and speculators.  In so doing, the law 
codifies owner accountability “to the Commonwealth and its municipalities, as 
well as to tenants, adjoining property owners and neighborhoods” (Act 90).  
 At the local level, Philadelphia has begun to consistently enforce a 
“Doors and Windows Ordinance,” passed by City Council during the early years 
of the Street administration.  This law allows the City to fine neglectful property 
owners up to $300 per opening per day after a mailed notification has been 
received.  (Figure 04.4) As Maura Kennedy stated unequivocally, “we’re making 
it expensive for someone to hold onto vacant, unmaintained property.  It’s been 
essentially free to blight the city for a long time…But we’re not going to put up 
with blight anymore.  It’s a true cost to us all” (Kennedy).
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LAND BANKING
The tools outlined above address part, but not all, of the property lifecycle, as 
acquisition is the bridge between enforcement and disposition.  The City’s ability 
to actively acquire property is critical in weak market neighborhoods where the 
private market cannot be expected to function as a corrective to abandonment. 
Land banking, described as “the process or policy by which local governments 
acquire surplus properties and convert them to productive use or hold them 
for long-term strategic public purposes,” is an increasingly popular acquisition 
approach (Alexander, 22).  This popularity is largely due to the successes (and 
charisma) of Dan Kildee, whose Gennessee County Land Bank has proved to be 
a game changer in Flint, Michigan, and whose advocacy group, the Center for 
Community Progress, sponsors an annual conference devoted to land banking.
 Though land banking has long been a goal of planners and policymakers 
Figure 04.4: Blighted rowhouses in South Philadelphia.  New code enforcement tools will seek to address 
buildings such as these with steep fines for open windows and doors. (Photo © the author)
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in Philadelphia – it was one of the core recommendations in the initial 2001 
NTI rollout – recent local and state-level bills might soon make this a reality. 
House Bill 1682, introduced this winter by State Representative John Taylor and 
currently wending its way through the halls of the State House in Harrisburg, 
would authorize “the creation of land banks for the conversion of vacant or 
tax-delinquent properties into productive use” (House Bill 1682).  Concurrently, 
Philadelphia Councilwoman María Quiñones-Sánchez has proposed Bill 
120052 in support of the creation of a Philadelphia Land Bank.  As the Bill 
asserts: “Evidence demonstrates that a persistently high rate of vacant lots 
and structures harms the safety and economic strength of individual blocks 
and neighborhoods, as well as the City of Philadelphia as a whole.  A municipal 
land bank would ensure clear, transparent, and efficient operations by serving 
as a single entity to acquire, hold, and dispose of vacant property with the 
participation and approval of City Council” (Bill 120052). 
 The rhetoric in support of land banking as a blight panacea is often 
effusive, but there are those advocating for a more measured approach.  As 
Managing Director (and one of the conveners of the Land Management Working 
Group) Rich Negrin warned, “We have to ask the fundamental question as a 
city of whether we should be in the real estate business, period.  Clearly, this is 
something that’s hard to do, and we don’t manage it well over time. We shouldn’t 
be a problem in the neighborhood…Shame on us if we put this together quickly 
and do it in a way where it will get unraveled” (Kerkstra 2012a).
PHILADELPHIA PLANS AGAIN
Reforms to disposition policy, code enforcement, and the potential introduction 
of land banking will be critical to Philadelphia’s ability to holistically and 
proactively address blight throughout the property lifecycle.  All support the 
more efficient return of properties into productive use; however, all are process-
oriented and conspicuously devoid of an image.  Little has been prescribed 
beyond conforming to the stated goals of existing planning initiatives, giving 
considerable weight to the City’s new “citywide vision,” Philadelphia2035.  
 Released in the summer of 2011 to much fanfare, Philadelphia2035 
was long overdue by all accounts.  For decades the Planning Commission had 
been nominally working off of a Comprehensive Plan developed by Bacon and 
the Commission staff in the late 1950s.  But to call Philadelphia2035 simply an 
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updated Comprehensive Plan would not capture its true intent or implications. 
Unlike Bacon’s plan, Philadelphia2035 is neither a descriptive nor a diagnostic 
exercise, but rather, in intent at least, an active, living document; “a blueprint 
to guide public and private investment in the physical development of our city” 
(City of Philadelphia 2012, 8).  A true product of twenty-first century participatory 
planning, the document is geared not towards the technocrat, but to “residents 
and business owners…developers or builders and…public employees” (City of 
Philadelphia 2012, 8).  Broken down into three thematic sections – “THRIVE, 
CONNECT, and RENEW” – Philadelphia2035‘s dozens of recommendations 
reflect an ambitious and empowered Planning Commission.  
 Though not treated at length, vacancy is directly addressed in the 
THRIVE section.  Reiterating Econsult’s findings, the generic principles guiding 
Philadelphia’s vacant land management align with the ongoing efforts of PRA 
and L&I: “First, create a transparent and market-based land disposition policy 
for the City with a comprehensive vacant property database…Second, adopt 
policies which prevent further abandonment.  Third, discover creative ways to 
reuse vacant land and structures” (City of Philadelphia 2012, 92).  These blanket 
principles are broken down into somewhat predictable recommendations: 
Promote adaptation of vacant buildings for creative, mixed-use 
development; much of Philadelphia’s vacant building stock is worthy of 
preserving through adaptive reuse; Competitively bid out larger vacant 
property assemblages and give preference to proposals that incorporate 
high-performance building practices; Support the use of vacant land 
to expand parks and recreation opportunities and/or stormwater 
management; Identify vacant lots for public art projects, neighborhood 
gateways, community gardens, agriculture, and energy farms (City of 
Philadelphia 2012, 94).  
Though admirable goals, all of the above are predicated on the existence of 
latent demand and a healthy, functional market.  It is impossible to imagine the 
application of any of these recommendations on a large scale or in Philadelphia’s 
blighted, low capacity neighborhoods.  Yet Philadelphia2035 has little else to 
say on the matter, indicating a problem endemic to “citywide visions”; the wide-
ranging ambitions of such a document preclude specificity and are best suited 
to loosely articulated goals.  
 If that were the end of the story, there would be little room for optimism 
that Philadelphia2035 would have a discernible impact, for the generalized 
goals fail to suggest any workable image.  Given the thrice-repeated commitment 
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to “encourage the development 
and reuse of vacant properties 
consistent with Philadelphia2035 
and other city-approved and 
accepted plans” in the Policies for 
the Sale, the absence of an image 
would suggest the likelihood of 
another period of wheel spinning. 
However, the plan’s structure 
reflects a cognizance of the intrinsic 
limitations of a citywide vision.  The 
publication of Philadelphia2035 
marked the beginning, not the end, 
of a citywide planning process.  Over 
the next few years, district planning 
will seek to address the City’s 
challenges and opportunities at an 
unprecedented, intermediate scale: 
(Figure 04.5)
Each district is larger than an 
individual neighborhood, but is smaller than whole quadrants of the 
city.  These District Plans will be strategic in nature and will recommend 
specific actions to realize the future envisioned in the Citywide Vision.  
Each District Plan will concentrate on such issues as major development 
opportunities, redevelopment of vacant land and buildings, areas 
in transition, transit-oriented development, neighborhood centers, 
community facilities, and community needs, all in relation to specific 
character and growth patterns. (City of Philadelphia 2012)
Conceiving of planning in this way represents an intriguing departure from a 
scalar vacillation between the neighborhood-scaled design visions of Bacon 
and Kromer, and the abstracted citywide strategies of Rafsky and Street, and 
suggests opportunities for cultivating images at the scale of the district.
 Philadelphia2035’s eighteen District Plans will each be the product of 
an extended community engagement process.  Public meetings and targeted 
steering committee meetings will be used to outline a range of concerns both 
broad and narrow, for each district.  When applicable, approved, community-
led neighborhood plans will be formally adopted and integrated into District 
Figure 04.5: Map of Philadelphia indicating the eighteen 
districts and the accompanying phasing plan 
(Source: Philadelphia2035)
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Plans, imbuing the process with additional flexibility and taking the community 
engagement imperative a step further.
 The only two District Plans completed to date – Lower South and West 
Park – were both adopted by the City on March 20, 2012.  The Lower South 
District, home to the Navy Yard, Philadelphia’s stadia, and considerable active 
industrial land, is something of an outlier.  West Park on the other hand, is a 
predominantly residential district which contains a mix of stable, traditionally 
middle-class enclaves and the blighted Parkside and Cathedral Park 
neighborhoods, each of which have current vacancy rates over 20%. (Figure 
04.6)  As the West Park District Plan reports: 
Vacant land offers an opportunity to provide new amenities and uses 
in these residential communities. Side yards for existing residences, 
community gardens, and pocket parks can all utilize the small-sized 
footprints of vacant rowhouse parcels. However, the development of 
these parcels for community-serving open space requires dedication and 
capacity from local community groups to maintain and manage the sites. 
Several nonprofits specialize in activities that help convert vacant property 
to more active uses. (Philadelphia City Planning Commission 2012, 40)
Figure 04.6: A map of the West Park District indicating local assets (Source: West Park District Plan)
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The West Park District Plan makes measured, grounded recommendations, 
including the identification of specific “priority” blocks for redevelopment, blocks 
where illegal dumping is an ongoing problem, and where additional City and 
community attention is required.   Though these two high vacancy neighborhoods 
represent only a fraction of the district, the Plan presents an image of sorts for 
these neighborhoods.  The clearly represented, well considered urban design 
and development visions promulgated for the West Park District’s “focus areas” 
suggest the District Plans are a workable vehicle and logical scale for thinking 
ambitiously about urban form. (Figure 04.7)  
 The viability of District Plans in larger areas of market failure will be tested 
in 2013, when the Planning Commission initiates planning processes in North 
and Lower North Philadelphia.  In a conversation with Dave Fecteau, planner 
and project lead on both upcoming District Plans, he identified a number of 
challenges and as-yet unanswered questions that can only be addressed once 
the district planning is underway:
We don’t know what exactly to do with all the vacant land and there 
can only be so much community gardening on these lots.  We do know 
that we want to get the City-owned inventory off our hands and into the 
hands of people who are going to take care of it and use it, but in a 
way that’s thoughtful…But that presents a policy dilemma.  Who decides 
what’s appropriate? (Fecteau)
Figure 04.7: A map of the West Park District Plan’s high vacancy neighborhoods and an accompanying list of site-
specific revitalization strategies represents a strong first step towards a new image for the district. 
(Source: West Park District Plan)
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These basic questions underscore the importance of bridging the scale of the 
neighborhood and the scale of the city to generate an image as a means of 
thinking creatively about blight strategies moving forward.  Given the context 
and range of imaginative reinterpretations of Philadelphia’s fabric, including 
East Poplar, Yorktown, and West Poplar, creating a strong image for North 
Philadelphia can engage, and build off of past precedent:
We have a street grid that largely works, but there are areas where the 
smaller side streets are blown ou t.  We have to think carefully about 
what we’re doing there.  There could be opportunities to think creatively 
about the grid…It doesn’t have to be Yorktown, but it can be different 
way of thinking about urban space. (Fecteau)
Current planning practice in Philadelphia reflects a willingness to think about 
challenges facing the City holistically.  The district planning process is a new 
and appropriate mechanism for the creation and promulgation of an image, yet 
it remains to be seen how the City plans to strategically address blight in the 
City’s most disinvested areas.  Planning in these contexts will prove increasingly 
challenging as certain neighborhoods continue to thrive, attracting investment 
activity, while others languish, exaggerating the existing inequities.  As many 
of my interviewees were quick to point out, Philadelphia is not Detroit, or 
even Baltimore.  Yet driving around certain neighborhoods it is hard to tell the 
difference.  Though Philadelphia as a whole is no longer a shrinking city, many 
neighborhoods remain burdened by blight and continued depopulation.
 As I will explore in the next chapter, there is a small but growing body 
of literature and theory on shrinking cities which can inform the City’s blight 
strategies, including the forthcoming District Plans, moving forward.  Identifying 
where and how that theory overlays with the recent policy and regulatory 
advances of the PRA and L&I, and with the planning armature Nutter and the 
Planning Commission are putting in place, will provide a strong foundation for 
future imaging of Philadelphia.
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CONCLUSION - A FLEXIBLE IMAGE
Despite the host of redevelopment strategies that have run the gamut of urban 
design theory and policy, blight in Philadelphia persists to an astonishing degree. 
Many neighborhoods, beset over the years with overcrowding, disinvestment, 
and ultimately abandonment, have carried this unfortunate designation 
for decades.  The persistence of blight confronts us with an uncomfortable 
question: What has planning in Philadelphia gotten wrong all these years, 
that neighborhoods mere blocks from some of the region’s strongest housing 
markets are so neglected? But there are more productive questions as well: 
Where are the opportunities for impactful intervention?  What should those 
interventions look like?  What is the mechanism for generating a new image 
powerful enough to carry the City forward? 
 Answering such questions requires thinking critically about the built 
environment, as decisions made today will not only impact the lives of current 
and future Philadelphians, but also the evolving form of the city.  It requires 
an image built not around a presumption of eventual growth, but against the 
backdrop of decline.  As Edmund Bacon, midcentury director of the Philadelphia 
Figure 05.1: The challenges posed by such streetscapes call out for a strong image (Photo © the author) 
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City Planning Commission remarked “until and unless we face up to the issue of 
abandonment…and until we get a program which really handles the situation, 
we are going to get nowhere” (Bacon 1975, 14-15).
 Generally speaking, Philadelphia’s blight strategies have vacillated 
between localized worst-first design solutions and citywide strategies executed 
without any consideration of city form.  Despite diametrically opposed points of 
departure – one predicated on the adaptation of Philadelphia’s urban fabric, the 
other on a rejection of the selfsame fabric – Bacon and Kromer’s work in Lower 
North Philadelphia is unified by a commitment to diversifying Philadelphia’s 
housing stock and enlivening the built environment.  They both explored the 
relationship between built and unbuilt space, positing contrasting but equally 
polemical visions of open space.  These place-based rebuilding efforts, however, 
were executed in something of a vacuum, unable to address conditions on those 
blocks just outside of the designated project area.  While intended to raise 
investor confidence, these design interventions underestimated the realities of 
market failure and disinvestment.  In the words of William Rafsky, they created 
“islands of good surrounded by a sea of bad” (Rafsky, 8).
 As was shown in the 1950s and later in the 2000s, when neighborhood-
scaled design visions failed to catalyze the expected revitalization, the strategy 
invariably shifted to one more technocratic in nature.  Both the Central Urban 
Renewal Area approach under William Rafsky and Mayor Street’s Neighborhood 
Transformation Initiative emphasized using data to refine an understanding 
of relative neighborhood strength.  Based on supposedly comprehensive 
understandings of the City, code enforcement was proposed in transitional 
neighborhoods.  Neighborhoods considered “most blighted” or “reclamation” 
areas were either dismissed as poor investment choices or, conversely, were 
viewed as opportunities for clearance and land assembly.  And while both 
strategies sought systemic change, they were communicated without an image. 
As David Wallace, CURA Study coauthor, noted:  “What is needed is a real, 
tangible image of what comprehensive metropolitan-wide urban renewal would 
do.  The CURA Study was a start toward the kind of thing I have in mind, but 
only a start.  It did not translate statistics and method into a concrete image” 
(Wallace 1961, 52-53).  As a consequence of this omission, the resultant plan 
failed to win the hearts and minds of Philadelphians, engendering instead a 
fear and suspicion of the unknown. 
 The shortcomings of Philadelphia’s neighborhood-scaled design 
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interventions and its citywide investment strategies are not, however, indicative 
of some perpetual miscalculation; there is an unassailable logic to both.  The 
City is accountable to and responsible for the revitalization of its most blighted 
neighborhoods.  And blight, as an indicator of market strength, is a systemic 
problem.  There is also the fact that in a time of reduced federal funding and 
diminished municipal budgets, the City must necessarily think strategically 
about how it deploys its limited resources.  If this is all true, what then must 
Philadelphia do in order to move forward?  How can Philadelphia craft an 
image for high-vacancy neighborhoods that is grounded in the present but that 
communicates a compelling vision of tomorrow?  What should it look like?  How 
can a fuller understanding of the complexity of blight yield an image that is 
assertive, but sufficiently flexible to accommodate multiple outcomes? 
THE TRAP of the TABULA RASA
Contemporary shrinking cities design theory often starts with the problematic 
notion of the tabula rasa. This seductive approach suggests abandoned, high 
vacancy neighborhoods are best suited for wholesale reinterpretation.  Such 
an approach is almost invariably at the heart of current design proposals for 
blighted swaths of Detroit, Buffalo, and Cleveland, and also Philadelphia.  
 The brief for the 2006 ideas competition, URBAN VOIDS: grounds for 
change, sponsored by Philadelphia’s City Parks Association, imposed this 
mindset onto its entrants:
For the designer, vacant land presents a tabula rasa, and offers an 
opportunity to think about possibilities – whether creating connections 
among existing elements or imagining new and innovative relationships.  
What does a city do to respond to its vacancy crisis? [sic]...What could 
Philadelphia imagine for its future, what ideas might be generated if 
we looked at the 40,000 vacant properties counted as assets, not as 
liabilities?  How might the repurposing of the land inform new ways of 
living in the urban environment? (D. Loeb, 3)
Approached from this perspective, most (though not all) of the premiated 
competition entries fall into the trap of the tabula rasa, objectifying vacant 
neighborhoods with visionary, polemical, Gesamtkunstwerke – city-scaled 
open space systems, expansive urban farms, and “new multi-story ‘structures’ 
[that] act as programmatic catalysts for the neighborhood and offer community 
space for social and educational activities” (D. Loeb, 34).  Beyond the practical 
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implausibility of these proposals – to be expected of an ideas competition – their 
diagrammatic nature creates a level of remove from the lived experience of the 
City.  Bird’s eye renderings and stark figure-grounds depict the “connections” 
between existing city fabric and proposed design solutions but fail to consider 
the messy realities of the ground plane. (Figures 05.2) 
THEORIES of FLEXIBILITY
As the ongoing recession has shown, Philadelphia is not immune to the 
vicissitudes of the national economy, and shifts in employment or speculative 
property appreciation can quickly derail the best-laid plans.  Any image must 
therefore be flexible if it is to have a sustained impact on the built environment.  A 
flexible image must embrace the realities of shrinkage while acknowledging the 
absence of a policy or design panacea.  As city economist Kirk Petshek observed 
in 1973: “One could not always be sure, in retrospect, whether the building of a 
Figure 05.2: A rendering of “Farmadelphia” - one of the URBAN VOIDS finalists - that reflects the hazards of the tabula 
rasa in its blatant disregard for the fabric or lived experience of the City. (Source: URBAN VOIDS: grounds for change)
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children’s playground, or the removal of a junkyard, or the restoration of historic 
houses nearby were in themselves responsible for the rehabilitation of an area. 
Experience in one neighborhood might not necessarily be applicable to the next” 
(Petshek, 144-45).  Petshek’s assertion holds true today, and after decades of 
planning and millions of dollars it is impossible to posit universal truths about 
redevelopment strategy.  This fact does not, however, justify inaction or suggest 
the market should be left to “sort it out,” but rather that flexibility must be the 
guiding principle.
 Franck and Stevens capture the notion of flexibility in their conception of 
“loose space,” a condition which, though tied more to insurgent spatial practice, 
is still instructive:  
Empty lots, abandoned buildings, piers, waterfronts, and tunnels – 
spaces that once had assigned functions but no longer do – possess 
similar qualities.  Here the previously established uses have become 
detached from the space leaving it open for new uses and new 
meanings…Physical deterioration can make complex the layout of the 
terrain, opening up new links and thus new opportunities.” (Franck and 
Stevens, 8-9) 
But Franck and Stevens are more interested in the participatory aspect of loose 
space than in the promise of the tabula rasa.  “Disarray and deterioration have 
benefits: they invite people to take the initiative in imagining and creating their 
own arrangements of space and finding alternative uses as, for instance, in 
empty lots and other abandoned sites” (Franck and Stevens, 21).  
 An important distinction between Franck and Stevens’s loose space 
and the flexibility I suggest is their celebration of the unobserved, which I find 
problematic.  Philadelphia’s blighted neighborhoods do not stand to benefit from 
a further relaxing of control.  Indeed, the results of decades of such municipal 
inattentiveness are immediately apparent, and are not cause for such celebration. 
 A more measured, less anarchic approach to this same idea is that of 
“everyday urbanism.”  Everyday urbanism, more a school of observation than of 
design, is generally attributed to planner Margaret Crawford.  Crawford has long 
recognized the near endless possibilities represented by generally invisible, 
quotidian spaces; “vacant lots, sidewalks, front yards, parks, and parking lots…
apparently empty of meaning, they acquire constantly changing meanings – 
social, aesthetic, political, economic – as users recognize and reinterpret them” 
(Crawford et al, 28).  Crawford and her cohort focus on the underappreciated 
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Figure 05.3: A PHS lot waiting for informal users (Photo © the author)
Figure 05.4: An ideal location for horse grazing? (Photo © the author)
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overlap of “public” and “private” property, and on what activities can and do 
take place within that overlap.
 In Philadelphia, PHS’s lot stabilization program has created ideal 
spaces for the everyday urbanist.  Though most of the stabilized lots are 
technically privately owned, deliberate breaks in the post-and-rail fences make 
the unprogrammed open spaces available for a wide range of technically 
unsanctioned uses.  (Figures 05.3-4)  As Bob Grossman, current senior director 
of PHS’s Philadelphia Green program, noted in an interview: “Most of these lots 
are privately owned so there’s not much we can do in terms of encouraging use, 
but there are plenty of examples of informal use.  People play football, graze 
horses, have parties and even weddings on these lots” (Grossman).  
 Another oft-cited example of such an approach can be found in “blotting,” 
a neologism coined by Brooklyn-based Interboro Partners.  Used to describe 
the practice of homeowners annexing adjacent lots in Detroit, blotting captures 
the everyday urbanist spirit of individuals appropriating and transforming 
urban space for their own purposes: “All over Detroit, homeowners—many of 
who have stuck it out through race riots, deindustrialization, and the resulting 
depopulation and disinvestment—are starting to spread out, expanding their 
property by gradually accumulating lots that others abandoned…in order to 
accommodate parked cars, satellite dishes, trampolines and the like” (Interboro, 
47).  From this perspective, PHS’s work and blotting represent opposite ends of 
the spectrum of everyday urbanist practice; the former allows for the temporary, 
public appropriation of publicly maintained private land, the latter the formal 
annexation of abandoned land.
 Though everyday urbanists would argue that such appropriations of 
space are nothing new, the everyday ideal has garnered increased recognition 
and currency within the fields of planning and design in recent years. “Tactical 
urbanism,” for instance, is a new frame for everyday urbanism that imbues 
such practices with an activist bent:
Improving the livability of our towns and cities commonly starts at the 
street, block or building scale.  While larger scale efforts do have their 
place, incremental, small-scale improvements are increasingly seen as a 
way to stage more substantial investments.  This approach allows a host 
of local actors to test new concepts before making substantial political 
and financial commitments.  Sometimes sanctioned, sometimes not, 
these actions are commonly referred to as “guerilla urbanism,” “pop-up 
urbanism,” “city repair,” or “D.I.Y. urbanism.” (Lydon et al, 01)
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A trek through many Philadelphia neighborhoods yields plenty of evidence of 
tactical urbanists at work: vacant lots appropriated, legally or not, for memorial 
space, an urban refuge, private parking, and occasionally for intriguingly 
indeterminate activities.  (Figures 05.5-8)
 All of the designers and theorists cited above maintain a degree of 
remove from the activities in question; acting more as documentarians than 
as participants.  Some, however, have begun to consider the broader spatial 
implications of such practice.  As architect and everyday urbanist John Kaliski 
describes:
The city’s inhabitants continue to use the elements, things, and spaces 
of the actual city.  Over time, through individual and collaborative actions, 
each city’s collection of everyday objects is reorganized, producing a 
specific and architectural spatial order that defies urban design.  Whether 
master planned or not, the strategic city is continuously reinvented and 
physically marked by everyday activities, which are manifested in the built 
environment through architecture and landscape (Crawford et al, 104).
Kaliski’s point - that individual actions can supplant and even subvert the top-
down master plan - is well taken, yet it does not provide any guidance with 
respect to the idea of an image.  How can planning engage a city’s inhabitants, 
channeling those everyday activities rather than simply staying out of the way? 
THE TOOLS of FLEXIBILITY
The aforementioned theories collectively describe an emerging discourse on 
the importance of flexibility and the role of the entrepreneurial individual in 
blighted neighborhoods.  Even so, these well-formulated descriptions stop short 
of positing an image.  An image must provide an aspirational vision of the future 
– a context for the everyday – and while everyday and tactical urbanists identify 
spatial implications, they resist taking a position on how, where, or under what 
conditions planning can aide and even amplify such individual action.  Though 
experimental, there are a range of tools, some new, some less so, that lend 
themselves to the construction of a flexible image.
 Stephen Pantalone and Justin Hollander’s recently developed “relaxed 
zoning overlay” (RZO) represents an interesting point of departure.  The 
RZO is a novel way of using the regulatory tool of zoning.  Rather than the 
traditional separation of land uses, an RZO provides a means of adapting 
blighted neighborhoods over time through the gradual incorporation of new 
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Figure 05.5: Lot as memorial (Photo © the author) Figure 05.6: Lot as urban refuge (Photo © the author)
Figure 05.7: Lot as reserved parking 
(Photo © the author)
Figure 05.8: Lot as mystery (Photo © the author)
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uses.  In high vacancy neighborhoods, Pantalone and Hollander argue, zoning’s 
overriding concern for protecting residential areas from “conflicting uses,” 
has in fact hastened neighborhood decline.  Blighted, abandoned residential 
neighborhoods have an excess supply of housing which drives down value, 
increasing the number of homeowners potentially “underwater,” and thus 
furthering abandonment.  A relaxed zoning overlay would, with community 
input, break this chain by establishing successive “triggers” that make a 
neighborhood’s zoning increasingly permissive as vacancy rates rise:
In [high vacancy areas] there may be a demand for other uses that are 
not currently zoned, such as cold storage facilities or agricultural uses.  
Currently the inflexibility of zoning restricts the ability of communities 
to quickly react to decline by expanding the legally allowable uses of 
property…The RZO addresses this issue by expanding the list of by-right 
uses in a given community when it faces declining residential demand, 
thereby providing owners the flexibility to adapt their properties to a use 
that will continue to be productive. (Pantalone and Hollander, 2)
Given that the field of city planning, and zoning in particular, is largely 
predicated on growth, recontextualizing the tools and orientation of planning to 
address decline seems entirely appropriate.  Pantalone and Hollander’s RZO is 
agnostic with respect to design, and thus represents the beginning rather than 
the end of a conversation about crafting an image for Philadelphia’s blighted 
neighborhoods.   
 While the RZO is a new and untested tool for building adaptability into 
a legal planning framework, a 1995 publication authored by the Philadelphia 
City Planning Commission suggests a more contextual strategy for creating a 
flexible image through “restructuring.” Titled Vacant Land in Philadelphia, the 
publication’s generic title and its misleadingly prosaic illustrations belie the 
compelling, design-oriented recommendations contained therein:
“Restructuring” neighborhoods refers to the process of physically 
transforming the aging, blighted, and worn out sections of the City 
into healthy, attractive, and desirable living environments for the next 
century.  This restructuring process is envisioned as a planning and urban 
design framework for rebuilding and revitalizing Philadelphia’s inner-city 
neighborhoods, particularly those that are most negatively affected by 
vacant land and buildings…A key element of neighborhood restructuring 
includes a renewed emphasis on urban design issues…Redefining the 
relationship between housing types and private open space, better 
integrating automobile use and parking into urban neighborhoods, and 
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retrofitting an aging infrastructure to accommodate new [neighborhood] 
design ideas are all part of the restructuring task. (PCPC 1995, 16)
The guidelines circumscribing restructuring promulgate an incrementalist 
approach, suggesting strategic, phased interventions on the part of the City with 
the intention of transforming blighted neighborhoods over time.  Significantly, 
the Planning Commission’s recommendations reflect a deep respect for the 
traditional urban fabric of the City, identifying the need for increased open space 
while warning that “the look and feel of the City should not be compromised by 
supporting actions to ‘suburbanize’ redeveloping neighborhoods” (PCPC 1995, 
19).  
 The bulk of the content in Vacant Land in Philadelphia is a series of 
fascinating, case studies.  Each of these case studies presents a different 
generic urban condition; “scattered vacant structures and lots” in a streetcar 
suburb, a “declining neighborhood commercial strip,” an area with “multiple 
contiguous vacant lots and deteriorated commercial structures,” and a “mixed-
use industrial area.”  (Figure 05.9) Each condition is then paired with a set of 
Figure 05.9: An uninspiring “before and after” representation of a creative approach to “restructuring” a 
blighted, high vacancy neighborhood (Source: Vacant Land in Philadelphia)
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specific strategies.  “Case Study Neighborhood ‘A’: Scattered Vacant Structures 
and Lots,” for instance, notes that in this based-on-a-true-story neighborhood, 
“the scattered pattern of vacant and occupied properties generally precludes 
the large-scale assembly of land for new development sites.  However, given 
the clustered locations of some vacant lots, limited infill construction is 
possible with a few strategic property acquisitions” (PCPC 1995, 39).  It goes 
on to recommend “side yard disposition for vacant lots,” infill housing to be 
“built at a lower residential density (recognizing that the area’s population has 
declined) by providing more open space for the residents of the new housing,” 
rehabilitation to “preserve intact residential blocks,” and “where infill housing 
on parcels assembled from vacant lots proves infeasible, vacant land should be 
‘developed’ as community-managed open space” (PCPC 1995, 43-44). 
 The Planning Commission study is replete with powerful ideas about how 
considerations of land use and urban design might be used to “restructure” 
Philadelphia’s most blighted neighborhoods.  It posits an adaptive, phased 
frame for individual actions and is very much in keeping with the notion of 
flexibility.  Unfortunately, its technical mode of representation diminishes its 
impact providing an object lesson in how the ideas underlying an image are only 
as strong as the way in which they are communicated.
THE WEST PHILADELPHIA LANDSCAPE PLAN
If the RZO is a tool, and Vacant Land in Philadelphia a promising approach, 
Anne Spirn’s multi-part West Philadelphia Landscape Plan, developed over 
twenty years ago in the late 1980s, is a roadmap to a flexible image.  The Plan 
expressly articulates what a flexible image should look like, and how it might be 
cultivated.  
 Spirn opens by anticipating the current interest in everyday urbanism 
with the assertion that “incremental improvements to the urban landscape 
made by individuals and small groups can have an enormous, cumulative effect 
on the city and how it looks and functions” (Spirn, v).  Within Spirn’s plan – 
subtitled “A Framework for Action” – she envisions a panoply of actors – public 
and private, designers and residents – as part of a much larger collaborative 
process.  Each of these individuals, Spirn’s work suggests, is operating with his 
or her own personal, aspirational image of their surroundings.  The Plan is meant 
less as a prescriptive document than as a “framework” to put these overlapping 
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images in dialogue with one another.  In a recent conversation, Spirn likened 
her framework to a jazz melody in which the underlying structure, represented 
by both the Plan itself and by Philadelphia’s regular grid and rowhouse fabric, 
provide the beat and the melody – a context for individual improvisation.  
 While it celebrates small moves, the Plan is not simply a proto-
everyday urbanist paean.  Spirn makes specific, well conceived, place-based 
recommendations, described as “visions of the future,” represented not as 
visual but as narrative renderings.  The “vision of the future” for a section 
entitled “Redesigning Small Neighborhoods” begins thusly:
Many neighborhoods in West Philadelphia look very different than they 
did a century ago or even a decade ago.  There are new gardens, outdoor 
workshops, playlots, and small parking lots between houses on blocks 
of rowhouses where once there was no outdoor space at all besides the 
street, sidewalk, and porch, and where ten years ago trashed vacant lots 
formed gaping holes between houses.  Trees now shade the sidewalks 
on most residential blocks, where the sun once baked the block like an 
over every summer. (Spirn, I-44)
This is an novel take on the more conventional approach to imaging, as 
it requires readers to place their individual images into Spirn’s evocative 
framework.  Importantly, Spirn provides an imaging toolkit in “Vacant Land: A 
Resource for Reshaping Urban Neighborhoods.” (Figure 05.10)  This section of 
the Plan provides simple, freehand representations of the range of possibilities 
in West Philadelphia’s vacant spaces.
 Description rather than depiction serves an important function within the 
West Philadelphia Landscape Plan – by providing only broad-brush “visions,” 
Spirn’s framework retains the critical flexibility I am advocating for.  Using “plan” 
in place of what I have described as an image, Spirn captures the notion:  
A plan is particularly important when resources are limited and every 
investment must count…a plan should be a vision that engenders 
excitement and inspires confidence and stimulates investment in a 
community…a plan should grow out of the place and the people who live 
there…a plan should combine both the overview and the local view…a 
plan should be dynamic and responsive to change…a framework for 
action that is open-ended and incomplete [italics added]. (Spirn, I-3-4)
 Spirn’s West Philadelphia Landscape Plan was an innovative, 
experimental plan arguably executed at the wrong time in the wrong place. 
For one, the ideas contained within lacked the benefit of a wider appreciation 
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for the everyday.  In addition, the Plan, which advocated the dissemination of 
a “Digital Database,” was developed in the last pre-Internet years.  Perhaps 
most important, in the late 1980s and early 1990s there was no political will to 
integrate these ideas into an anemic Planning Commission.  
 For all of these reasons, despite the promise of Spirn’s Plan, it did not 
have the envisioned transformative impact.  However, the recommendations 
contained within it remain fresh.  The demonstrable revival of planning in 
Philadelphia suggests that after twenty years, now is a time to revisit the tenets 
of the West Philadelphia Landscape Plan.  Furthermore, a plethora of mobile 
Figure 05.10: One of many sets of of drawings representing different potential uses for Philadelphia’s “missing teeth” 
from “Vacant Land: A Resource for Reshaping Urban Neighborhoods” (Source: West Philadelphia Landscape Plan)
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technologies, web-based tools, and a general embrace of “crowd sourcing,” 
would all breathe new life into the idea of the improvisational framework as 
flexible image.
PHILADELPHIA’S NEXT IMAGE
Fighting blight is a messy, unpredictable, interminable business.  In hindsight, 
the many policies and plans rolled out over time seem to carry the inherent 
futility of arrows fired at a moving target. This metaphor of the moving target 
can be taken literally, for as Brent Ryan observed, “the patchwork fabric of 
shrinking cities will continue to shift even with new construction.  As parts of the 
city are rebuilt, others will be abandoned” (Ryan 2010, 214).  In other words, 
blight will always exist somewhere.  In the wake of the subprime-lending crisis, 
for instance, Atlantic Magazine ran a story whose arresting title – “The Next 
Slum?” – was emblazoned above a photograph of a seemingly idyllic suburban 
streetscape.  Revisiting the anxieties of the post-World War II era, the author 
states, “a structural change is under way in the housing market – a major shift 
in the way many Americans want to live and work” (Leinberger).  As the Atlantic 
article implies, population growth and shrinkage can amount a zero-sum game 
(though as was shown in Philadelphia by the latest Census, this can be mitigated 
by immigration).  The metaphor of the moving target can also be taken more 
generally, for the factors that contribute to a neighborhood’s obsolescence, or to 
the desirability of the building stock, or to whether or not there are enough jobs 
in a community, or to the quality of educational opportunities, are myriad and 
impossible to disentangle.  
 Looking at the outcomes of redevelopment policy in Philadelphia over 
the last several decades, the balance between success and failure is undeniably 
skewed towards the latter.  In their search for a solution to blight, planners and 
policymakers alike largely missed the fact that blight in Philadelphia can never 
be solved, no matter how much money is in play, nor how big the idea.  Yet 
planners must continue to strive for new and better solutions.  And despite the 
human tendency to distance oneself from the failures of one’s predecessors, 
the narrative of Philadelphia’s fight against blight can provide a guide for what 
must be done moving forward.  
 In order to begin the work of imaging, the Planning Commission should 
revisit an unrealized recommendation from the aforementioned Vacant Land 
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in Philadelphia that the City “create an urban design vocabulary for new 
development in the City’s severely deteriorated neighborhoods.  Publish a 
catalog of urban design ideas setting forth a new vision for rebuilding these 
neighborhoods” (PCPC 1995, 38). This catalog could elaborate on Spirn’s 
“Vacant Land: A Resource for Reshaping Urban Neighborhoods,” and include 
price tags, timelines, and predictable regulatory hurdles for interventions. 
Using the Internet and mobile technology, this catalog could be easily and 
widely disseminated in ways unthinkable in the early 1990s.  By plugging these 
efforts into the ongoing district planning process, communities could begin to 
develop practicable ideas that would fit into a larger image developed by the 
Philadelphia City Planning Commission
 A further consideration of land use will be critical, though formally 
revisiting the newly overhauled zoning code is likely a nonstarter.  The core idea 
underlying the RZO, however, that the legal planning framework should adapt 
to changing conditions, must be considered as part of the district planning 
process, regardless of whether there is political will to actually think through the 
creation of such an overlay. Residents within a district should be provided with 
an opportunity to seriously consider the introduction of non-residential uses 
into a neighborhood in the service of blight mitigation.
 Even without the financial capital to pursue big plans, Philadelphia is 
in a position of relative strength.  There are nationally recognized programs 
now in place, including Philadelphia Green’s lot stabilization program and the 
Philadelphia Water Department’s new green stormwater infrastructure plan. 
The City has a network of ambitious community development corporations 
such as Asociación Puertorriqueños en Marcha, which is taking the lead on the 
construction of sustainably designed, LEED-certified affordable housing, and a 
$48 million, mixed-use, 164-unit, transit-oriented development in Eastern North 
Philadelphia.  The City has more data at its disposal, particularly with regards to 
blight, than ever before, and is more willing and able to share that data with the 
public.  A long overdue overhaul of the City’s vacant land management protocol 
promises to streamline what had been a needlessly onerous disposition process. 
New and powerful regulatory tools have empowered the City to force private 
property owners to adhere to basic maintenance requirements.  Interagency 
collaboration, long an oxymoron, is increasingly widespread, and mayoral 
support for a host of interrelated planning initiatives reflects a renewed interest 
in long term, holistic thinking.  These advances are laying the groundwork for a 
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new kind of image of the City, one that does not require a major initiative, huge 
federal subsidies, or another $300 Million bond.  The process of creating this 
image must be orchestrated by the public sector, but implementation cannot be 
the sole responsibility of the public sector, for there will never be enough money 
to accomplish the task at hand.  
 Just as this thesis took Edmund Bacon’s axiom that “the image...has the 
power” as a point of departure, so too will it end with Bacon.  His “Illustrative 
Site Plan” for the 1968 North Philadelphia Redevelopment Area Plan presents 
a true image at the district scale.  (Figure 05.11) In his words, the site plan “is 
to suggest an image of the total range of redevelopment envisioned in North 
Philadelphia...and further illustrates the nature of the physical connections 
Figure 05.11: This 1968 Illustrative Site Plan “is to suggest an image of the total range of redevelopment 
envisioned in North Philadelphia...and further illustrates the nature of the physical connections which will serve to 
link these development areas into a total environmental structure.”  (Source: North Philadelphia Redevelopment 
Area Plan)
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which will serve to link these development areas into a total environmental 
structure” (PCPC 1968, 22).  Bacon’s schematic drawing depicts blocks 
transformed, dense spines along important corridors, and new development 
nodes; it shows the fabric of North Philadelphia adapted to meet new needs 
and new circumstances.  And though it appears heavy-handed, it was not 
meant as a top-down decree, but as an aspirational framework, reliant not on 
any particular actor, but on collective action.  It is a messy, incomplete, flexible 
image. Having stepped down as Director of the Planning Commission two years 
after the publication of the North Philadelphia Redevelopment Area Plan, 
Bacon never had the opportunity to further articulate this image, but his work 
demands the consideration of Philadelphia’s next image.  
 Philadelphia’s next image must be assertive, but incremental rather 
than comprehensive.  Executed at the district scale, it should build upon the 
idea of an improvisational framework described in Spirn’s West Philadelphia 
Landscape Plan by providing space, tools, and guidance for developers and 
the next generation of everday urbanists alike.  This lightness of touch will be 
essential for ensuring the requisite flexibility. To again cite Ryan’s notion of 
“palliative planning,” the ambition underlying this new image should not be a 
totalizing solution to blight, but rather an attempt to improve the prospects for 
as many Philadelphians as possible in the name of social justice. Indeed, blight 
will always be a part of Philadelphia’s landscape, but planners must continue 
to craft new images with which to fight it.
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APPENDIX A: Personal Interviews
Glen Abrams, Manager of Strategic Policy and Coordination, Philadelphia Water Department (January 18, 2012)
Blaine Bonham, Former Executive Vice President, Pennsylvania Horticultural Society (January 26, 2012)
Santiago Burgos, Lead Organizer, American Street Empowerment Zone (November 11, 2011)
John Carpenter, Deputy Executive Director, Philadelphia Redevelopment Authorty (January 20 and 26, 2012)
Stephanie Chiorean, Environmental Planner, Philadelphia Water Department (January 09, 2012)
Dave Fecteau, Community Planner, Philadelphia City Planning Commission (January 19, 2012)
Eva Gladstein, Director of Neighborhood Transformation, 2005-07, City of Philadelphia (January 13, 2012)
Andrew Goodman, Planner, PennPraxis (January 11, 2012)
Bob Grossman, Senior Director – Philadelphia Green, Pennsylvania Horticultural Society (January 23, 2012)
Dana Hanchin, Director – Neighborhood Stabilization Program, Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority 
(January 17, 2012)
Mami Hara, Chief of Staff, Philadelphia Water Department (January 19, 2012)
Justin Hollander, Assistant Professor – Dept. of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning, Tufts University 
(March 26, 2012)
Michael Johns, General Manager of Community Development and Design, Philadelphia Housing Authority 
(January 26, 2012)
Maura Kennedy, Director of Strategic Initiatives, Department of Licenses and Inspections (January 27, 2012)
John Kromer, Director, 1992-2000, Office of Housing and Community Development (January 24, 2012)
Alan Mallach, Non-resident Senior Fellow – Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings Institution (January 25, 2012)
Deborah McColloch, Director of Housing, Office of Housing and Community Development (January 23, 2012)
Charisse Price, Business Analyst, Philadelphia Water Department (January 09, 2012)
Rick Sauer, Executive Director, Philadelphia Association of Community Development Corporations 
(January 10, 2012)
Pat Smith, Director of Neighborhood Transformation, 2001-05, City of Philadelphia (January 17, 2012)
 
Harris Steinberg, Founding Executive Director, PennPraxis (January 24, 2012) 
Joyce Wilkerson, Chief of Staff, 2000-08, City of Philadelphia (November 09, 2011)
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APPENDIX B: Research
The majority of the midcentury archival material I used was unearthed over the course of an 
overcast January afternoon in the basement of Paley Library at Temple University’s Urban 
Archives.  Established in 1967, the Urban Archives has a wealth of rare, historical documents, 
and a collection of photographs numbering over five million.  The pamphlet collection, some of 
which has been scanned and most of which is indexed online, was particularly useful.  Among 
the Urban Archives’ collection were many of the proto-renewal and renewal-era documents 
that made it into this thesis along with several reports that didn’t.  There are undoubtedly 
many treasures still to find in the basement of Paley Library.
Also of immense help was the University of Pennsylvania Schoenberg Center for Electronic Text & 
Image’s “Philadelphia Neighborhoods” website (sceti.library.upenn.edu/PhilaNeighborhoods/) 
which provides links to scanned, high-resolution versions of over eighty of the Philadelphia 
City Planning Commission’s historic redevelopment plans.   The rest of the archival material 
used was found in the Philadelphia City Planning Commission’s library, and serendipitously, in 
an unmarked cardboard box at the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority.
My account of the redevelopment strategies of the 1990s and into the NTI-era was built 
primarily on articles from the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Philadelphia Daily News, both of 
which are available through Lexis Nexis and Factiva.  These press accounts were supplemented 
by a number of edifying interviews with past and present planners and policymakers.
An internship with the Urban Design Division of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission, 
from June to August 2011, coincided with the release of Philadelphia2035, and my month at 
the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority in January 2012 provided an opportunity to work 
on Policies for the Sale and Reuse of City-Owned Property.   These personal experiences 
helped me develop an understanding of Philadelphia’s new planning tools.
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